DocketNumber: No. CA2008-03-036.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 6566
Judges: POWELL, J.
Filed Date: 12/15/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
{¶ 2} On June 3, 2000, appellant, then 11 years old, was charged with raping a six-year-old child in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} Several days later, on June 23, 2003, a new complaint was filed charging appellant, then 14, with raping a five-year-old child in violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} On June 28, 2004, appellant was again adjudicated delinquent after he attempted to escape from Mary Haven. The juvenile court, in response to appellant's latest behavior, terminated appellant's commitment to Mary Haven, ordered him to serve his previously suspended commitment to DYS on the 2003 rape charge, and ordered a sex offender registration hearing to be scheduled upon appellant's release from DYS.
{¶ 5} On July 31, 2006, appellant was paroled from DYS and placed on supervised release. On September 13, 2006, the juvenile court, over appellant's objection, held a juvenile sex offender classification hearing pursuant to former R.C.
{¶ 6} On September 22, 2006 appellant filed a notice of appeal with this court challenging the juvenile court's September 13th decision. Thereafter, in In re A.R., Warren App. No. CA2006-090-112,
{¶ 7} However, prior to our October 1, 2007 decision to reverse and remand the matter to the juvenile court to enter a proper disposition, appellant apparently completed his sex offender treatment and was discharged from any further parole obligations.1 On January 28, 2008, the juvenile court, again over appellant's objections and in order to comply with our decision reversing and remanding the matter for a new disposition, as well as to apply the *Page 4 newly-enacted classification requirements under Senate Bill 10, held another hearing where it classified appellant as a Tier III Sex Offender.
{¶ 8} Appellant now appeals the juvenile court's judgment entry classifying him as a Tier III Sex Offender, raising five assignments of error.
{¶ 9} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 10} "THE WARREN COUNTY JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED A NEW DISPOSITION IN [A.R.'S] CASE AFTER HE HAD COMPLETED HIS JUVENILE DISPOSITION AND WAS DISCHARGED FROM PAROLE."
{¶ 11} Appellant, although not explicit in his arguments, essentially argues that the juvenile court erred when it "resentenced" him on remand as a Tier III Sex Offender because (1) the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to classify him after he had already completed his original, although void, disposition, and because (2) he had a reasonable expectation of finality once he had completed his disposition, and therefore, the juvenile court's "resentencing" violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. We disagree.
{¶ 12} Initially, appellant argues that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to "resentence" him because he had already completed his original disposition in May 2007, which we found void in his then pending appeal. See In re A.R., Warren App. No. CA2006-090-112,
{¶ 13} Pursuant to the doctrine of the law of the case as summarized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Nolan v. Nolan (1984),
{¶ 14} Appellant, in support of his claim that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction to hold a hearing and to classify him as a Tier III Sex Offender, relies on In re Cross,
{¶ 15} In Cross, the juvenile court re-imposed a minor's suspended sentence and committed him to a DYS facility after his release from probation and the successful completion of his disposition. Id. at ¶ 28-29. The Ohio Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals decision to re-impose the suspended sentence, found that "the completion of probation signals the end of the court's jurisdiction over a delinquent juvenile," and concluded by noting that, "[w]hen the court ended Cross's probation, it ended its ability to make further dispositions as to Cross on that delinquency count." Id.
{¶ 16} In this case, however, and unlike Cross, the juvenile court did not attempt to re-impose a suspended sentence on appellant. Instead, the juvenile court was merely correcting an error and following our mandate from In re A.R. in which we remanded his case to the juvenile court so it could enter the proper classification in accordance with former R.C.
{¶ 17} Appellant also argues that State v. Bezak,
{¶ 18} Here, although it is true that appellant completed the terms of his disposition, much like the defendant who completed his sentence inBezak, the state is not attempting to increase appellant's punishment by having him recommitted to DYS, placed on probation, or, as appellant claims, to "resentence" him. Instead, the juvenile court is merely correcting its earlier classification error and applying the newly-enacted Senate Bill 10. As a result, the juvenile court was not increasing appellant's punishment or "resentencing" him after his classification as was found impermissible under Bezak. Therefore, we again find that the ruling in Bezak is distinguishable from the case at bar.
{¶ 19} Appellant also essentially argues that the juvenile court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Ohio State Constitutions by following our mandate to "resentence" him accordingly. This argument lacks merit.
{¶ 20} The Double Jeopardy Clause protects persons from "(1) ``a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,' (2) ``a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,' and (3) ``multiple punishments for the same offense.'" State v. Roberts,
{¶ 21} Contrary to appellant's claim, the provisions of Senate Bill 10 are not meant to punish a defendant or juvenile delinquent, but instead, are civil in nature and are used to protect the safety of the public.State v. Williams, Warren App. No. CA2008-02-029,
{¶ 22} Finally, it should be noted that even if we had not remanded his case to the juvenile court to classify appellant, Senate Bill 10 requires the re-classification of all offenders who were classified prior to January 1, 2008. In re Smith, Allen App. No. 1-07-58,
{¶ 23} Appellant's remaining assignments of error all deal with the constitutionality of Senate Bill 10, and therefore, will be addressed together.
{¶ 24} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 25} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED SENATE BILL 10 TO [A.R.], AS THE APPLICATION OF SENATE BILL TO [A.R.] VIOLATES HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND GUARANTEED BY THE
{¶ 26} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 27} "THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SENATE BILL 10 TO [A.R.] VIOLATES THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE RETROACTIVITY CLAUSE OF SECTION
{¶ 28} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶ 29} "THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SENATE BILL 10 TO [A.R.] VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE THAT IS INHERENT IN OHIO'S CONSTITUTION." *Page 8
{¶ 30} Assignment of Error No. 5:
{¶ 31} "THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SENATE BILL 10 VIOLATES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE RETROACTIVITY CLAUSE OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."
{¶ 32} In his remaining assignments of error, appellant argues that the application of Senate Bill 10 violates various constitutional provisions; specifically (1) the right to Due Process guaranteed by the
{¶ 33} Further, and as an initial matter, with respect to the constitutionality of an enactment of the Ohio General Assembly, it is well-established that "statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality," and therefore, we begin our analysis with the strong presumption that Senate Bill 10 is constitutional. State v. Cook,
{¶ 36} Next, appellant claims that Senate Bill 10 is unconstitutional and violates his right to Due Process because it removed the juvenile court's discretion to determine his appropriate classification on a case-by-case basis, as was required under former R.C.
{¶ 37} However, although not explicitly in his argument, appellant implicitly argues that the juvenile court's failure to use its discretion in classifying him as a Tier III Sex Offender under Senate Bill 10 was in error. We agree, and therefore, even though we determined that appellant's constitutional rights were not violated, we nonetheless find that the matter must be reversed and remanded to the juvenile court.
{¶ 38} In this case, the juvenile court, albeit without the guidance of In re G.E.S., mistakenly believed that it was required to classify appellant as a Tier III Sex Offender due to his prior adjudication for rape.2 However, in light of our adoption of the Ninth District Court of Appeals' finding in In re G.E.S., which determined that Senate Bill 10 provided the juvenile court with full discretion in classifying a delinquent child, we find the juvenile court erred when it determined that it was required to classify appellant as a Tier III Sex Offender based solely on his prior adjudication for rape. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing and to use its full discretion in classifying appellant under Senate Bill 10, and in accordance with the law of this state.
{¶ 39} Judgment reversed and remanded.
BRESSLER, P.J., and YOUNG, J., concur.