State v. Pierce

[Cite as State v. Pierce, 2017-Ohio-4223.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 13-16-36
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
URIAH L. PIERCE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court
Trial Court No. CRB16-0321AB
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 12, 2017
APPEARANCES:
James M. Ruhlen for Appellant
Richard H. Palau for Appellee
Case No. 13-16-36
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Uriah L. Pierce (“Pierce”) appeals the judgment
of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court, alleging that his convictions for
obstructing official business and resisting arrest were not supported by sufficient
evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons
set forth below, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 9, 2016, Lawrence Blackful (“Blackful”)—who was in
Tiffin, Ohio—had a FaceTime conversation with his father. Tr. 82-83, 97. During
this conversation, Blackful was “threatening to hang himself” and had “something
tied around his neck.” Tr. 56, 83. The father, fearful that Blackful was going to
harm himself, called the police to report that Blackful may attempt to commit
suicide. Id. Sergeant Laverne Keefe (“Keefe”) and Officer Eric Aller (“Aller”)
were dispatched to perform a welfare check on Blackful. Tr. 57. At roughly 3:00
a.m., the police arrived at Pierce’s house, which is where Blackful was reportedly
staying. Tr. 57. As Keefe and Aller approached the house, Keefe observed a
lighted room in the second story of the house and heard a male screaming. Id.
Aller knocked on the front door. Tr. 57, 98.
{¶3} Pierce opened the front door, told Aller that he was not Blackful, and
said that Blackful was upstairs. Tr. 98-99. Aller then asked Pierce to go inside
and get Blackful. Tr. 99. At this time, Pierce agreed to cooperate and returned
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into the house to get Blackful. Id. While Pierce was inside the house, Aller
radioed dispatch to get a physical description of Blackful. Tr. 100. Dispatch
responded, informing Aller that Blackful was “[a]pproximately 5’6, 130 pounds,
black hair, brown eyes, and African-American.” Id. This description closely
matched the appearance of Pierce, and the police officers began to wonder if
Pierce was Blackful. Tr. 101.
{¶4} When Pierce returned to the front door several minutes later, the
police asked him if he was the subject, Lawrence Blackful. Id. Pierce said, “No.
That subject is upstairs and he doesn’t want to talk to you guys.” Id. Keefe then
asked Pierce if they could go inside to speak with Blackful, but Pierce refused to
let them in the house. Id. At this point, both Keefe and Aller believed that Pierce
was, in fact, Blackful. Tr. 60, 101. At trial, Aller testified that Pierce seemed to
be behaving deceptively in this interaction. Tr. 101. Keefe then asked Pierce to
identify himself and explained that he needed to provide this information because
the police were there to investigate a complaint. Tr. 101. Keefe informed Pierce
that he could be arrested if he did not comply with the police. Tr. 72, 101.
{¶5} At this time, Pierce refused to identify himself to the police, darted
into the house, and attempted to shut the door behind him. Tr. 61, 84, 101-102.
Keefe reached out and stopped the door from closing. Tr. 61. Keefe and Aller
pushed the door open and entered the house. Tr. 61, 102. Officer Rebecca Timm
(“Timm”), who had arrived at the scene shortly after Keefe and Aller had gotten
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there, saw Keefe and Aller enter the house. Tr. 84. Timm then entered into the
house where Keefe and Aller were attempting to subdue Pierce. Tr. 84-85. At
trial, Keefe described what happened after he entered the house, saying,
When I grabbed him, he fell to the ground. He tried to pull
away from me. And in the process, he fell to the ground. We
had a very hard time trying to control him in the way that he
was moving, rolling around, pulling his arms away from us.
And I just kept yelling at him, ‘Quit resisting arrest. You’re
under arrest.’
Tr. 61. During this altercation, Pierce was saying, “Get off me.” Tr. 103. Pierce
also said, “B****, don’t touch me, you ain’t even cute” to Timm. Tr. 62, 103.
{¶6} Timm and Aller then assisted Keefe in handcuffing Pierce. Tr. 86.
After the officers had subdued Pierce, a woman came down the stairs. Tr. 63.
When he saw her, Keefe pointed to Pierce and asked the woman if she could
identify him. Id. Pierce then called out, “Don’t tell them s***.” Id. The woman,
however, was unable to identify Pierce, saying she only knew him as “Squiddy.”
Id. After Pierce had been removed from the house, Blackful came downstairs at
Keefe’s request and identified himself. Tr. 64. The police then completed the
welfare check. Tr. 87.
{¶7} On March 9, 2016, Pierce was charged with obstruction of official
business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A) and resisting arrest in violation of R.C.
2921.33(A). Doc. 1, 2. The jury trial was set for November 2, 2016. Tr. 1. At
trial, Keefe, Aller, and Timm testified as to what they had witnessed on that night.
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Tr. 54, 80, 95. Pierce was found guilty and sentenced on November 2, 2016. Doc.
52. On November 29, 2016, Pierce filed a notice of appeal. Doc. 56. On appeal,
Pierce raises three assignments of error, which read as follow:
First Assignment of Error
The record contains insufficient evidence to support appellant’s
conviction for obstructing official business.
Second Assignment of Error
The record contains insufficient evidence to support appellant’s
conviction for resisting arrest.
Third Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction for obstructing official business and
resisting arrest were both against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
We will consider these assignments of error in the order they were presented in the
appellant’s brief.
First Assignment of Error
{¶8} In this assignment of error, Pierce argues that his conviction for
obstructing official business is not supported by sufficient evidence. In particular,
Pierce asserts that the prosecution did not present evidence that proves he
performed an affirmative act that “hamper[ed] or impede[d] a public official in the
performance of the public official’s lawful duties.” R.C. 2921.31(A). Pierce
argues that refusing to identify himself is an omission and not an act within the
meaning of R.C. 2921.31(A). On appeal, the State points to Pierce’s refusal to
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identify himself to the police and his flight into the house as acts that satisfy this
element. Pierce, however, claims that he was within his rights in choosing not to
identify himself and in returning into his home.
Standard of Review
{¶9} “An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Walters, 3d
Dist. Defiance No. 4-16-17, 2017-Ohio-793, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by
state constitutional amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St. 3d 89,
684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4. Under the sufficiency of the evidence standard,
“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Potts,
2016-Ohio-5555, 69 N.E.3d 1227, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting Jenks at paragraph two
of the syllabus.
{¶10} “Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict is a
question of law.” State v. Schaeffer, 2015-Ohio-3531, 41 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 14 (3d
Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
For this reason, “[i]n deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve
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evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions
reserved for the trier of fact.” Potts at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Jones, 1st Dist.
Hamilton Nos. C–120570 and C–120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33, citing State v.
Williams, 197 Ohio App. 3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, 968 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).
{¶11} R.C. 2921.31(A) defines the crime of obstructing official business
and reads as follows:
No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to
prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official
of any authorized act within the public official's official capacity,
shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the
performance of the public official's lawful duties.
R.C. 2921.31(A). Thus, to obtain a conviction for obstructing official business,
the State had to provide evidence for five essential elements:
(1) an act by the defendant; (2) done with the purpose to
prevent, obstruct, or delay a public official; (3) that actually
hampers or impedes a public official; ([4]) while the official is
acting in the performance of a lawful duty; and (5) the
defendant does so act without a privilege to do so. R.C. 2921.31.
State v. Dice, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-04-41, 2005-Ohio-2505, ¶ 19, citing R.C.
2921.31(A). We now turn to the record to determine whether Pierce’s conviction
was supported by sufficient evidence.
Legal Analysis
{¶12} Regarding the first element, Pierce argues that R.C. 2921.31(A)
requires the defendant to have committed an affirmative act to be guilty of
obstructing official business and that refusing to provide the police with his
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identification upon request does not qualify as an action within the meaning of the
statute. As to this particular argument, Pierce is largely correct. “Ohio courts
have consistently held that in order to violate the obstructing official business
statute a defendant must engage in some affirmative or overt act * * *.” State v.
Crowell, 189 Ohio App. 3d 468, 2010-Ohio-4917, 938 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 11 (2d
Dist.), quoting State v. Harrell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21736, 2007-Ohio-
4550, ¶ 12. “[O]ne cannot obstruct official business by doing nothing.” Garfield
Hts. v. Simpson, 82 Ohio App. 3d 286, 291, 611 N.E.2d 892, 896 (8th Dist.1992).
Failure to give the police requested information is generally viewed as an omission
rather than as an overt act. State v. Prestel, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20822,
2005-Ohio-5236, ¶ 16; State v. Justice, 4th Dist. Pike No. 99CA631, 1999 WL
1125113, 5 (Nov. 16, 1999); Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 187 Ohio App. 3d 786, 2010-
Ohio-2208, 933 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.); State v. McCrone, 63 Ohio App. 3d
831, 835, 580 N.E.2d 468, 470-471, (9th Dist.1989); Middletown v. Hollon, 156
Ohio App. 3d 565, 2004-Ohio-1502, 807 N.E.2d 945, ¶ 33-34 (12th Dist.).
{¶13} However, Pierce’s conduct went beyond choosing not to answer the
police’s questions and moved into the realm of affirmative action when he decided
to flee into the house in the midst of a police investigation and attempted to close
the door on the officers.
[W]hile Ohio courts have concluded that the mere refusal to
answer questions does not constitute an ‘act,’ it has been further
held that where an individual ‘also takes affirmative actions to
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hamper or impede the police from finding out his or her identity,
the defendant may be guilty of obstructing official business.’
State v. Brickner-Latham, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-05-26, 2006-Ohio-609, ¶ 27.
See State v. Faber, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-01, 2015-Ohio-3720, ¶ 31. “Courts
have found evidence sufficient to sustain convictions for obstructing official
business where a defendant fled from an officer's lawful request for an
investigatory detention.” State v. Watson, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-09-01, 2009-
Ohio-6713, ¶ 35, citing State v. Certain, 180 Ohio App. 3d 457, 2009-Ohio-148,
905 N.E.2d 1259 (4th Dist.); State v. Dunfee, 4th Dist. Athens No. 02CA37, 2003-
Ohio-5970.
{¶14} In this case, the police were attempting to make contact with
Blackful for the purpose of performing a welfare check. Once they received a
description of Blackful from dispatch, the police had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that Pierce was Blackful because Pierce closely fit the description they
received. Tr. 60, 86, 100. See State v. Kates, 169 Ohio App. 3d 766, 2006-Ohio-
6779, 865 N.E.2d 66, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.). Based on this reasonable suspicion, Keefe
sought additional information regarding Pierce’s identity for the purpose of
confirming whether they had successfully made contact with the subject of their
welfare check. Tr. 67, 70-71. Since Pierce’s identity appeared to be essential to
this police investigation, Keefe warned Pierce that “if he didn’t identify himself,
he was going to be arrested * * *.” Tr. 72. At this time, Pierce was being lawfully
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detained by the police and had notice of his detention through Keefe’s warning.
Tr. 70-72. All three police officers testified at trial that Pierce, after he had heard
Keefe’s warning, fled into the house, attempted to shut the door, struggled to
escape from police custody, and ordered another person in the house not to give
the police information about his identity. This testimony is sufficient to provide
evidentiary support for the affirmative act element of this offense.
{¶15} For the second element, Pierce’s actions demonstrate an intent to
prevent the police from obtaining the information that was necessary to conduct a
welfare check on Blackful. All three officers testified that Pierce “darted” into the
house and attempted to shut the front door. Tr. 60, 84, 102-103. Keefe also
testified that Pierce told another person in the house not to give the police any
information about his identity. Tr. 63. See Dice, supra, at ¶ 22. Regarding the
third element, Pierce’s actions did impede the police investigation as the officers
had to subdue Pierce and undertake additional investigatory steps to perform the
welfare check on Blackful. Tr. 61-62, 63-64. See State v. Davis, 140 Ohio
App.3d 751, 753, 749 N.E.2d 322, 323-324 (1st Dist.2000). For the fourth
element, the actions of the police were unquestionably in furtherance of a lawful
duty as all three officers were on patrol and were responding to a complaint
relayed to them by dispatch at the time of this incident. Tr. 56-57, 82-82, 99.
Fifth, there is no information in the record and no allegation on appeal that
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suggests Pierce was privileged to act in this manner. Brickner-Latham, supra, at ¶
28.
{¶16} Since the State provided evidence for each of the essential elements
of this crime that, if believed, could persuade a reasonable trier of fact that Pierce
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, Pierce’s conviction for obstructing official
business is supported by sufficient evidence. His first assignment of error is,
therefore, overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶17} Here, Pierce claims that his conviction for resisting arrest is not
supported by sufficient evidence. He focuses this argument on the lawfulness of
his arrest. In this case, Pierce was ostensibly arrested for committing the offense
of obstructing official business. Under his first assignment of error, Pierce asserts
that he did not commit the crime of obstructing official business by failing to
identify himself or by fleeing into his home. Pursuant to this argument, Pierce
challenges the lawfulness of his arrest on the grounds that no reasonable basis
existed for believing that he had committed the crime of obstructing official
business.
Standard of Review
{¶18} We here reincorporate the general standard of review that governs
sufficiency of the evidence challenges as set forth under the first assignment of
error above. We add to this general standard the essential elements for the
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conviction challenged under this assignment of error, which is for the offense of
resisting arrest. Under R.C. 2921.33(A), the State had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Pierce “[1] recklessly or by force, [2] * * * resist[ed] or
interfere[d] with [3] a lawful arrest * * *. R.C. 2921.33(A). We now turn to the
record to determine whether Pierce’s conviction for resisting arrest was supported
by sufficient evidence.
Legal Analysis
{¶19} For the first element, Pierce employed force against the police.
“‘Force’ is defined as any violence, compulsion or constraint physically exerted by
any means upon or against a person or thing.” Dice, supra, at ¶ 27, quoting R.C.
2901.01(1). At trial, all three officers testified that Pierce forcibly tried to prevent
Keefe from entering the house, struggled with all three officers as they arrested
him, and attempted to break free from their grasp. Tr. 61-62, 84-86, 102-103.
{¶20} As to the second element, Pierce used force for the purpose of
resisting the police officers’ efforts to arrest him. Keefe testified that he told
Pierce that he was under arrest and repeatedly instructed Pierce to stop resisting
the police. Tr. 61-62. The three officers also testified that Pierce, in spite of these
warnings, attempted to evade the police and break free from the officers when they
were trying to handcuff him. Tr. 62, 84, 102-103. Compare State v. Carroll, 162
Ohio App. 3d 672, 2005-Ohio-4048, 834 N.E.2d 843, ¶ 18.
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{¶21} Third, “[a]n arrest is ‘lawful’ if the surrounding circumstances would
give a reasonable police officer cause to believe that an offense has been or is
being committed.” State v. Blair, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24784, 2012-Ohio-
1847, ¶ 8, citing State v. Hurst, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C–880706, 1989 WL
140010 (Nov. 22, 1989). See State v. Sansalone, 71 Ohio App. 3d 284, 285–286,
593 N.E.2d 390 (1st Dist.1991); City of Parma Heights v. Kaplan, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 55108, 1989 WL 30584 (Mar. 30, 1989). The police had detained
Pierce because they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was the subject
of their welfare check. Tr. 100. Keefe had informed Pierce that he would be
arrested if he failed to comply with their investigation, giving Pierce notice that he
was being detained. Tr. 72. Since Pierce was lawfully detained, Pierce committed
the offense of obstructing official business when he fled from their presence.
Thus, the police had reasonable cause to believe that Pierce was committing a
crime and, therefore, had legal grounds to arrest him. Tr. 69-74.
{¶22} Since the prosecution presented evidence at trial for each of these
essential elements, Pierce’s conviction for resisting arrest is supported by
sufficient evidence. Thus, his second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶23} In this assignment of error, Pierce argues that both of his convictions
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Here, Pierce largely reiterates
the arguments put forward under his sufficiency of the evidence challenges. He
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contends that the manifest weight of the evidence does not support the finding that
he committed the crime of obstructing official business because refusing to
provide identification to the police is an omission and is not an affirmative act as
required by R.C. 2921.31(A). Based on this argument, he then asserts that a
finding that is consistent with the manifest weight of the evidence on his
obstruction of official business charge deprives his arrest of a reasonable basis,
making his arrest unlawful and his conviction for resisting arrest also against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review
{¶24} “Unlike our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate
court's function when reviewing the weight of the evidence is to determine
whether the greater amount of credible evidence supports the verdict.” State v.
Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 73 (3d Dist.), citing Thompkins, supra. In
the manifest weight analysis, “the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror.’”
Thompkins, supra, at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S. Ct.
2211, 2218, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652, 661 (1982).
The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and
all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a
new trial ordered.
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State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721 (1983).
“Only in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court's judgment.” State v.
Haller, 2012–Ohio–5233, 982 N.E.2d 111, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter,
131 Ohio St. 3d 67, 2011–Ohio–6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119.
Legal Analysis
{¶25} In the sufficiency of the evidence analysis, we reviewed the evidence
presented by the prosecution in support of each of the essential elements of both
offenses. We here reincorporate the evidence presented as part of that earlier
analysis. Since the appellant argues again that his refusal to identify himself was
not an act but an omission, we reiterate our previous determination that Pierce’s
conduct included several affirmative actions that impeded the police investigation.
Thus, the jurors, in finding Pierce guilty of obstructing official business, did not
reach a verdict that was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Since Pierce
committed the offense of obstructing official business in the presence of the
police, the police had reasonable grounds to arrest him, making this arrest lawful.
Thus, the jurors did not enter a verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence
when they found him guilty of the offense of resisting arrest.
{¶26} As we examine the testimony presented at trial, we also note that the
different accounts provided by the three police officers were consistent. The
material facts contained in the testimony of each of these officers were
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corroborated by the testimony of the other officers. Further, we do not see any
evidence in the record that the jury lost its way and committed a miscarriage of
justice by returning a verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence. Since
neither of Pierce’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence,
his third assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶27} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court is
affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
/hls
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