State v. Gray

[Cite as State v. Gray, 2015-Ohio-4723.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
: Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs- :
:
MARION GRAY, JR. : Case No. 15CA74
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2007CR0560
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 12, 2015
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
DANIEL M. ROGERS MARION GRAY, JR., Pro Se
38 South Park Street Inmate No. 532-025
Mansfield, OH 44902 Madison Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 740
London, OH 43140-0740
Richland County, Case No. 15CA74 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On July 20, 2007, a jury found appellant, Marion Gray, Jr., guilty of one
count of felony murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02, one count of felonious assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.11, and two counts of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02. The
verdicts were filed on July 23, 2007. By sentencing entry filed July 24, 2007, the trial
court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of seventeen years to life.
{¶2} Appellant appealed, and this court affirmed appellant's convictions in State
v. Gray, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2007-CA-64, 2008-Ohio-6345. However, this court
reconsidered appellant's case in light of the Supreme Court of Ohio's ruling in State v.
Colon, 119 Ohio St.3d 204, 2008-Ohio-3749, and vacated appellant's robbery
convictions because the indictments failed to state the necessary mens rea for each
crime. State v. Gray, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2007-CA-0064, 2009-Ohio-455. On
remand, the trial court vacated appellant's convictions for the two robbery counts and
resentenced him to an aggregate term of fifteen years to life, fifteen years on the felony
murder conviction and seven years on the felonious assault conviction, to be served
concurrently (March 10, 2009).
{¶3} Appellant appealed again, and this court held felony murder and felonious
assault were allied offenses of similar import and the case was remanded to the trial
court for resentencing. State v. Gray, 5th Dist. Richland No. 09-CA-50, 2010-Ohio-
1139. On remand, the trial court again resentenced appellant to a term of fifteen years
to life on the felony murder conviction, but did not impose an additional sentence on the
felonious assault conviction because it was an allied offense of felony murder (June 15,
2010). The resentencing hearing was held via video conference.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA74 3
{¶4} Appellant appealed again, and this court held the trial court erred in
conducting a resentencing hearing by video conference over appellant's objections and
without obtaining a waiver. State v.Gray, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2010-CA-0089, 2011-
Ohio-4570. On remand, the trial court once again resentenced appellant to fifteen years
to life on the felony murder charge (October 19, 2011).
{¶5} Appellant appealed again, and this court held the resentencing entry was
not a final appealable order because it failed to "include the fact of the conviction on
Count Four as required by Crim. R. 32(C)." State v. Gray, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2011-
CA-112, 2012-Ohio-3796, ¶ 14. On remand, the trial court filed a nunc pro tunc
resentencing entry to correct the deficiency (May 9, 2013).
{¶6} Appellant appealed again (Case No. 2013CA0052), and this court
dismissed appellant's appeal for want of prosecution (September 23, 2013).
{¶7} On April 13, 2015, appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate void sentence,
claiming his sentence was contrary to law because it included an order of restitution, did
not include a sentence for the allied offense of felonious assault and therefore his
conviction for felony murder could not stand, and did not include reasons for the findings
of the trial court's sentence. By judgment entry filed July 23, 2015, the trial court treated
appellant's motion as a motion for postconviction relief and overruled the motion, finding
the motion was untimely and was barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶8} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
Richland County, Case No. 15CA74 4
I
{¶9} "TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPLIED THE
WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW AND HELD THAT THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE VOID SENTENCE WAS A POSTCONVICTION PETITION UNDER R.C.
2953.21."
II
{¶10} "TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE FELONY MURDER CONVICTION
DESPITE THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES AND
CONTROLLING CASE AUTHORITIES."
{¶11} Preliminarily, we note this case comes to us on the accelerated calendar.
App.R. 11.1, which governs accelerated calendar cases, provides in pertinent part the
following:
(E) Determination and judgment on appeal
The appeal will be determined as provided by App. R. 11.1. It shall
be sufficient compliance with App. R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason
for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary
form.
The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be
published in any form.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA74 5
{¶12} One of the important purposes of the accelerated calendar is to enable an
appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision more quickly than in a case on
the regular calendar where the briefs, facts, and legal issues are more complicated.
Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Association, 11 Ohio App.3d 158 (10th Dist.1983).
{¶13} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned
rules.
I, II
{¶14} Appellant claims the trial court erred in determining his motion to vacate
void sentence was a motion for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21, and erred in
overruling the motion. We disagree.
{¶15} In his April 13, 2015 pro se motion to vacate void sentence, appellant
argued his sentence was contrary to law for the following reasons: (1) it included an
order of restitution; (2) it did not include a sentence for the allied offense of felonious
assault and therefore his conviction for felony murder could not stand; and (3) it did not
include reasons for the findings of the trial court's sentence. We note the motion
appears to be a pieced together compilation of various other briefs and/or motions.
{¶16} By judgment entry filed July 23, 2015, the trial court treated appellant's
motion as a motion for postconviction relief and overruled the motion, finding the motion
was untimely and was barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶17} As we can glean from appellant's pro se appellate brief, he complains of
two issues: (1) his motion to vacate void sentence was not a petition for postconviction
relief; and (2) he was not sentenced for the allied offense of felonious assault and
therefore his conviction for felony murder cannot stand.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA74 6
{¶18} In State v. Sturkey, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2006-0087, 2007-Ohio-
5701, ¶ 12, this court found motions to vacate sentence are postconviction relief
motions and are bound by the statutory time limitations of R.C. 2953.21. Under R.C.
2953.21(A)(2), a motion for postconviction relief "shall be filed no later than three
hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of
appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication."
{¶19} The trial transcript was filed in the original direct appeal on November 16,
2007, and appellant filed his motion to vacate void sentence on April 13, 2015, more
than six years later. Even if we were to consider appellant's final appeal from the May
9, 2013 nunc pro tunc resentencing entry and this court's dismissal of the appeal for
want of prosecution on September 23, 2013, the motion to vacate void sentence was
untimely filed. We find appellant does not meet any exception found in R.C. 2953.23(A)
for the untimely filing.
{¶20} In addition, we concur with the trial court's analysis that the doctrine of res
judicata applies in this case. Although appellant appealed the trial court's May 9, 2013
nunc pro tunc resentencing entry, this court dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution. Res judicata is defined as "[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the
merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action." Grava v. Parkman
Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 1995-Ohio-331, syllabus.
{¶21} Also, we find appellant's argument, that because a sentence was not
imposed for the felonious assault conviction and therefore his conviction for felony
murder cannot stand, to be without merit. In State v. Gray, 5th Dist. Richland No. 09-
Richland County, Case No. 15CA74 7
CA-50, 2010-Ohio-1139, this court found the felony murder conviction and the felonious
assault conviction were allied offenses. Although appellant can legally be convicted of
both, he can only be sentenced on one. "Where the same conduct by defendant can be
construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be
convicted of only one." R.C. 2941.25(A). See State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319,
2010-Ohio-2.
{¶22} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in treating appellant's
motion to vacate void sentence as a motion for post-conviction relief, and did not err in
overruling the motion.
{¶23} Assignments of Error I and II are denied.
{¶24} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Wise, J. concur.
SGF/sg 1027
Richland County, Case No. 15CA74 8
Hoffman, P.J., concurring
{¶25} I concur in the majority’s analysis and disposition of Appellant’s
assignments of error.
{¶26} I write separately only to clarify I do not believe all motions to vacate
sentence are post-conviction relief motions bound by the statutory time limitations of
R.C. 2953.21. Only those based upon an alleged violation of constitutional rights are so
bound.1 A post sentence motion to vacate a sentence can be based upon a claim the
sentence was illegal per statutory authority as opposed to a constitutional deprivation.
Such type motion would not be barred by res judicata and can be raised at any time.
{¶27} Because I find the arguments raised in Appellant’s motion to vacate
sentence do not render his sentence statutorily illegal and thereby void, I agree they are
both untimely and barred by res judicata.
________________________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
1 State v. Sturkey, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2006-0087, 2007-Ohio-5701, involved a
claim of violation of the constitutional right to counsel.