State v. Stauffer

[Cite as State v. Stauffer, 2016-Ohio-159.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
AUGLAIZE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 2-15-09
v.
ROGER J. STAUFFER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2006-CR-0040
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: January 19, 2016
APPEARANCES:
Edwin A. Pierce for Appellant
Joseph A. Benavidez for Appellee
Case No. 2-15-09
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the May 5, 2015
judgment entry of the Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas granting
defendant-appellee’s, Roger J. Stauffer (“Stauffer”), Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief
from judgment, vacating the trial court’s previous judgment classifying Stauffer a
sexual predator, and classifying Stauffer a sexually oriented offender. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} Under a negotiated plea agreement, Stauffer waived prosecution by
indictment, and the State, on March 8, 2006, filed a bill of information charging
Stauffer with Count One of attempted pandering obscenity involving a minor in
violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and 2907.321(A)(1), a third-degree felony, and
Count Two of pandering obscenity involving a minor in violation of R.C.
2907.321(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony. (Doc. Nos. 8, 7, 1). The alleged events
giving rise to the bill of information took place between March 8, 2004 and
August 31, 2005. (See Doc. No. 1). Stauffer agreed to and, on March 8, 2006, did
plead guilty to the two counts in the bill of information. (Doc. Nos. 8, 9). The
trial court found Stauffer guilty of Counts One and Two. (Doc. No. 9). Also
under the plea agreement, Stauffer “stipulate[d] to findings of sexual predator
status.” (Doc. No. 8).
{¶3} On May 1, 2006, the trial court held a sexual-offender classification
hearing and classified Stauffer a sexual predator. (Doc. Nos. 23, 70). The trial
-2-
Case No. 2-15-09
court also held a sentencing hearing that day, at which it sentenced Stauffer to five
years of community-control sanctions. (Id.). The trial court filed its judgment
entry of sexual-predator classification and sentence on May 1, 2006, followed by a
nunc pro tunc entry on May 5, 2010. (Id.).
{¶4} On March 27, 2015, Stauffer filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief
from judgment, requesting “that his classification as a sexual offender be modified
from a sexual predator finding.” (Doc. No. 80). On April 30, 2015, the trial court
held a hearing on Stauffer’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion. (See Apr. 30, 2015 Tr. at 3).
{¶5} On May 5, 2015, the trial court filed a judgment entry granting
Stauffer’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion. (Doc. No. 87). Specifically, the trial court
vacated its previous judgment classifying Stauffer a sexual predator and classified
him a sexually oriented offender. (Id.).
{¶6} The State filed a notice of appeal on June 2, 2015. (Doc. No. 92). It
raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted
defendant/appellee’s Civil Rule 60(B) motion to reclassify
defendant/appellee’s sex offender registration status in
contravention of Ohio Revised Code §2950.09(D)(2), effective
July 31, 2003.
{¶7} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the version of R.C.
2950.09(D)(2) in effect at the time Stauffer committed the offenses and was
classified a sexual predator prohibits the trial court’s removal of Stauffer’s sexual-
-3-
Case No. 2-15-09
predator classification. Therefore, the State argues, the trial court lacked the
authority to remove Stauffer’s sexual-predator classification and reclassify him a
sexually oriented offender. The State does not offer an alternative argument
concerning the merits of the trial court’s determination under Civ.R. 60(B).
Accordingly, the sole issue before us is whether the trial court had the authority to
remove Stauffer’s sexual-predator classification and reclassify him a sexually
oriented offender. We conclude that it did not.
{¶8} The history of sexual-offender laws in Ohio is well-documented. See
State v. Blankenship, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2015-Ohio-4624, ¶ 9, citing State v.
Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 3-28. Relevant to this case, R.C.
2950.09(D)(2) went into effect on July 31, 2003 as part of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5
(“S.B. 5”), which amended R.C. Chapter 2950, the Sexual Offender Registration
and Notification Law, also known as Megan’s Law. State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio
St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, ¶ 1, 20; State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St. 3d 344, 2011-
Ohio-3374, ¶ 37. That version of R.C. 2950.09(D)(2), which was in effect at the
time Stauffer committed the offenses and was classified a sexual predator,
provided, in relevant part:
If an offender who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a
sexually oriented offense is classified a sexual predator pursuant to
division (A) of this section or has been adjudicated a sexual predator
relative to the offense as described in division (B) or (C) of this
-4-
Case No. 2-15-09
section, * * * the classification or adjudication of the offender as a
sexual predator is permanent and continues in effect until the
offender’s death and in no case shall the classification or
adjudication be removed or terminated.
R.C. 2950.09(D)(2) (2004-2006).1 Under that version of R.C. 2950.09(D)(2), “if
an offender is classified as a sexual predator, the classification remains permanent,
except in limited circumstances.”2 Ferguson at ¶ 20, citing former R.C.
2950.09(D)(2) and (F), 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6698, 6701-6702. R.C.
2950.09(D)(2) was repealed effective January 1, 2008 by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10.
See State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St. 3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, ¶ 15.
{¶9} We first address whether the version of R.C. 2950.09(D)(2) in effect
at the time Stauffer committed the offenses and was classified a sexual predator
applies in this case. In State v. Brunning, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
“the repeal of Megan’s Law is invalid as it affects offenders originally classified
under Megan’s Law” and that those offenders “had a continuing duty to comply
with Megan’s Law requirements.” 134 Ohio St. 3d 438, 2012-Ohio-5752, ¶ 22.
Accordingly, the version of R.C. Chapter 2950 in effect at the time Stauffer
committed the underlying offenses remains in effect as to Stauffer. See id. See
1
Division (A) and Divisions (B) and (C) of R.C. 2950.09 concern the manner in which the offender is
classified or adjudicated, respectively, a sexual predator. The manner in which Stauffer was classified or
adjudicated a sexual predator is not at issue in this appeal.
2
The “limited circumstances” set forth in former R.C. 2950.09(F), to which the Supreme Court of Ohio
refers in Ferguson, concern offenders who were classified sexual predators outside the state of Ohio. See
State v. Forsythe, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2012CA00225, 2013-Ohio-3301, ¶ 17-18. Those “limited
circumstances” do not apply in this case.
-5-
Case No. 2-15-09
also State v. Howard, 134 Ohio St. 3d 467, 2012-Ohio-5738, ¶ 14-17, citing
Bodyke at ¶ 66, State v. Gingell, 128 Ohio St. 3d 444, 2011-Ohio-1481, ¶ 8, and
William at ¶ 23; State v. Martin, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-14-12, 2015-Ohio-1339, ¶
11. Therefore, former R.C. 2950.09(D)(2), which provides that the sexual-
predator classification “is permanent and continues in effect until the offender’s
death,” remains in effect as to Stauffer. See Brunning at ¶ 22; Howard at ¶ 14-17.
See also Ferguson at ¶ 20 (“[C]lassification as a sexual predator is unalterable
under S.B. 5. * * * Pursuant to the S.B. 5 provisions, if an offender is classified as
a sexual predator, the classification remains permanent, except in limited
circumstances. See former R.C. 2950.09(D)(2) and (F). 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV,
at 6698, 6701-6702.”); State v. Johnson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-549, 2013-
Ohio-4990, ¶ 7 (“[T]he entry [classifying the defendant a sexually oriented
offender] is contrary to law since * * * no statutory authority exists to support the
alteration of a classification as a sexual predator in this instance.”), citing former
R.C. 2950.09(D)(2) and (F) and Ferguson at ¶ 20.
{¶10} In this case, given that the applicable version of R.C. 2950.09(D)(2)
prohibits the removal or termination of a sexual-predator classification, but for
certain limited circumstances that do not apply here, the trial court lacked
authority to remove Stauffer’s sexual-predator classification and, therefore, erred
by doing so. See State v. Leftridge, 174 Ohio App. 3d 314, 2007-Ohio-6807, ¶ 8
(8th Dist.) (holding that, based on R.C. 2950.09(D)(2)’s prohibition against
-6-
Case No. 2-15-09
removing or terminating a sexual-predator classification, “the trial court was
without jurisdiction to modify Leftridge’s sexual offender status”); State v. Turner,
5th Dist. Richland No. 2004-CA-36, 2004-Ohio-6573, ¶ 9 (concluding that,
because “[t]he Revised Code no longer provides a mechanism to rescind a sexual
offender designation imposed upon an adult nor to relieve such an offender from
his duty to comply with the registration requirements that result from that
designation,” “the trial court had no authority to rescind the sexual offender
designation or relieve appellee of the resulting duty to register as a sex offender
pursuant to the Revised Code”).
{¶11} The State’s assignment of error is sustained.
{¶12} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
SHAW, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
-7-