State v. King

[Cite as State v. King, 2015-Ohio-5257.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 102666
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DONTEL KING
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-14-585954-A
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Keough, P.J., and McCormack, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 17, 2015
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Matthew C. Bangerter
Bangerter Law, L.L.C.
P.O. Box 148
Mentor, Ohio 44061
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Stephanie N. Hall
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Justice Center - 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Appellant Dontel King appeals his convictions for drug possession, drug
trafficking, and possessing criminal tools. Upon review, we affirm.
{¶2} On June 23, 2014, appellant was indicted on one count of drug possession,
two counts of drug trafficking, and one count of possessing criminal tools. Appellant
entered a plea of not guilty to the charges, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
{¶3} Officer Alex Gritton testified that on May 24, 2014, a little after 8:00 p.m., he
was in a zone car and pulled behind appellant’s vehicle while exiting the freeway. He
observed the driver, who was the appellant, immediately reach down toward the
floorboard. Officer Gritton followed the vehicle and observed the vehicle pull into a
busy Walmart parking lot. The officer drove around the building and parked in an area
where he could observe appellant’s vehicle, which was parked in the parking lot.
Appellant was in the vehicle with an adult female passenger.
{¶4} Officer Gritton testified that he saw an individual, later identified as Ronald
Snipe, approach the driver’s side of appellant’s vehicle, talk with appellant for less than
two minutes, and then return to his own vehicle and place something inside. Snipe then
walked toward Walmart.
{¶5} Officer Gritton pulled up and asked Snipe what he had just purchased. Snipe
stated that he had purchased one ounce (28 grams) of cocaine and had given a payment of
$300, all in $20 bills. The dash camera in the officer’s vehicle recorded the
conversation. The video also showed appellant’s vehicle exiting the Walmart parking
lot.
{¶6} Snipe testified that earlier that day he called appellant and asked him if he
“could put something together” because he was trying to get some cocaine for a bachelor
party and “a couple people” were “trying to get ahold of some.” He arranged to meet
appellant at the Walmart parking lot around 8:00 p.m. When appellant arrived, he
parked four or five rows away from Snipe. Snipe testified that he walked over to
appellant’s car, had a short conversation with appellant, put his hand down in the car,
gave appellant the money, and appellant put the cocaine in his hand. Snipe put the
package of cocaine in his pocket, returned to his vehicle, and put the cocaine inside his
vehicle. As he walked toward Walmart, he was stopped by the officer.
{¶7} At the time of trial, Snipe testified that he actually handed appellant $1,500,
in mostly large bills, for one ounce of cocaine. He testified that he lied to the officer
about giving appellant $300. Snipe pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine. He testified
that he was not offered any deals for his testimony in this case.
{¶8} Approximately ten minutes after the transaction occurred, appellant’s vehicle
was stopped on the freeway by police. A fold of money totaling $1,500 was in plain
view, sitting on top of an open purse. Appellant also had $804 on his person. Appellant
stated that he was given $500 from his “Uncle Ronnie” at Walmart. Appellant also
stated that he “sells meat out of his vehicle” and is a mechanic doing odd jobs. The
female passenger was with him when he was apprehended.
{¶9} Officer Andrew Rocco, who had responded to assist in the matter, testified
that he has witnessed approximately 100 controlled buys and that the transactions happen
“very quickly, very discreetly.” He testified that “typically [officers] are not able to see
[the perpetrator’s] hands.” He further testified that an ounce of cocaine, based on its
purity, would generally range from $1,300 to $2,000.
{¶10} Powdered cocaine that was wrapped and in a plastic bag was recovered from
Snipe’s vehicle. The total weight of the packaged cocaine was 27.83 grams.
{¶11} The jury found appellant guilty on all counts. Following merger, the trial
court sentenced appellant to a mandatory three-year prison term on the trafficking charge
and a one-year concurrent term on the criminal tools charge. The court also imposed five
years of mandatory postrelease control.
{¶12} Appellant timely filed this appeal. He raises two assignments of error for
our review.
{¶13} Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims his conviction was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. When reviewing a claim challenging the
manifest weight of the evidence, the court, reviewing the entire record, must weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387,
1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest
weight of the evidence should be reserved for only the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id.
{¶14} R.C. 2925.11(A), possession of drugs, provides: “No person shall
knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance * * *.”
{¶15} R.C. 2925.03(A), trafficking in drugs, provides:
No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance * * *;
(2) Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or
distribute a controlled substance, when the offender knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance is intended for sale
or resale by the offender or another person.
{¶16} R.C. 2923.24(A), possessing criminal tools, provides: “No person shall
possess or have under the person’s control any substance, device, instrument, or article,
with purpose to use it criminally.”
{¶17} Appellant questions the evidence in this case, claiming that the officers
never witnessed appellant in possession of the drugs or the $1,500, Snipe had a motive to
lie, Snipe told Officer Gritton he had purchased cocaine for $300, Snipe had a history of
drug possession and trafficking, Snipe was unable to link any evidence presented in court
to appellant, the state failed to subpoena and verify phone records and present them to the
jury, the $1,500 was found in a purse belonging to the female passenger, and the evidence
points to the female passenger as another culprit.
{¶18} Our review reflects that both Officer Gritton and Snipe provided testimony
that, if believed, established that appellant was trafficking in drugs and sold
approximately one ounce of cocaine to Snipe. Snipe offered testimony to establish that
he spoke to appellant on the phone to arrange the transaction. The transaction took place
at the driver’s side window of appellant’s vehicle, and Snipe immediately returned to his
vehicle and placed the packaged cocaine inside. Snipe’s testimony of what transpired
was corroborated by the officer’s testimony concerning his observations of the interaction
between appellant and Snipe. Although Snipe had indicated he gave appellant $300, he
testified at trial that the amount given was actually $1,500. This was the same amount
located in plain view in appellant’s vehicle when he was apprehended. The amount was
consistent with the officers’ testimony as to the value for one ounce of cocaine. Snipe
also testified that he was not offered any deals for his testimony. The jury, as the
factfinder, was able to listen to the witnesses and assess their respective credibility.
{¶19} Upon our review, we are unable to find appellant’s convictions were against
the manifest weight of the evidence. The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶20} Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred
in denying his motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A). A motion for judgment of
acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) requires a court to consider if the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a conviction. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61
Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶21} Appellant argues that the officers failed to see any transaction occur, that a
lack of evidence was presented, that the cash was found in the possession of the
passenger, and that Snipe’s testimony lacked credibility. We are not persuaded by his
argument.
{¶22} It is well established that the elements of an offense may be established by
direct or circumstantial evidence, or both, and that they are of equal evidentiary value.
State v. Howard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99535, 2013-Ohio-5125, ¶ 11. In this case,
Snipe testified to arranging a meeting with appellant to purchase an ounce of cocaine for
$1,500. He testified that he reached his hand down into appellant’s car where he handed
appellant money for drugs. His testimony reflects that he concealed the drugs in his
pocket and did not inspect his purchase before placing the drugs in his vehicle. Shortly
after the packaged cocaine was recovered from Snipe’s vehicle, appellant was stopped by
police and $1,500 was found in plain view in his vehicle. Officer Gritton testified to
observing actions consistent with Snipe’s testimony. After viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crimes proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶23} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The
court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR