State v. Smith

[Cite as State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-5845.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 9-17-05
v.
LESLEE SMITH, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 16-CR-0641
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: July 17, 2017
APPEARANCES:
Kevin P. Collins for Appellant
Sheena Bateman-Carothers for Appellee
Case No. 9-17-05
SHAW, J.
{¶1} The State of Ohio brings this appeal from the February 23, 2017,
judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court granting the suppression
motion of defendant-appellee, Leslee Smith (“Smith”). On appeal, the State argues
that the trial court erred in finding that the officer who performed a traffic stop of
Smith lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that a marked lanes violation had
been committed to stop Smith’s vehicle. For the reasons that follow we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On June 11, 2016, Smith’s vehicle was stopped by Sergeant Mark
Menendez of the Ohio State Highway Patrol for failing to drive within the marked
lanes in violation of R.C. 4511.33. As a result of the traffic stop, drugs were located
in Smith’s vehicle. Subsequently Smith was indicted for one count of Possession
of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(4), a felony of the fifth degree, and
one count of Possession of Heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(6), a felony
of the fifth degree. Smith pled not guilty to the charges.
{¶3} On January 20, 2017, Smith filed a motion to suppress arguing that
video from Sergeant Menendez’s dash camera showed that Sergeant Menendez had
no lawful cause to stop Smith’s vehicle. Smith contended that the video merely
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showed that her vehicle’s tires touched the white edge line one time but she never
drove outside of the marked lanes.
{¶4} On February 17, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the suppression
motion. At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of Sergeant Menendez
and entered the dash camera video of Sergeant Menendez’s cruiser into evidence.
The video was viewed multiple times at the hearing. Sergeant Menendez testified
that he saw things that were not present on the video as he had a slightly different
vantage point.
{¶5} The trial court conducted an analysis of the issues and in its judgment
entry on the matter, the trial court held as follows.
An evaluation as to whether Sgt. Menendez had reasonable
suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle depends on the factual
conclusions reached by this Court. In the instant case, even
though only one witness testified and only one exhibit was
introduced, the evidence before the Court is in conflict. The
conflict is between the testimony of Sgt. Menendez and what is
clearly depicted on the video. The Court finds that, in this case,
the video is a [sic] more probative of the facts, as it is not subject
to fallibility of human perception or memory.
* * * [The trial court then summarized the testimony of Sergeant
Menendez and what was depicted on the video.] * * *
[Based on the evidence presented,] [t]he Court makes the
following factual findings:
1. The Defendant’s vehicle stayed within its lane of travel at all
times while on Vernon Heights Blvd. At 1:44:54, the right
tires of the Defendant’s vehicle drove on top off [sic] the
white line separating the parking area from the lane of travel
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for approximately one second, but never crossed the line.
This is apparent because the white line can be seen on the
video both behind and in front of the tires, but is not visible
where the tires are on top of the white line.
2. When the Defendant’s vehicle entered Vernon Heights Blvd.
at 1:43:39, Sgt. Menendez was not in a position where he
could observe whether or not the vehicle was in its lane of
travel, as he was too far away, and was perpendicular to the
vehicle on the driver’s side. The Defendant’s vehicle appears
to be operating within its lane of travel at that point as well.
3. At no time did the Defendant’s operation of the vehicle pose
any risk of safety to the public. There was not a single
parked car in the parking lane anywhere on Vernon Heights
Blvd. when the Defendant was driving on that street.
Additionally, no pedestrians or other moving vehicles were
on the street. Moreover, the Defendant was driving within
the speed limit. Any slight weaving appeared to be consistent
with normal operation. At all times, the Defendant’s vehicle
was being operated in a safe manner.
***
For these reasons, the Court finds that Sgt. Menedez [sic] did not
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that the
Defendant committed a traffic violation or any other criminal
offense.
(Doc. No. 37). The trial court thus found the traffic stop of Smith’s vehicle invalid
and suppressed the evidence obtained as a result.
{¶6} It is from this judgment that the State appeals, asserting the following
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee’s motion to
suppress evidence.
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{¶7} In its sole assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred
by granting Smith’s suppression motion. Specifically, the State argues that Sergeant
Menendez specifically testified that Smith drifted outside of her lane twice, that
Sergeant Menendez testified that he had a slightly different vantage point from the
dash camera, and that in the video Smith’s tire clearly drove onto the white line.
The State argues that under this Court’s decisions in State v. Shaffer, 3d Dist.
Paulding No. 11-13-02, 2013-Ohio-3581, and State v. Anthony, 3d Dist. Seneca No.
13-9-26, 2009-Ohio-6717, and pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in
State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, the trial court’s factual and
legal conclusions leading to suppression in this matter were erroneous.
Standard of Review
{¶8} “Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents a
mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003–
Ohio–5372, ¶ 8. The trial court serves as the trier of fact and is the primary judge
of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence
presented. State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 850 (12th Dist.2000).
Therefore, when an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, it must accept the trial court's findings of facts so long as they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71,
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2006–Ohio–3665, ¶ 100. The appellate court must then review the application of
the law to the facts de novo. Burnside at ¶ 8.
Relevant Authority
{¶9} The primary issue before this Court in this case is whether Sergeant
Menendez had a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe Smith committed a
marked lanes violation pursuant to R.C. 4511.33. The Supreme Court of Ohio has
defined “reasonable articulable suspicion” as “specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
intrusion [upon an individual’s freedom of movement].” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio
St.3d 177, 178 (1988), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). “The
‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors,
not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Mays, 119 Ohio
St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403,
2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 11. “A traffic stop is constitutionally valid when a law-
enforcement officer witnesses a motorist drift over the lane markings in violation of
R.C. 4511.33, even without further evidence of erratic or unsafe driving. Mays at
syllabus.
{¶10} In this case Sergeant Menendez testified that he stopped Smith’s
vehicle for a violation of R.C. 4511.33, which reads as follows.
(A) Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic, or wherever within municipal
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corporations traffic is lawfully moving in two or more
substantially continuous lines in the same direction, the following
rules apply:
(1) A vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven, as nearly as is
practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall
not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
Evidence Presented
{¶11} At the Suppression hearing Sergeant Menendez testified that while he
was on patrol at approximately 1:43 a.m. on June 11, 2016, he was turning left onto
a tree-lined boulevard that Smith’s vehicle was merging onto from the opposite
direction. Sergeant Menendez testified that during Smith’s turn, he observed her
drive over the white line on her right side. Sergeant Menendez testified that he
thought she may have even hit the curb because it looked like her car “jumped” or
“bounced.”
{¶12} Sergeant Menendez testified that he followed Smith’s vehicle and that
he observed it weaving while driving through the boulevard’s curves, though the
weaving was done entirely within the marked lane lines. Sergeant Menendez
admitted that the weaving did not appear to be visible on the dash camera video.
Sergeant Menendez also testified that Smith’s vehicle was traveling under the speed
limit, going approximately 28 mph in a 35 mph zone.
{¶13} After following the vehicle for approximately a minute, Sergeant
Menendez testified that he observed the vehicle travel outside of the marked lanes
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for a second time. Sergeant Menendez testified that he then initiated a traffic stop
for driving outside the marked lanes.
{¶14} The State entered dash camera footage of Sergeant Menendez’s cruiser
into evidence. Due to Sergeant Menendez being perpendicular to Smith’s vehicle,
the first instance where Sergeant Menendez testified he observed Smith’s vehicle
driving over the white line is not visible. As the trial court noted, there is also no
indication of Smith’s car hitting the curb or “jumping/bouncing.” To be clear,
Smith’s vehicle is visible as it turns onto Vernon Heights Boulevard, but nothing on
the video shows the car either crossing the edge line or “bouncing.”
{¶15} After the first purported incident, Sergeant Menendez followed Smith
and while he testified that Smith was weaving within her lane, the video only shows
perhaps the slightest shift of Smith’s vehicle entirely within her lane of travel. The
trial court determined this to be consistent with normal travel, particularly when
considering Smith was driving on a relatively curvy boulevard.
{¶16} As to the second instance wherein Sergeant Menendez testified that
Smith drove over the white edge line, the video shows that Smith did, in fact, drive
onto the white edge line just after a truck passed in the opposite direction with its
lights appearing fairly bright in the dash camera video. The video does not clearly
show Smith driving over the white line, but it does show Smith’s vehicle driving
onto the line.
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{¶17} When the discrepancies between the video and Sergeant Menendez’s
testimony were pointed out to Sergeant Menendez by defense counsel and by the
trial court, Sergeant Menendez testified that he had a slightly different vantage point
than his dash camera, and that he could see better with his naked eye. Sergeant
Menendez also testified that there was little-to-no traffic out, that there were no
parked cars on the street, that conditions were clear, and there were no obstructions
on the roadway. On examination by the court regarding the video, Sergeant
Menendez testified that he “guess[ed]” Smith’s vehicle was on top of the line and
not over the line.
Argument and Analysis
{¶18} Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that the dash
camera footage conflicted with Sergeant Menendez’s testimony and that the dash
camera footage essentially rendered Sergeant Menendez’s testimony not to be as
persuasive to the trial court as the video.1 The trial court found no evidence of
weaving, no evidence of any driving outside of the marked lanes in the first instance
(or even onto the white line), and the trial court found that in the second instance,
Smith’s tires were merely on top of the white edge line, not across it as Sergeant
Menendez testified. Thus the trial court found no traffic violation warranting a stop
by Sergeant Menendez.
1
Although the trial court did not explicitly say it found Sergeant Menendez not to be credible, it is implicit
in the factual findings.
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{¶19} On appeal, the State argues that the trial court’s factual and legal
conclusions were erroneous. Regarding the factual conclusions, the State argues
Sergeant Menendez’s testimony established a marked lanes violation, and the dash
camera footage did not contradict his account. However, the trial court found the
dash camera footage was more probative and thus to be given greater weight than
Sergeant Menendez’s testimony, and the dash camera footage does support the
findings made by the trial court.
{¶20} As to the trial court’s legal conclusions, the State argues that the trial
court operated on an incorrect assumption. Specifically, the State contends that
driving onto the white line does not consist of driving entirely within the lane, and
that the trial court thus erred for operating under the assumption that driving onto
the white line does not constitute a marked lanes violation. In support of its
argument, the State cites a number of cases including this Court’s decision in State
v. Shaffer, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-13-02, 2013-Ohio-3581.
{¶21} In Shaffer, we addressed whether an officer had reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity to stop a vehicle for a marked lanes violation where a
vehicle’s tires were on the white line but parts of the vehicle, such as the fender and
mirror, were across the line. We found that the testimony in Shaffer did not support
a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a traffic stop for a marked lanes
violation. In making that finding, we reasoned as follows.
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In drafting the foregoing subsection [R.C. 4511.33](A)(1), the
legislature specifically chose the phase “as nearly as is
practicable” in describing a motorist’s duty to drive within a
single lane or line of traffic. We believe the language “as nearly as
is practicable” inherently contemplates some inevitable and
incidental touching of the lane lines by a motorist’s vehicle during
routine and lawful driving, without the vehicle being considered
to have left the lane of travel so as to constitute a marked lanes
violation as proscribed by R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), such as to avoid
debris, obstructions or imperfections in the roadway.
In the alternative, the same subsection notably does not proscribe
all movement from the marked lane but expressly links any
movement from the marked lane directly with the element of
safety—specifically permitting movement from the lane only
where “the driver has first ascertained that such movement can
be made with safety.”
Accordingly it is our conclusion that consideration of the
statutory factors of practicability and safety is integral to any
determination of a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1).
We would be inclined to agree that a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) could be established
by almost any evidence in the record addressing either the
practicability or the safety of the driving circumstances. This
conclusion stems in part from the fact that a sudden deviation
from the lane of travel, where there is nothing in the surrounding
circumstances to indicate why it was not practicable for the driver
to remain within the lane, could in itself raise a legitimate safety
concern sufficient to constitute a reasonable, articulable suspicion
of a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) in the right case.
At the same time, we also recognize that there could always exist
something in the surrounding conditions or circumstances that
raises a safety concern regarding the driver’s deviation from the
lane that completely obviates any need to address the issue of the
driver’s practicability in maintaining the lane of travel, all of
which could likewise independently constitute a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1).
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However, the fact remains that in this case there is no evidence in
the record from which any legitimate inference can be drawn
regarding either one of these requisite statutory elements. As
noted earlier, the only evidence presented to the trial court was
Trooper Sisco’s testimony that there was a one-time touching of
Shaffer’s tires on the white fog line, causing a slight extension of
the right fender and mirror of the vehicle over the line for
approximately three seconds. There was no other evidence
concerning the circumstances surrounding Shaffer’s failure to
maintain her lane of travel.
More specifically, there was nothing in Trooper Sisco’s testimony
as to the traffic, weather or road conditions, or anything else in
the record to indicate either 1) that there was no apparent reason
why it was not practicable for Shaffer to remain within the
lane, or 2) that in this instance, Shaffer’s single and brief
movement from the lane otherwise presented any apparent issue
of safety. Accordingly, without some additional evidence in the
record regarding the surrounding circumstances, traffic and road
conditions going to the express statutory language regarding
either practicability or safety, we cannot conclude that the act of
Shaffer driving onto the white fog line one time for a matter of
three seconds is alone sufficient to establish the requisite
reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Shaffer for a
violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1).
Shaffer at ¶¶ 21-27.
{¶22} Although Shaffer reached the opposite conclusion of what the State
advocates in this case, the State argues that the evidence that was precisely lacking
in Shaffer is present here. The State contends that it did put forth evidence that there
was no apparent reason for Smith to travel outside of her lane of travel and that
Smith’s movement onto the white edge line was not for safety purposes. However,
in this case it is clear that the trial court did not find the State’s testimony to be as
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credible as the video evidence.2 Under such circumstances, the State’s insistence
that Shaffer would compel a different result here is misplaced.3
{¶23} As additional support, the State cites this Court’s decision in State v.
Anthony, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-9-26, 2009-Ohio-6717, wherein this Court
affirmed a trial court’s determination that a stop was valid where a vehicle crossed
the white line by two tire-widths. Anthony is easily distinguishable from the case
before us for multiple reasons. First, the vehicle in Anthony traveled outside its lane
by two tire-widths, a fact that is not present here. While we do not expressly adopt
a “tire rule,” that fact is clearly distinguishable. Second, in Anthony we merely
upheld the trial court’s discretion in determining facts and then found that
controlling law did not compel a different result. Thus Anthony is unpersuasive in
these circumstances where we are upholding a trial court’s discretion to determine
the facts so long as they are supported by competent and credible evidence.
2
In Shaffer we also expressly declined to adopt the “tire rule” as espoused by other Ohio Appellate Districts,
wherein there is no marked lanes violation without crossing over the white line. See Wickliffe v. Petway,
11th Dist. Nos. 2011-L-101, 2011-L-102, 2012-Ohio-2439. We chose to determine these issues on a case by
case basis. However, the State does mostly ignore our finding in ¶ 21 of Shaffer that it seems inherent in the
legislature’s word choice that the legislature contemplated “some inevitable and incidental touching of the
lane lines.” (Emphasis sic.)
3
At the trial court level, the State insinuated that our decision in Shaffer was inconsistent with the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539. The trial court disagreed
and we would emphasize that in Mays, the driver drifted entirely outside his lane of travel multiple times and
the Supreme Court of Ohio found in those circumstances a stop was valid. While Sergeant Menendez claimed
that Smith went outside of her lane multiple times, the trial court found this not to be credible in light of the
video and the video does not dispute the trial court’s finding on the matter. Moreover, Mays does not deal
with a situation where a vehicle was merely on an edge line. Furthermore, at least one Ohio Appellate Court
has agreed with our interpretation in Shaffer. See State v. Kneier, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2015-Ohio-P-0006,
2015-Ohio-3419 (upholding trial court’s determination that officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion
to stop vehicle where, inter alia, the DVD of stop disputed officer’s testimony that tire passed over the line).
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{¶24} Finally, the State argues that a police officer’s testimony alone is
sufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion for a traffic stop, citing
State v. Harrison, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-16, 2015-Ohio-1419, in support.
Harrison at ¶ 24, quoting State v. McClellan, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-21, 2010-
Ohio-314, ¶ 38 (“ ‘A police officer’s testimony alone is sufficient to establish
reasonable articulable suspicion for a stop.’ ”). We do not dispute the statement that
a police officer’s testimony can be sufficient to establish reasonable articulable
suspicion for a stop; however, the State fails to acknowledge that the trial court
apparently did not find the police officer’s testimony credible in light of the footage
from his dash camera. Our repeated viewing of the dash camera video supports the
trial court’s factual findings regarding the video. Although Sergeant Menendez’s
testimony went further than what can be viewed on the dash camera, the trial court
found that the camera footage can be viewed more credible and relied upon it.
{¶25} Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot find
that the trial court erred in finding that Sergeant Menendez lacked a reasonable
articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Smith’s vehicle. Therefore, the
State’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
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Conclusion
{¶26} For the foregoing reasons, the State’s assignment of error is overruled
and the judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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