State v. Gideon

[Cite as State v. Gideon, 2019-Ohio-2482.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-18-27
v.
JAMES A. GIDEON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-18-28
v.
JAMES A. GIDEON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-18-29
v.
JAMES A. GIDEON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
Appeals from Lima Municipal Court
Trial Court Nos. 17CRB01386, 17CRB01387, and 17CRB01385
Judgments Reversed and Causes Remanded
Date of Decision: June 24, 2019
APPEARANCES:
Dennis C. Belli for Appellant
Anthony L. Geiger for Appellee
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, James A. Gideon (“Gideon”), appeals the May 11,
2018 judgment entries of sentence of the Lima Municipal Court. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} This case stems from an investigation of Gideon for allegedly
inappropriately touching patients in his capacity as a licensed physician. As part of
the investigation, Sergeant Tyler Hochstetler (“Sergeant Hochstetler”) of the
Bluffton Police Department criminally investigated the patient complaints, while
Investigator Chad Yoakam (“Investigator Yoakam”) of the State Medical Board
pursued an administrative investigation for possible violations of the statutes and
rules governing the practice of medicine.
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{¶3} Sergeant Hochstetler and Investigator Yoakam agreed “to cooperate
with each other” by trading information during the course of their investigations.
(Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 51-52). According to Investigator Yoakam, it is advantageous
for state investigators to cooperate with law enforcement under “what they call a
bootstrap on a criminal case” because proving an administrative-sanction case is
easier “from a criminal conviction” as opposed to “through witness testimony.” (Id.
at 15-16). Thus, Investigator Yoakam met with Sergeant Hochstetler “to determine
how [he] was going to proceed with the criminal case.” (Id. at 15). After learning
from Sergeant Hochstetler that Gideon denied the patients’ allegations to Sergeant
Hochstetler, Investigator Yoakam informed Sergeant Hochstetler that he was going
to interview Gideon himself. Importantly, Investigator Yoakam warned Sergeant
Hochstetler against participating in his interview with Gideon—because Gideon
was statutorily obligated to cooperate with his investigation—so that any confession
could be used in a criminal proceeding against Gideon. (See Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at
28-29, 55-56); (Defendant’s Ex. 4).
{¶4} In accordance with that agreement, Investigator Yoakam arrived
unannounced at Gideon’s medical office and asked Gideon “if he would have a few
minutes to chat with” him to which Gideon—who was aware of his duty to
cooperate with Investigator Yoakam’s investigation—responded that he did. (Aug.
22, 2017 Tr. at 5). Commensurate with his duty to cooperate and provide truthful
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answers to Investigator Yoakam’s questions, Gideon provided Investigator Yoakam
with an oral and written statement. Thereafter, Investigator Yoakam immediately
shared the information from his interview of Gideon with law enforcement “because
the doctor had [] an interview with [law enforcement] where he denied any
impropriety so I wanted to tell [law enforcement] what happened during [his]
interview.” (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 26-27).
{¶5} On May 26, 2017, three complaints were filed in the Lima Municipal
Court, each charging Gideon with sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
2907.06(A)(1), third-degree misdemeanors. (Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 3);
(Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 3); (Case No. 17CRB01387, Doc. No. 3). The
complaints were assigned case numbers 17CRB01385, 17CRB01386, and
17CRB01387, respectively. (Id.); (Id.); (Id.). Gideon appeared for arraignment and
entered pleas of not guilty on June 6, 2017. (Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 7);
(Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 7); (Case No. 17CRB01387, Doc. No. 7).
{¶6} On July 5, 2017, Gideon filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Case
No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 10); (Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 12); (Case No.
17CRB01387, Doc. No. 11). Specifically, Gideon requested that “his written and
recorded statements given during an interrogation conducted by [Investigator
Yoakam]” be suppressed because “the statements were involuntary and elicited in
violation of [Gideon’s] right to Due Process and the Privilege against Self-
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Incrimination guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.” (Id.); (Id.);
(Id.). After the conclusion of suppression hearings on August 22, 2017 and October
13, 2017, the trial court determined that Gideon “made voluntary statements during
a noncustodial interview” and denied the motion to suppress his statements. (Case
No. 17CRB01385, Doc. Nos. 12, 14, 17); (Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. Nos. 14,
17); (Case No. 17CRB01387, Doc. No. 12, 14). (See also Case No. 17CRB01385,
Doc. Nos. 14, 15, 16).
{¶7} On February 6, 2018, the State filed a motion to join case numbers
17CRB01385, 17CRB01386, 17CRB01387. (Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No.
18).1 Gideon filed a memorandum in opposition to the State’s joinder request on
February 23, 2018. (Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 20). The trial court granted
the State’s motion on April 9, 2018 and joined all of the cases for trial. (Case No.
17CRB01385, Doc. No. 27A); (Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 18A); (Case No.
17CRB01387, Doc. No. 15A). (See Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. Nos. 21, 25, 27).
(See also Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 22).
{¶8} The cases proceeded to a jury trial on April 18-20, 2018. (Apr. 18, 2018
Tr., Vol. I, at 1); (Apr. 19, 2018 Tr., Vol. II, at 1); (Apr. 20, 2018 Tr., Vol. III, at 1).
1
The State’s February 6, 2018 motion requesting joinder also requests the joinder of case numbers
17CRB01711, 17CRB01712, 17CRB01713, and 17CRB01765; however, those cases are not before this
court.
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The jury found Gideon guilty of the sexual-imposition charge in case number
17CRB01385, 17CRB01386, and 17CRB01387, respectively. (Case No.
17CRB01385, Doc. No. 42); (Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 22); (Case No.
17CRB01387, Doc. No. 19).
{¶9} On May 11, 2018, the trial court sentenced Gideon to 60 days in jail in
case number 17CRB01385, 60 days in jail in case number 17CRB01386, and 60
days in jail in case number 17CRB01387. (Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 45);
(Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 25); (Case No. 17CRB01387, Doc. No. 22). The
jail terms imposed were ordered to be served consecutively for an aggregate
sentence of 180 days in jail. (Id.); (Id.); (Id.). The trial court also classified Gideon
as a Tier I sex offender. (Id.); (Id.); (Id.).
{¶10} Gideon filed his notice of appeal on May 11, 2018, and raises four
assignments of error for our review. (Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 46); (Case
No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 26); (Case No. 17CRB01387, Doc. No. 23). Because
it is dispositive, we address only Gideon’s first assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. I
The Denial of Defendant-Appellant’s Motion to Suppress His
Oral and Written Statements to the Medical Board Investigator
and the Admission of Those Statements in the State’s Case-In-
Chief Violated His Rights Under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. (Apx.A-7)
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{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Gideon argues that the trial court erred
by denying his motion to suppress oral and written statements that he made to
Investigator Yoakam as evidence. In particular, Gideon contends that the trial court
erred by concluding that his belief that his statements were coerced was objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances. In making that determination, Gideon
argues that the trial court “failed to consider the degree to which [Investigator]
Yoakam’s disciplinary investigation was intertwined with the police department’s
criminal investigation.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8).2
Standard of Review
{¶12} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed
questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372,
¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as
such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.
Id. See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St. 3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a
ruling on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s
findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at
¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St. 3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s
2
Gideon also argues that the trial court’s admission of his involuntary confessions into evidence at trial “was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Appellant’s Brief at 14, citing Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S.
279, 295, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)). In other words, Gideon argues that the admission of his involuntary
confessions into evidence at trial amounted to structural error. However, based on our conclusion that
Gideon’s statements should have been suppressed under the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self
incrimination, we need not address Gideon’s structural-error argument.
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conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must
independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.,
citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App. 3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
Due Process Voluntariness
{¶13} First, we will address Gideon’s argument that his pre-trial statements
“were procured in violation of his right to due process * * *.” (Appellant’s Brief at
5). Separate from the consideration of whether a defendant’s statements should be
suppressed under the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination privilege, is the
consideration of whether the defendant’s statements were voluntary. See, e.g.,
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985) (“Prior to Miranda, the
admissibility of an accused’s in-custody statements was judged solely by whether
they were ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.”); State v.
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, 231 (1984) (noting that “due process provisions of the
federal Constitution dictate that the state must meet by a preponderance of the
evidence its burden of proving that any inculpatory statement was made
voluntarily”); State v. Tussing, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-10-11, 2011-Ohio-1727, ¶ 32
(stating that “the Due Process Clause requires an inquiry regarding the voluntariness
of a defendant’s confession, which is a separate inquiry from the considerations
regarding whether a defendant is subject to a custodial interrogation”), citing State
v. Petitjean, 140 Ohio App. 3d 517, 526 (2d Dist.2000), citing Dickerson v. United
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States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000); State v. Scholl, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 12AP-309, 2012-Ohio-6233, ¶ 7 (“The voluntariness of a confession presents
‘an issue analytically separate from those issues surrounding custodial
interrogations and Miranda warnings.’”), quoting State v. Walker, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 04AP-1107, 2005-Ohio-3540, ¶ 24, citing State v. Kelly, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 2004-CA-20, 2005-Ohio-305, ¶ 10. See also United States v.
Goodpaster, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1021-1022 (D.Or.2014). “Using an involuntary
statement against a defendant in a criminal trial is a denial of due process of law.”
State v. Carse, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-932, 2010-Ohio-4513, ¶ 23, citing
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978). Statements are
considered involuntary when, under the totality of the circumstances, the
“defendant’s will was overborne.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226,
93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973). Some of the circumstances that are commonly considered
include the defendant’s age, education, intelligence, and knowledge of his rights;
the duration and nature of detention and questioning; and whether physical
punishment was used or threatened. Id.
{¶14} Although Gideon asserts that he is challenging the admissibility of his
pre-trial statements under the Due Process Clause, he failed to make any argument
in support of that contention. “[A] defendant has the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating the error of the trial court on appeal.” State v. Stelzer, 9th Dist.
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Summit No. 23174, 2006-Ohio-6912, ¶ 7, citing State v. Cook, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 20675, 2002-Ohio-2646, ¶ 27. “Moreover, ‘[i]f an argument exists that can
support this assignment of error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’” Id.,
quoting Cook at ¶ 27. “App.R. 12(A)(2) provides that an appellate court ‘may
disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to
identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to
argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).’”
State v. Jackson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-670, 2015-Ohio-3322, ¶ 11, quoting
App.R. 12(A)(2). “Additionally, App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that an appellant’s brief
include ‘[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to
each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the
contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on
which appellant relies.’” Id., quoting App.R. 16(A)(7). Notwithstanding Gideon’s
failure to include an argument regarding how his pre-trial statements were
inadmissible under the Due Process Clause, the voluntariness of his statements are
immaterial to the resolution of his suppression argument because we conclude that
his statements were otherwise per se compelled under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
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Fifth Amendment
{¶15} “‘The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, states that “[n]o person * *
* shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”’” State
v. Jackson, 154 Ohio St. 3d 542, 2018-Ohio-2169, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Graham,
136 Ohio St. 3d 125, 2013-Ohio-2114, ¶ 19, quoting the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. 3 See also Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. “It has long
been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against
himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also ‘privileges him not to
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal,
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings.’” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984),
quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S. Ct. 316 (1973).
{¶16} “The privilege against self-incrimination is generally not self-
executing; a person ‘ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than answer if he
3
Gideon’s argument necessarily incorporates the procedural safeguards of the Sixth Amendment. See State
v. Jackson, 154 Ohio St. 3d 542, 2018-Ohio-2169, ¶ 13. (See also Appellant’s Brief at 13). “‘The Sixth
Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”’” Jackson at ¶ 16,
quoting Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009). “‘The core of this right has historically
been, and remains today, ‘the opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney and to have him
investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial.”’” Id., quoting Ventris at 590, quoting Michigan v. Harvey,
494 U.S. 344, 348, 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990). However, “‘[t]hat the right extends to having counsel present at
various pretrial “critical” interactions between the defendant and the State, * * * including the deliberate
elicitation by law enforcement officers (and their agents) of statements pertaining to the charge.’” (Emphasis
added.) Id., quoting Ventris at 590.
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desires not to incriminate himself.’” Graham at ¶ 19, quoting Murphy at 429. See
also Murphy at 427 (noting that “[t]his principle has been applied in cases involving
a variety of criminal and noncriminal investigations”). Thus, “[i]f a witness—even
one under a general compulsion to testify—answers a question that both he and the
government should reasonably expect to incriminate him, the Court need ask only
whether the particular disclosure was ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.” Murphy at 428.
There are well-known exceptions to the requirement of asserting the
privilege: (1) “custodial interrogation”; (2) situations where the
assertion is penalized to an extent that a “‘free choice to remain
silent’” is foreclosed; and (3) situations where parties fail to file tax
returns rather than identifying themselves as gamblers and asserting
the Fifth Amendment privilege.
State v. Schimmel, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2017-CA-23, 2017-Ohio-7747, ¶ 17, quoting
Murphy at 429-430, 434, 439, quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 661,
96 S. Ct. 1178 (1976). See also Goodpaster, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1022-1023 (“Rather
than ask whether statements were actually compelled, a prophylactic rule asks
whether certain other conditions were met and provides that statements made under
those conditions are deemed per se compelled.), citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307. “A
prophylactic rule, therefore, ‘sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself’
and may exclude even ‘patently voluntary statements.’” (Emphasis sic.)
Goodpaster at 1023, quoting Elstad at 306-307.
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{¶17} Here, the trial court addressed two of the exceptions to the requirement
of asserting the privilege: the Miranda and the Garrity rules. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S. Ct.
616 (1967). Accordingly, we will review the trial court’s application of the Miranda
and Garrity rules to the facts and circumstances presented by this case.
Miranda
{¶18} The first well-known exception under Miranda excludes “‘statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless [the state] demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective
to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.’” (Emphasis added.) Jackson,
154 Ohio St. 3d 542, 2018-Ohio-2169, at ¶ 14, quoting Miranda at 444. “The basic
insight of Miranda is that custody contains ‘inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where
he would not otherwise do so freely.’” Goodpaster at 1023, quoting Miranda at
467. “To offset this coercion, Miranda mandated that certain warnings be given
before a suspect in custody is interrogated.” Id., citing Miranda at 478-479.
“Absent these warnings, * * * a suspect’s statements made during custodial
interrogation * * * may not be used against him * * *.” Id., citing Elstad at 307 and
Miranda at 478-479.
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{¶19} “The prophylactic rule of Miranda, therefore, substitutes the totality-
of-the-circumstances voluntariness inquiry with” a four-prong inquiry: First, was
the suspect in custody? Second, was the suspected being interrogated? Third, was
the custodial interrogation conducted by law enforcement? Fourth, if the first three
inquiries produce an affirmative result, were adequate warnings given? See id.
{¶20} A “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda “‘means
“questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into
custody.”’” (Emphasis added.) Jackson at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Watson, 28 Ohio
St.2d 15 (1971), paragraph five of the syllabus, quoting Miranda at 444, and citing
State v. Bernard, 31 So. 3d 1025, 1029 (La.2010) (noting that Miranda applies only
if “the interrogation is conducted by a ‘law enforcement officer’ or someone acting
as their agent”). See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S. Ct.
1682 (1980) (defining “interrogation” as “express questioning or its functional
equivalent”). “When determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda
purposes, we must consider whether there was a formal arrest or the functional
equivalent of ‘a restraint of an individual’s freedom of movement commensurate
with that of a formal arrest.’” In re M.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105742, 2018-
Ohio-4848, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83481, 2004-Ohio-
5205, ¶ 39, citing Miranda at 444. “In considering whether an individual is in
custody for Miranda purposes, “courts must first inquire into the circumstances
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surrounding the questioning and, second, given those circumstances, determine
whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interview and leave.’” Id. at ¶ 24, quoting State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio
St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, ¶ 27, citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112,
116 S. Ct. 457 (1995). “In so doing, we examine the totality of the circumstances
and how a reasonable person would have understood the circumstances.” Id. at ¶
20, citing State v. Montague, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97958, 2012-Ohio-4285, ¶ 8,
citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984). “Relevant
factors to consider in determining whether a custodial interrogation took place are:
(1) the location of the questioning; (2) duration of the questioning; (3) statements
made during the interview; (4) the presence or absence of physical restraints; and
(5) whether the interviewee was released at the end of the interview.” State v.
Billenstein, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-13-10, 2014-Ohio-255, ¶ 44, citing Howes v.
Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012).
{¶21} However, generally, “[t]he Miranda requirements do not apply when
admissions are made to persons who are not law enforcement officers or their
agents, even if an individual’s efforts aid in law enforcement.” 4 In re M.H. at ¶ 19,
citing Jackson at ¶ 15. See also id. at ¶ 21 (“Generally, courts have held that [state
4
A law enforcement officer is defined under R.C. 2901.01(A)(11)(b) as follows: “An officer, agent, or
employee of the state or any of its agencies, instrumentalities, or political subdivisions, upon whom, by
statute, a duty to conserve the peace or to enforce all or certain laws is imposed and the authority to arrest
violators is conferred * * *.”
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investigators—namely, social workers—]do not have a duty to advise suspects of
their Miranda rights because they are private citizens with no power to arrest.”),
citing Jones at ¶ 40, State v. Coonrod, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2009-08-013, 2010-
Ohio-1102, ¶ 9, State v. Thoman, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-787, 2005-Ohio-
898, ¶ 7, State v. Dobies, 11th Dist. Lake No. 91-L-123, 1992 WL 387356, *3 (Dec.
18, 1992), and State v. Simpson, 4th Dist. Ross No. 1706, 1992 WL 37793, *4 (Feb.
21, 1992). Nevertheless, when a state investigator acts as an agent of law
enforcement, that investigator may be required to provide Miranda warnings. Id. at
¶ 22. A state investigator is an agent of law enforcement when he or she acts under
the direction or control of law enforcement. Id., citing State v. Bolen, 27 Ohio St. 2d
15, 18 (1971). Whether an individual is acting as an agent of law enforcement
depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. Jackson at ¶ 17.
{¶22} In the case before us, the trial court concluded that suppression of
Gideon’s statements was not warranted under Miranda because Gideon was not in
custody. In support of its conclusion that Gideon was not in custody, the trial court
found that (1) the interview with Investigator Yoakam was conducted at Gideon’s
office; (2) Gideon was freely accessible to his staff; (3) Gideon repeatedly left his
office to see patients; (4) Gideon was not physically threatened, intimidated, or
restrained; and (5) Investigator Yoakam did not dominate the interview. The record
reveals that the trial court’s findings are supported by competent, credible evidence.
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Accordingly, although there may a tenable argument that Investigator Yoakam was
acting as an agent of law enforcement, suppression of Gideon’s statements under
Miranda is unavailing. Compare State v. Kuruc, 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0088-
M, 2017-Ohio-4112, ¶ 22 (“concluding that suppression was not warranted under
Miranda because, “[e]ven assuming that the Fire Chief and/or the other firefighters
here were acting as agents of the police when they met with Kuruc, the record does
not support his assertion that they subjected him to custodial interrogation). See
also State v. Woods, 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 16CA28 and 16CA29, 2018-Ohio-
4588, ¶ 49-50, 52.
Garrity
{¶23} “The Garrity rule * * * applies when the government threatens to
penalize the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” (Emphasis added.)
Goodpaster, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1023. Specifically, the Garrity rule applies “when a
person’s assertion of the privilege is penalized in a way that precludes that person
from choosing to remain silent and compels his or her incriminating testimony.”
Graham, 136 Ohio St. 3d 125, 2013-Ohio-2114, at ¶ 20. “For instance, a person
need not assert the [self-incrimination] privilege in cases in which the state compels
the person to give up the ‘privilege by threatening to impose economic or other
sanctions “capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the [Fifth] Amendment
forbids.”’” Id., quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434, quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,
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431 U.S. 801, 806, 97 S. Ct. 2132 (1977). “Where it has threatened to do so, the
government has created a ‘classic penalty situation,’ and any answers given by the
suspect are ‘deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.’”
Goodpaster at 1024, quoting Murphy at 435.
{¶24} “[T]he constitutional protection ‘against coerced statements prohibits
use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of
removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other
members of our body politic.’” Graham at ¶ 21, quoting Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
See Goodpaster at 1024 (noting that the “‘loss of job, loss of state contracts, loss of
future contracting privileges with the state, loss of political office, loss of the right
to run for political office in the future, and revocation of probation all are “penalties”
that cannot be imposed on the exercise of the privilege’”), quoting United States v.
Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 658 (3d Cir.1991). See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511, 516, 87 S. Ct. 625 (1967) (applying the “classic-penalty-situation” rule to
lawyers and noting that “[t]he threat of disbarment and the loss of professional
standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of
compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege”); Moody v. Michigan Gaming
Control Bd., 790 F.3d 669, 674 (6th Cir.2015) (applying the rule to state-license
holders).
{¶25} In classic-penalty-situation cases,
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the government is playing two roles. One role is always law
enforcer—police and prosecutor. Often, as in Garrity, the second role
is employer, but it need not be. The key is that in these second roles,
the state has special relationships with certain people—employees,
probationers, and so on—through which it can apply additional
pressure to cooperate.
Goodpaster at 1024-1025.
Corresponding to these dual roles, the Fifth Amendment principle
implemented by Garrity can be implicated in two distinct contexts. In
the more common scenario, the individual does not succumb to the
state’s pressure, but stands upon his privilege and maintains his
silence; in this context, he appears as a civil plaintiff, seeking to
prevent the government—employer from “mak[ing] good on its prior
threat” by penalizing him.
Id., quoting Murphy at 434. “But sometimes, as in Garrity and Murphy, the
individual succumbs to the pressure and discloses incriminating information; in this
context, he appears as a criminal defendant, seeking to prevent the government—
prosecutor from using his statements against him.” Id., citing Murphy at 434.
{¶26} “Garrity does not, however, discount the important public interest in
obtaining information to ensure effective governmental functioning.” Graham at ¶
21, citing Turley, 414 U.S. at 81, citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 93, 84 S. Ct. 1594 (1964) (White, J., concurring). “Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that Garrity rests on reconciling the
recognized policies behind the privilege against self-incrimination and the
government’s need to obtain information.” Id., citing Turley at 81. See also
Goodpaster at 1025, citing Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276, 88 S. Ct. 1913
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(1968) and Murphy at 435. “A state may compel a public employee’s cooperation
in a job-related investigation, so long as the employee is not asked to surrender the
privilege against self-incrimination.” Graham at ¶ 21, citing Turley at 84. “For
example, the state may compel incriminating answers from its employee if neither
those answers nor the fruits thereof are available for use against the employee in
criminal proceedings.” Id., citing Turley at 84 and Jones v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff,
52 Ohio St. 3d 40, 44 (1990) (stating that a grant of immunity preserves the self-
incrimination privilege because no statement made in that context is incriminatory).
“But when the state compels testimony by threatening potent sanctions unless the
witness surrenders the constitutional privilege, the state obtains the testimony in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, and it may not use that testimony against the
witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.” Id., citing Cunningham, 431 U.S. at
805 and State v. Jackson, 125 Ohio St. 3d 218, 2010-Ohio-621, ¶ 14 (plurality
opinion) (noting that the State may not directly or derivatively use statements that
are compelled under threat of termination). “This balance ‘provid[es] for
effectuation of the important public interest in securing from public employees an
accounting of their public trust.’” Id., quoting Cunningham at 806.
{¶27} “Compulsion within the meaning of Garrity is obvious in cases in
which, as in Garrity, the state has expressly confronted the public employee with
the inescapable choice of either making an incriminatory statement or being fired.”
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(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 23. In the absence of an express threat, “‘“for statements
to be considered compelled by threat of discharge, (1) a person must subjectively
believe that he will be fired for asserting the privilege, and (2) that belief must be
objectively reasonable under the circumstances.”’” Id., quoting State v. Brockdorf,
291 Wis. 2d 635, 2006 WI 76, ¶ 25, quoting People v. Sapp, 934 P.2d 1367, 1372
(Colo.1997). “Determining whether an employee’s subjective belief was
objectively reasonable requires a court to examine the totality of the circumstances.”
Id., citing Brockdorf at ¶ 36. “The circumstances must show some demonstrable
coercive action by the state beyond ‘[t]he general directive to cooperate.’” Id.,
quoting United States v. Vangates, 287 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir.2002).
{¶28} In this case, after concluding that there was no express threat of
penalty by Investigator Yoakam, the trial court examined whether Gideon
subjectively believed that he would be penalized and, if so, whether that belief was
objectively reasonable. The trial court found that Gideon “testified that he believed
he would be penalized” if he did not answer Investigator Yoakam’s questions. And,
in our review, the trial court’s finding is supported by competent, credible evidence
because Gideon testified as follows:
“My understanding is that I have a legal obligation to comply with
questions asked by the Medical Board and my understanding was that
I have an obligation to comply with Mr. Yoakam’s visit subject to
penalties if I didn’t, potentially even loss of licensure.”
(Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 72).
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{¶29} Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately concluded that Gideon’s belief
was not objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.
Specifically, the trial court found that Gideon,
a well-educated individual, initiated contact with the investigator,
spoke with him at his medical office after already communicating
with law enforcement, was given the opportunity to reschedule, took
the lead in the discussion throughout, treated/examined patients, and
never sought to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.
(Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 17); (Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 17);
(Case No. 17CRB01387, Doc. No. 14). Even though the trial court’s findings are
primarily supported by competent, credible evidence, the trial court’s totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis necessarily applies to whether Gideon’s statements were
voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, or whether his statements
should be suppressed under Miranda.5 See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226
(noting that a court may consider a defendant’s age, education, intelligence, and
knowledge of his rights; the duration and nature of the detention and questioning;
and whether physical punishment was used or threatened to determine whether the
defendant’s statements were voluntary); Billenstein, 2014-Ohio-255, at ¶ 44 (noting
that the factors to consider when determining whether a custodial interrogation took
5
The trial court’s finding that Gideon “was given the opportunity to reschedule” is not supported by
competent, credible evidence. (Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 17); (Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No.
17); (Case No. 17CRB01387, Doc. No. 14). Rather, the record reflects that Investigator Yoakam asked
Gideon “if he would have a few minutes to chat with” him, which is different than offering Gideon the
opportunity to reschedule. (See Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 5). (See also State’s Ex. A). Indeed, Gideon testified
that Yoakam did not explicitly offer him the opportunity to reschedule. (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 73).
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place includes “(1) the location of the questioning; (2) duration of the questioning;
(3) statements made during the interview; (4) the presence or absence of physical
restraints; and (5) whether the interviewee was released at the end of the interview”).
{¶30} In considering the totality of the circumstances as to whether a person
was compelled to make statements against his or her own interest within the
meaning of Garrity—that is, whether the subject’s subjective belief that he or she
would be penalized for remaining silent was objectively reasonable—a trial court
must consider the circumstances surrounding the subject’s “‘duty to cooperate’ and
the threat of ‘administrative discipline.’” Goodpaster, 65 F. Supp. at 1032. See also
Graham, 136 Ohio St. 3d 125, 2013-Ohio-2114, at ¶ 27. As to those circumstances,
the trial court specifically found that
the Board of Medical Examiners may consider a refusal to cooperate
with their investigations when reviewing Complaints, this does not
necessarily lead to a termination of his medical license. It just may be
one of the many considerations taken into account by the Board.
(Case No. 17CRB01385, Doc. No. 17); (Case No. 17CRB01386, Doc. No. 17);
(Case No. 17CRB01387, Doc. No. 14). See R.C. 4731.22 (Apr. 4, 2017) (current
version at R.C. 4731.22 (Mar. 20, 2019)).
{¶31} In our view, the trial court did not capture the concept of the statute
and, more importantly, failed to consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding Gideon’s interview with Investigator Yoakam to determine whether
suppression is warranted under Garrity. Indeed, we cannot turn a blind eye to the
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totality of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supporting that
Gideon’s belief (that he would be penalized if he remained silent) was objectively
reasonable. The requirements of R.C. 4731.22 are but one piece of the puzzle.
R.C. Chapter 4731 and Garrity
{¶32} “R.C. Chapter 4731 provides for the establishment of the State
Medical Board and contains provisions concerning the licensing and disciplining of
physicians.” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St. 3d 551, 557 (2001). In general,
the board “has authority to investigate possible violations of the statutes and rules
governing the practice of medicine, to hold hearings, and to share its information
with other licensing boards and with law enforcement agencies.” 1999 Ohio
Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 1999-044, citing R.C. 4731.22(F). See also R.C. 4731.22(F)(1)
(April 6, 2017) (“The board shall investigate evidence that appears to show that
person has violated any provision of this chapter or any rule adopted under it.”)
(current version at R.C. 4731.22(F)(1) ((Mar. 20, 2019)).. “All investigations that
are conducted by the Board are conducted in accordance with R.C. 4731.22 and the
rules adopted by the Board under R.C. 4731.05.” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76730, 1999 WL 1085519, *8 (Nov. 24, 1999), rev’d on other
grounds, 90 Ohio St. 3d at 557-558.6 In accordance with those investigations, the
6
This court could not find any administrative rules adopted by the State Medical Board pertaining to the
conduct of its investigators during the course of an investigation under R.C. 4731.22. See Ohio Adm.Code
4731-1-01, et seq. But see R.C. 4731.05(C) (stating that “[t]he state medical board shall develop requirements
for and provide appropriate initial and continuing training for investigators employed by the board to carry
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board “is authorized to limit, revoke, or suspend a certificate or otherwise discipline
the holder of a certificate who commits any of a number of violations.” 1999 Ohio
Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 1999-044, citing R.C. 4731.22(A), (B).
{¶33} In particular, regarding the board’s disciplinary procedure, R.C.
4731.22(B) provides, in its relevant part, as follows:
The board, by an affirmative vote of not fewer than six members,
shall, to the extent permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend an
individual’s certificate to practice * * * or reprimand or place on
probation the holder of a certificate for one or more of the following
reasons:
***
(11) A plea of guilty to, a judicial finding of guilt of, or a judicial
finding of eligibility for intervention in lieu of conviction for, a
misdemeanor committed in the course of practice;
(12) Commission of an act in the course of practice that constitutes a
misdemeanor in this state, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the
act was committed;
(13) A plea of guilty to, a judicial finding of guilt of, or a judicial
finding of eligibility for intervention in lieu of conviction for, a
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude;
(14) Commission of an act involving moral turpitude that constitutes
a misdemeanor in this state, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the
act was committed;
***
out its duties under Chapter 4731. of the Revised Code. The training and continuing education may include
enrollment in courses operated or approved by the Ohio peace officer training commission that the board
considers appropriate under conditions set forth in section 109.79 of the Revised Code.”).
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(34) Failure to cooperate in an investigation conducted by the board
under division (F) of this section, including failure to comply with a
subpoena or order issued by the board or failure to answer truthfully
a question presented by the board in an investigative interview, an
investigative office conference, at a deposition, or in written
interrogatories, except that failure to cooperate with an investigation
shall not constitute grounds for discipline under this section if a court
of competent jurisdiction has issued an order that either quashes a
subpoena or permits the individual to withhold the testimony or
evidence in issue.
R.C. 4731.22(B)(11)-(14), (34) (Apr. 4. 2017) (current version at R.C.
4731.22(B)(11)-(14), (34) (Mar. 20, 2019)).
{¶34} On appeal, the State argues that the trial court correctly concluded that
Gideon’s belief that he would suffer a penalty if he remained silent was not
objectively reasonable—that is, the State argues that the trial court correctly
concluded that Gideon’s belief was not objectively reasonable because R.C.
4731.22(B) does not result in an automatic penalty. In support of its argument, the
State contends that the word “shall” as used in R.C. 4731.22(B) “does not mandate
a medical license revocation, because the statute (1) requires an affirmative vote of
six board members; (2) provides limiting language on the board’s powers (‘to the
extent permitted by law’); and, (3) provides a variety of disciplinary options short
of revocation.” (Emphasis sic.) (Appellee’s Brief at 5-6).
{¶35} The State’s argument is problematic for a several reasons. The State’s
argument that Gideon’s belief could not be objectively reasonable because R.C.
4731.22(B) authorizes the board to institute a “variety of disciplinary options short
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of license revocation” is misguided. Rather, the disciplinary options authorized by
the statute—namely, the authority to limit, revoke, suspend, reprimand, or place on
probation the holder of a medical license—are penalties for conduct, such as the
failure to cooperate in an investigation, that resemble the “classic penalty situation”
prohibited by Garrity and its progeny. See Schimmel, 2017-Ohio-7747, at ¶ 38
(recognizing that the Supreme Court of Ohio has not adopted a “narrow view” of
what constitutes a penalty within the meaning of Garrity), citing Graham, 136 Ohio
St.3d 125, 2013-Ohio-2114, at ¶ 27 (considering “disciplinary action up to and
including termination” as a penalty within the meaning of Garrity). See also
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 (“In each of the so-called ‘penalty’ cases, the state not only
compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo
the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other
sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment
forbids.’”), quoting Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806 (noting that the Fifth Amendment
protects against state-imposed “potent sanctions” or “substantial penalties”).
{¶36} Next, suppression under Garrity does not fail in the absence of a
statute clearly mandating an automatic penalty. See Goodpaster, 65 F. Supp. at 1029
(stating that “a clear-statement rule is foreclosed [because] threatening a penalty ‘by
implication’ is sufficient to create a penalty situation”), quoting United States v.
Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073, 1076-1080 (9th Cir.2005). See also Graham at ¶ 25
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(considering a notice, which provided that the “failure to answer truthfully ‘may
lead to disciplinary action up to and including termination’”); United States v.
Camacho, 739 F. Supp. 1504, 1517, 1520 (S.D.Fla.1990) (considering a statute,
which provided “that a city employee who is guilty of insubordination may be
subject to dismissal, suspension, or demotion” when considered in combination with
the state’s conduct). “[E]vidence of an express threat of termination or a statute,
rule, or policy demanding termination will almost always be sufficient to show
coercion”; however, it is not the only evidence that can be considered. (Emphasis
added.) See Graham at ¶ 24; Walker v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 01AP-791, 2002 WL 243318, *5 (Feb. 21, 2002) (“The potential loss of her
medical license does not, in and of itself, raise a claim of compulsion by the state.”);
State v. Connor, 124 Idaho 547, 548, 861 P.2d 1212 (1993) (stating that evidence
of a “policy, rule, or regulation concerning the effect on the employment of a state
police officer who refuses to cooperate in an investigation” is evidence of “an
objectively reasonable belief that [the] use of the Fifth Amendment in response to
questions would result in” the loss of a job).
{¶37} Further, the State’s contention that “the mere possibility of license
revocation is insufficient to show that the person had an objectively reasonable
expectation of discharge” misconstrues the Supreme Court of Ohio’s recitation in
Graham. (Appellee’s Brief at 6, citing Graham at ¶ 23, citing Sapp, 934 P.2d at
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Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
1372). In Graham, the court offered that “‘ordinary job pressures, such as the
possibility of discipline or discharge for insubordination, are not sufficient to
support an objectively reasonable expectation of discharge.’” (Emphasis added.)
Graham at ¶ 23, quoting Sapp at 1372. The case to which the court cited in
Graham—Sapp—follows its “ordinary-job-pressures” statement with the rule that
for a “subjective belief that [a person] might be fired to be considered objectively
reasonable for purposes of Garrity immunity, it must be supported by some
demonstrable action of the state.”7 Sapp at 1372. Thus, a subjective belief will be
considered objectively reasonable if the state played a role in creating an impression
that the refusal to give a statement will be met with the type of penalty prohibited
under Garrity. Camacho at 1515, citing United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863,
871-872 (2d Cir.1975) and United States v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411, 415 (2d
Cir.1974).
{¶38} The evidence in the record reflects that the circumstances surrounding
the administrative investigation at issue in this case show some demonstrable,
coercive action by the state beyond the general directive to cooperate. Indeed, the
combination of Gideon’s duty to cooperate under R.C. 4731.22(B)(34) and
Investigator Yoakam’s process in this case exceeded an ordinary job pressure to
7
The Supreme Court of Ohio was not presented in Graham with a situation involving a subjective belief that
a person might suffer a penalty because the sanction in that case was expressly conveyed. See State v.
Graham, 136 Ohio St. 3d 125, 2013-Ohio-2114, ¶ 25.
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cooperate. As we have noted, R.C. 4731.22(B)(34) requires licensees to cooperate
with investigations of the board.8 Compare Goodpaster at 1029 (noting that
“Goodpaster was subject to a regulation * * * requiring that he ‘cooperate with all
audits, reviews, and investigations conducted by the Office of Inspector General’”),
quoting 39 C.F.R. 230.3(a). R.C. 4731.22(B) puts licensees on notice that their
failure to cooperate, amongst other reasons, will penalize their license (by a vote of
no fewer than six members of the board). Compare id. (“The same regulation
provides that ‘failing to cooperate [* * *] may be grounds for disciplinary or other
legal action.’”), quoting 39 C.F.R. 230.3(a).
{¶39} Further, in addition to R.C. 4731.22(B)(34)’s directive to cooperate
with the board’s investigation, the record reflects “some demonstrable action of the
state” supporting Gideon’s subjective belief. See Sapp at 1372; Camacho at 1518.
In this case, the demonstrable action of the State lies with Investigator Yoakam’s
conduct and his intent underlying that conduct. Compare Camacho, 739 F. Supp. at
8
It appears that the State contends that R.C. 4731.22(B)(34)’s duty to cooperate requires only that a subject
answer truthfully questions posed by an investigator of the board during an interview. Compare United
States v. Goodpaster, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1029 (D.Or.2014) (noting that “[a]n order to ‘cooperate’ demands
more of the reasonable employee than an order merely to be ‘truthful’”), citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465
U.S. 420, 434, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984) (observing that “Murphy’s probation condition [to be truthful]
proscribed only false statements”). That is, the State argues that “[t]elling falsehoods * * * is different than
remaining silent, and the Fifth Amendment is not implicated.” (Appellee’s Brief at 6). However, the text of
that subsection of the statute states that a subject must cooperate in investigations of the board. R.C.
4731.22(B)(34) proceeds to provide a non-exhaustive list of ways in which a subject must cooperate with an
investigation of the board—only one of which is to provide truthful answers to questions presented by the
board in an investigative interview. See In re Hartman, 2 Ohio St. 3d 154, 155-156 (1983) (noting that the
word “‘including’ implies that that which follows is a partial, not an exhaustive listing of all that is subsumed
within the stated category. ‘Including’ is a word of expansion rather than one of limitation or restriction.”).
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Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
1518-1519 (construing the evidence in the record reflecting the “actions of the
investigators” to determine whether there was “demonstrable state conduct” and,
thus, whether the defendants’ beliefs that they would penalized for asserting their
Fifth Amendment rights were objectively reasonable).
{¶40} At the suppression hearing, Investigator Yoakam testified to the extent
that he collaborated with law enforcement as part of his investigation—that is, he
specifically stated that the investigation of Gideon “turned into a joint
investigation.” (Aug. 22, 2017 Tr. at 4); (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 7, 20-21). Indeed,
Sergeant Hochstetler concurred that he and Investigator Yoakam agreed “to
cooperate with each other” during the course of their investigations. (Oct. 13, 2017
Tr. at 51-52). By cooperating, Sergeant Hochstetler clarified that meant that he and
Investigator Yoakam would share information. Investigator Yoakam elaborated
that the Revised Code permits him to share information obtained as part of his
investigations with law enforcement and that he will share such information if there
is “a shared interest.” (Id. at 19-20). Investigator Yoakam further testified that he
shared the information he collected (regarding Gideon) with the Bluffton Police
Department.
{¶41} Undeniably, R.C. 4731.22(F) provides, in relevant part, the following:
(3) In investigating a possible violation of this chapter or any rule
adopted under this chapter, * * * the board may question witnesses,
conduct interviews, administer oaths, order the taking of depositions,
inspect and copy any books, accounts, papers, records, or documents,
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Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
issue subpoenas, and compel the attendance of witnesses and
production of books, accounts, papers, records, documents, and
testimony, except that a subpoena for patient record information shall
not be issued without consultation with the attorney general’s office
and approval of the secretary and supervising member of the board.
***
(4) All * * * investigations * * * of the board shall be considered civil
actions for the purposes of section 2305.252 of the Revised Code.
(5) * * *
The board may share any information it receives pursuant to an
investigation * * * with law enforcement agencies, other licensing
boards, and other governmental agencies that are prosecuting,
adjudicating, or investigating alleged violations of statutes or
administrative rules.
R.C. 4731.22(F)(3)-(5) (Apr. 6, 2017) (current version at R.C. 4731.22(F)(3)-(5)
(Mar. 20, 2019)).9
{¶42} Thus, while there is nothing inherently wrong with Investigator
Yoakam and law enforcement’s agreement to share information, the evidence in the
record reveals that Investigator Yoakam exceeded statutorily permissible
collaboration by taking demonstrable steps to coerce Gideon to provide him an
9
R.C. 2305.252 applies to peer-review privilege. See, e.g., Cousino v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-17-1218, 2018-Ohio-1550, ¶ 15 (“The purpose of this statute is to protect the integrity and
confidentiality of the peer review process so that health care entities have the freedom to meaningfully review
and critique—and thereby improve—the overall quality of the healthcare services they provide.”). The
statute also applies the peer-review privilege to only the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”);
however, the statute excepts the BWC to “share proceedings and records within the scope of the peer review
committee * * * with law enforcement agencies, licensing boards, and other governmental agencies that are
prosecuting, adjudicating, or investigating alleged violations of applicable statutes or administrative rules”.
R.C. 2305.252(B).
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incriminating, oral and written statement in reliance on Gideon’s duty to cooperate.
In other words, Investigator Yoakam was posing as a “straw man” to effectuate law
enforcement’s criminal investigation. See State v. Gradisher, 9th Dist. Summit No.
24716, 2009-Ohio-6433, ¶ 23 (Belfance, J., dissenting) (approving the “concern that
government agents should not pose as ‘straw men’ in order to effectuate police
investigations”). Specifically, Investigator Yoakam contacted Sergeant Hochstetler
prior to interviewing Gideon, and “discussed that [he] was going to hold off on the
administrative investigation until [law enforcement determined] that [Investigator
Yoakam] could interview [Gideon].” (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 7-8). Investigator
Yoakam’s intention for sharing his investigative plan with law enforcement was to
“determine how [law enforcement] was going to proceed with the criminal case”
because proving an administrative-sanction case is easier “from a criminal
conviction” as opposed to “through witness testimony.” (Id. at 15-16). That is, he
elaborated that his method is “what they call a bootstrap on a criminal case that’s
where a physician * * * is criminally charged, and the Board takes action on that
criminal disposition, and the other [is] based on information gathered in the course
of an investigation. Action that’s taken based on that.” (Id. at 15).
{¶43} Prior to Investigator Yoakam’s interview of Gideon, Sergeant
Hochstetler told Investigator Yoakam that Gideon “denied any improprieties during
[law enforcement’s] interview” of Gideon. (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 21, 55). And, after
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discussing Gideon’s denials to law enforcement with Sergeant Hochstetler,
Investigator Yoakam informed Sergeant Hochstetler that it would not be
“appropriate” for law enforcement to jointly interview Gideon with Investigator
Yoakam. (Id. at 28, 55-56). Specifically, Investigator Yoakam testified that
doctor’s [sic] are obligated to cooperate in our investigation. So [he]
did not want that to * * * impede in * * * any of the criminal
proceedings…And [he] didn’t want * * * there to be an issue that the
doctor provided a statement with law enforcement present because the
provider is obligated to cooperate in our investigations.
(Emphasis added.) (Id. at 29). (See also Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 55); (Defendant’s Ex.
4). In other words, Investigator Yoakam’s method was to avoid a scenario in which
his interview (of Gideon) could not be used as part of the criminal case because (as
indicated by Investigator Yoakam) the lack of a criminal conviction would make his
administrative-sanction case more cumbersome. Compare Gradisher at ¶ 23
(Belfance, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that “government overreaching could
easily occur by pushing off criminal investigations to state agents so as to bypass
protection against the abridgement of an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights”);
Camacho, 739 F. Supp. at 1519 (noting that the investigator’s action in purposely
omitting “his preamble regarding voluntariness and compulsion * * * in order to
avoid flagging the issue of voluntariness” “speaks louder” than any belief that the
statements were voluntary and concluding that “the investigators’ central aim was
to take a statement first and litigate its admissibility later”).
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{¶44} Moreover, based on our review of the record, Investigator Yoakam’s
intent for the investigation reflects the demonstrable state action necessary to
support Gideon’s subjective belief that his medical license would be penalized if he
failed to cooperate with Investigator Yoakam’s investigation. Specifically,
Investigator Yoakam’s interview of Gideon reflects his intent to assist law
enforcement in obtaining a criminal conviction of Gideon for purposes of
influencing the outcome the administrative-sanction case against Gideon.
{¶45} Even though he is not a law enforcement officer, Investigator Yoakam
testified that he had law enforcement training and is familiar with the elements of
offenses under the Revised Code, including sexual imposition. Keeping his training
in mind, Investigator Yoakam arrived unannounced to Gideon’s medical office to
conduct his interview to catch him “off guard” “to get the truth out of [him].” (Oct.
13, 2017 Tr. at 5, 32-33). Despite Gideon having patient appointments at the time
of the visit, Investigator Yoakam did not advise Gideon that he did not have to speak
with him that day or otherwise offer to reschedule—he merely asked Gideon “if he
would have a few minutes to chat with” him. (Id. at 5). (See also State’s Ex. A).
In other words, Investigator Yoakam did nothing to dissuade Gideon’s belief that
he was statutorily obligated to cooperate with his investigation, which included
consenting to Investigator Yoakam’s request to “chat.” Compare Camacho at 1511
(“At no time during the interview or after did either Sergeant Green or Assistant
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Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
State Attorney DiGregory make any effort to dissuade Sinclair of his view that he
was compelled to give a statement or answer his question.”).
{¶46} Likewise, and unbeknownst to Gideon, Investigator Yoakam recorded
the interview even though it is not the board’s “protocol” to surreptitiously record
interviews of subjects. (See Aug. 22, 2017 Tr. at 5-6); (State’s Ex. A). (See also
Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 7, 13). Rather, as a “general practice” of his office, Investigator
Yoakam secretly records interviews of subjects involving sexual-impropriety
allegations. (Aug. 22, 2017 Tr. at 5-6). (See also Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 7, 33-34).
Further, Investigator Yoakam testified that he does not inform providers that they
are being recorded because “[s]ometimes if * * * a provider knows that they’re
being recorded then they’re more guarded in what they say.” (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at
34). Moreover, Investigator Yoakam chose not to inform Gideon that he intended
to share with law enforcement Gideon’s statements despite it being his intention to
do so.
{¶47} During the two-hour “chat,” Investigator Yoakam pressured Gideon
“that [he] wanted to get [the] interview done there * * * on all the subjects [he]
wanted to address, because [he] did not want to return” and that he “did not want to
drag him through the mud by interviewing multiple people.” (Emphasis added.)
(Id. at 39). Compare Camacho, 739 F. Supp. at 1518 (considering the evidence that
the defendants were not asked to provide statements, but rather, directed to provide
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Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
statements and the evidence that the investigators would not “even answer [the]
question as to whether the inquiry was administrative or criminal in nature”).
{¶48} In addition, during the interview, Investigator Yoakam advised
Gideon at multiple points to “to go back to [law enforcement] and change his
statement” to avoid facing possible falsification charges. (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 22).
Investigator Yoakam’s insistence that Gideon return to law enforcement to change
his statement is also evidence supporting Gideon’s belief that a refusal to give a
statement will be met with a licensure penalty. That is, Investigator Yoakam’s
insistence that Gideon provide law enforcement with a statement reflects an intent
to coerce Gideon to cooperate with the investigation. Indeed, (as raised during
cross-examination) if Investigator Yoakam was “just concerned about [the] medical
investigation there would be no need to tell [Gideon] to go back to the police
department and change his statement * * *.” (Id. at 22).
{¶49} The record also reflects that Gideon and Investigator Yoakam
possessed an implicit, trust-like relationship and that Investigator Yoakam exploited
that relationship to satisfy his ulterior motive of coercing Gideon into making
statements against his interest for law enforcement to ultimately obtain a criminal
conviction against him. That is, Gideon and Investigator Yoakam had a 15-year
relationship during which Investigator Yoakam investigated a prior complaint
against Gideon (which was determined to be unsubstantiated). Based on their prior
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Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
relationship, Gideon initially contacted Investigator Yoakam by text message to
inform him of the complaints at issue in this case. Likewise, Investigator Yoakam
can be heard during the beginning of the interview recalling their past relationship
by reminding Gideon that he has never “judged” him in their past dealings—a
characterization to which Gideon agrees. The record further reflects that
Investigator Yoakam was aware of Gideon’s religious beliefs and, as such, used the
words “confession” and “reconciliation” during his interview of Gideon because
Investigator Yoakam “figured he could relate to that.” (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 41).
{¶50} At the conclusion of the interview, instead of reporting back to the
board, Investigator Yoakam immediately went to the Bluffton Police Department to
report Gideon’s confessions to law enforcement. (See Defendant’s Ex. 2). Despite
his employment responsibilities with the State Medical Board, Investigator Yoakam
chose to immediately share Gideon’s confessions with law enforcement “because
the doctor had [] an interview with [law enforcement] where he denied any
impropriety so [he] wanted to tell [law enforcement] what happened during [his]
interview.” (Oct. 13, 2017 Tr. at 26-27). Moreover, Investigator Yoakam agreed
that he “wanted to assist [law enforcement] in that criminal investigation by
providing [law enforcement] with statements made by Dr. Gideon during an
interview that same day * * *[.]” (Id. at 27).
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Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
{¶51} Accordingly, we conclude that, based on the facts and circumstances
presented by this case, Investigator Yoakam’s actions created an impression that
Gideon’s refusal to cooperate with his investigation would result in the type of
penalty prohibited under Garrity. See Camacho at 1520 (concluding “that the
actions of the State were directly implicated in creating [the] belief” that the
defendants’ subjective belief “that failure to answer would result in termination”).
Therefore, Gideon’s belief that his medical license would be penalized if he did not
cooperate with Investigator Yoakam’s investigation was objectively reasonable.
See id. Thus, Gideon’s statements were not voluntary within the meaning of
Garrity. Accord Graham, 136 Ohio St. 3d 125, 2013-Ohio-2114, at ¶ 30
(“Statements extracted under these circumstances cannot be considered voluntary
within the meaning of Garrity.”); Goodpaster, 65 F. Supp. at 1033 (Under the facts
presented, the Government created a ‘classic penalty situation’ by threatening to
punish Goodpaster for remaining silent. Accordingly, under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Garrity v. New Jersey and its progeny, Goodpaster’s statements must be
suppressed.”).
{¶52} For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying
Gideon’s motion to suppress oral and written statements that he made to Investigator
Yoakam as evidence. His first assignment of error is sustained.
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Case Nos. 1-18-27, 1-18-28, 1-18-29
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court’s Order Consolidating the Separately-Docketed
Sexual Imposition Charges for the Trial Exposed Defendant-
Appellant to a Substantial Likelihood that the Jury Would
“Bootstrap” the Allegations of Different Patients in
Contravention of Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2907.06(B), and
Thereby Violated His Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Right to
a Fundamentally Fair Jury Trial. (Apx. A-19; 04/20/18 Tr. 82-84;
04/21/18 Tr. 20-21)
Assignment of Error No. III
The Trial Court’s Instructions and the Prosecutor’s Closing
Argument Encouraged the Jurors to Consider the Testimony of
One Alleged Victim as Corroboration of the Testimony of
Another Alleged Victim in Contravention of Evid.R. 404(B) and
R.C. 2907.06(B), and Thereby Violated Defendant-Appellant’s
Right to a Fundamentally Fair Jury Trial Under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
(04/18/18 Tr. 115-17; 04/21/18 44, 104-05, 114-15)
Assignment of Error No. IV
Defendant-Appellant’s Conviction for Sexual Imposition as to
Former Patient [M.M.] is Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence
to Satisfy the Requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Alternatively, the Jury’s Guilty Verdict is Against the Manifest
Weight of the Evidence. (04/20/18 Tr. 79; 04/21/18 Tr. 20-21).
{¶53} In his second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Gideon argues
that: (1) he was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court’s order consolidating the cases
for purposes of trial; (2) the trial court and the State improperly encouraged the jury
to consider the testimony of one victim as corroborating evidence of the veracity of
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another victim’s testimony; and (3) his conviction in case number 17CRB01385 is
based on insufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶54} In light of our decision to sustain Gideon’s first assignment of error,
his second, third, and fourth assignments of error are rendered moot, and we decline
to address them. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c); State v. Unger, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016 CA
00148, 2017-Ohio-5553, ¶ 22; State v. Caldwell, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 97-CA-802,
1998 WL 8847, *2 (Jan. 8, 1998). See also State v. Ecker, 9th Dist. Summit No.
28431, 2018-Ohio-940, ¶ 10-12 (suggesting that joinder decisions are ripe for
review after the trial court has had the opportunity to evaluate a defendant’s Crim.R.
14 motion for severance at trial).
{¶55} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars
assigned and argued in his first assignment of error, we reverse the judgments of the
trial court and remand for further proceedings.
Judgments Reversed and
Causes Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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