State v. Matharu

[Cite as State v. Matharu, 2017-Ohio-8251.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 26985
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2014-CR-1117
:
HARINDER MATHARU : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 20th day of October, 2017.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division,
Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JOHN S. PINARD, Atty. Reg. No. 0085567, 120 West Second Street, Suite 603, Dayton,
Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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TUCKER, J.
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Harinder Matharu appeals from the trial court's
judgment finding him guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide and sentencing him to seven
years incarceration. Matharu contends that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of
no contest and that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed to
have him evaluated for competency prior to his plea.
{¶ 2} We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the conviction.
I. Facts and Proceedings
{¶ 3} On October 12, 2013, Matharu was involved in an accident when his vehicle
went left of center and collided with a vehicle operated by Amanda Looman. After being
in a coma for ten days, Looman was pronounced brain dead. An eyewitness to the
accident indicated that she observed Matharu’s vehicle approaching behind the witness’s
vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed. The witness further stated that when Matharu
attempted to pass her vehicle, he collided with the car driven by Looman. Matharu’s
blood alcohol level was more than double the legal limit and he was driving under a
suspended license.
{¶ 4} On May 22, 2014, Matharu was indicted on four counts of aggravated
vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06. Matharu entered a plea of not guilty.
On July 14, 2014, Matharu filed a motion to suppress evidence regarding the search of
his vehicle and the admission of the results of a blood draw taken while he was
hospitalized following the crash. A hearing was conducted on September 25, 2014,
following which the trial court overruled the motion to suppress. A jury trial was
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scheduled for October 27, 2015.
{¶ 5} During the final pretrial conference conducted on October 19, 2015, Matharu
raised the issue of his mental competence to stand trial. He then filed a document
entitled “Plea of Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity and Suggestion of Incompetency to
Stand Trial.” 1 On October 20, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding
whether, given Matharu’s suggested incompetency, a competency evaluation was
required. There was no disagreement that immediately after the collision, Matharu spent
40 days in the hospital, and that he was in a coma for approximately two weeks of that
time. Nor was there any disagreement that Matharu had suffered from bleeding in the
brain. Defense counsel indicated that Matharu was unable to recall the events of the
collision and that he also suffered from short-term memory loss. The State cited State
v. Brooks, 25 Ohio St.3d 144, 495 N.E.2d 407 (1986) and State v. Hoffer, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 17241, 1999 WL 335136 (May 28, 1999), for the proposition that
amnesia, by itself, does not render a defendant incompetent to stand trial.
{¶ 6} Matharu testified that he has trouble remembering things he has previously
told people and he forgets the details of books he is reading. Likewise, he stated that if
he watches a movie, he sometimes forgets the name of characters. He testified that he
sometimes forgets the day of the week as well as conversations he has had. He testified
that he remembered his counsel meeting with him the week before the hearing, and he
was able to recall some long term memories. He testified that he sometimes has to write
down information in order to remember it.
{¶ 7} The trial court declined to order a forensic competency evaluation. On
1 Matharu withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
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October 22, 2015, the court conducted a competency hearing. At that time no further
evidence was submitted, and Matharu rested upon his testimony from the October 20
hearing. The trial court rendered a decision and entry finding Matharu competent to
stand trial. In its decision, the trial court found, in pertinent part:
Matharu argues he is incompetent to stand trial due to short-term
memory loss and his inability to remember the events surrounding the
October 2013 collision. During the October 20, 2015 hearing, Matharu
testified that he is able to write down matters of importance if he chooses,
which he has done in the past, and that he recognizes his counsel * * *.
Matharu remembers meeting with his attorneys at jail and discussing the
motion to suppress hearings. He was able to recall that his wife informed
him of the status of his injury, a brain hemorrhage, and that he did not have
any treatment for this injury. Matharu remembers that his wife worked at
Kroger in Springfield, Ohio before Matharu’s collision and knew that she
currently works there. He was able to recall that he was at Miami Valley
Hospital following the collision and some of the treatment provided.
Matharu was able to testify that he was employed at a gas station in
Springfield, Ohio and that he remembered his friend, Jake, whom he met at
the gas station. Further, Matharu understood that a trial was looming.
***
Matharu’s testimony indicated that though he has some memory
loss, he has a remaining ability to counsel with his lawyers and an
understanding to some extent of the legal proceedings in his case.
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Further, his short-term memory loss is not a component of competency.
***
{¶ 8} The plea hearing was conducted immediately after the competency hearing.
A proper Crim.R. 11 colloquy was conducted. Matharu engaged with the court
appropriately and denied any problems that would render him unable to voluntarily and
knowingly enter the plea. Matharu entered a plea of no contest to one count of
aggravated vehicular homicide (OVI, driving under a suspended license) in violation of
R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a)/(B)(2)(b)(i). He was sentenced to a term of seven years in prison.
A timely appeal was filed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 9} Matharu’s sole assignment of error states as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO ORDER A COMPETENCY EVALUATION FOR
DEFENDANT.
{¶ 10} Matharu contends the trial court erred when it declined to order a
competency evaluation. In support, he argues that the trial court confused the issue of
his short-term memory loss with the issue of his amnesia of the events surrounding the
car crash. He further argues that the trial court improperly stated that “short-term
memory is not a component of competency.”
{¶ 11} “Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant
who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.” State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d
354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995). If a defendant “lacks the capacity to understand the
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nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist
in preparing his defense[,]” he may not stand trial. State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195,
2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 155.
{¶ 12} This due process right has been codified at R.C. 2945.37, which provides
in pertinent part:
(B) In a criminal action in a court of common pleas, * * * [the] defense may
raise the issue of the defendant's competence to stand trial. If the issue is
raised before the trial has commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on the
issue as provided in this section. * * *
(C) The court shall conduct the hearing required or authorized under
division (B) of this section within thirty days after the issue is raised, unless
the defendant has been referred for evaluation in which case the court shall
conduct the hearing within ten days after the filing of the report of the
evaluation * * *.
{¶ 13} R.C. 2945.371 provides that if the issue of a defendant's competence to
stand trial is raised under R.C. 2945.37, the court may order one or more, but not more
than three, evaluations of the defendant's present mental condition. Further, R.C.
2945.37(E) states that “[t]he prosecutor and defense counsel may submit evidence on
the issue of the defendant's competence to stand trial. A written report of the evaluation
of the defendant may be admitted into evidence at the hearing by stipulation, but, if either
the prosecution or defense objects to its admission, the report may be admitted under
sections 2317.36 to 2317.38 of the Revised Code or any other applicable statute or rule.”
{¶ 14} The use of the word “may” in these statutes indicates that the decision
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whether to order an examination is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. “Taken as
a whole, the provisions of R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.371 support the inference that when
the initial hearing on a competency motion is held, the trial court is only required to give
the defendant, or his counsel, the chance to submit evidence on the issue.” State v.
Bailey, 90 Ohio App.3d 58, 67, 627 N.E.2d 1078 (11th Dist. 1992). “If this evidence
raises a genuine question as to the defendant's competency, the court can order that one
or more evaluations be performed.” Id.; State v. Carson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2002-CA-
73, 2003-Ohio-5958, ¶ 30.
{¶ 15} Thus, we review the decision of the trial court regarding competency
evaluations for an abuse of discretion. State v. Curry, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-CA-50,
2014-Ohio-3836, ¶ 40; State v. Cook, 2016-Ohio-2823, 64 N.E.3d 350, ¶ 63 (5th Dist.);
State v. Patton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-800, 2009-Ohio-1382, ¶ 8. In order to find
that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the trial court's decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,
219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 16} In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the test is “ ‘
“whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” ’ ” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio
St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 32, citing State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d
354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995), quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct.
788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), quoting the argument of then Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin.
It is with this standard in mind that we review the evidence in this record to determine
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whether Matharu raised a genuine question of his competency to stand trial and whether
the trial court abused its discretion by declining to order an evaluation.
{¶ 17} A review of the transcript of the October 20, 2015 hearing shows that
Matharu’s responses to questions, both on direct and cross-examination, were coherent
and appropriate. While he did note some issues with his short-term memory, he did not
claim that it affected his ability to understand the proceedings against him or his ability to
assist counsel with his defense. Indeed, he clearly was aware of the nature of the
proceedings, and noted that he is able to, and does, take notes of things he wants to
remember. Further, he was able to remember his attorneys, when he had spent time
conferring with them, and the topic about which they met.
{¶ 18} We do not agree that the trial court confused the issue of amnesia of the
accident with the issue of short-term memory loss. The amnesia was raised by Matharu
during the initial hearing, and the trial court correctly noted that Matharu’s inability to
remember the collision does not, by itself, render him incompetent. The trial court then
went on to address the short-term memory issues. We do, however, take issue with the
trial court’s blanket statement that short-term memory loss is not a component of
competency. We can envision numerous scenarios in which such memory loss could
effectively negate a criminal defendant’s ability to assist counsel in his defense. But, in
this case, on this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to order an evaluation as Matharu’s testimony did not raise a genuine question
of his ability to understand the proceedings or to aid his attorneys.
{¶ 19} Accordingly, Matharu’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
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III. Conclusion
{¶ 20} Matharu’s sole assignment of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
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FROELICH, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Andrew T. French
John S. Pinard
Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz