State v. Salahuddin

[Cite as State v. Salahuddin, 2018-Ohio-1943.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2017-CA-50
:
v. : T.C. NO. 2017-CR-222
:
MUHAMMAD I. SALAHUDDIN : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 18th day of May, 2018.
...........
NATHANIEL LUKEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0087864, 55 Greene Street, First Floor, Xenia, Ohio
45385
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
PHILLIP HOOVER, Atty. Reg. No. 0034386, 77 West Main Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
DONOVAN, J.
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{¶ 1} On April 28, 2017, defendant-appellant, Muhammad I. Salahuddin, was
indicted for the following offenses, to wit: Count I: trafficking in heroin, in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree; Count II: possession of a controlled substance
analog, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; Count III: trafficking in
heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree; Count IV:
possession of a controlled substance analog, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of
the fifth degree; Count V: trafficking in heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony
of the fifth degree; Count VI: possession of a controlled substance analog, in violation of
R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; Count VII: trafficking in heroin, in violation
of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the third degree; Count VIII: possession of heroin, in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; Count IX: aggravated possession
of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree; Count X: possession
of a controlled substance analog, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth
degree. Also attached to the indictment was a specification indicating that a maroon
2007 Chrysler 300 owned by Salahuddin was subject to forfeiture.
{¶ 2} At his arraignment on May 5, 2017, Salahuddin pled not guilty to all of the
offenses contained in the indictment. A jury trial was originally scheduled to be held on
July 10, 2017. However, at a hearing held on July 12, 2017, Salahuddin pled guilty to
Counts III, V, VII, and IX in return for dismissal of the remaining counts in the indictment.
The trial court accepted Salahuddin’s pleas and found him guilty of the four counts. The
trial court also ordered the Greene County Adult Probation Department to prepare a pre-
sentence investigation report (PSI). We note that at the plea hearing, Salahuddin
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indicated to the trial court that he was currently on post-release control for a previous
conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.
{¶ 3} At Salahuddin’s disposition on August 25, 2017, the trial court sentenced him
as follows: Count III, trafficking in heroin, 18 months; Count V, trafficking in heroin, 12
months; Count VII, trafficking in heroin, 36 months; and Count IX, aggravated possession
of drugs, to wit: fentanyl, a Schedule II drug, 12 months. The trial court ordered
Salahuddin’s sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 78
months. Significantly, the record establishes that at no time did Salahuddin object to the
sentence imposed by the trial court, nor did he file a pre- or post-sentence motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas. Salahuddin filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on
September 12, 2017.
{¶ 4} Salahuddin’s appeal is now properly before this Court.
{¶ 5} Salahuddin’s sole assignment of error is as follows:
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
TRIAL COUNSEL ADVISING APPELLANT TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA
TO POSSESSION OF FENTANYL WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
THAT APPELLANT HAD THE REQUISITE MENTAL STATE FOR
CONVICION [sic].
{¶ 6} In his sole assignment, Salahuddin contends that he received ineffective
assistance when his counsel advised him to plead guilty to Count IX, aggravated
possession of drugs, because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
for that offense. Specifically, Salahuddin argues that a statement made by his counsel
at sentencing suggested that Salahuddin believed that he had purchased heroin to traffic,
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not fentanyl. Therefore, Salahuddin argues that he could not be convicted for Count IX
because the State would have been unable to prove that he “knowingly” possessed
fentanyl, which is an element of the offense. We also note that according to the PSI,
Salahuddin claimed that he did not know that the drug he had purchased and was selling
as heroin contained fentanyl. However, Salahuddin also remarked to the drafter of the
PSI that, “It’s not like I forced him to buy it.” We note that in the instant appeal,
Salahuddin does not challenge his convictions and sentences for Counts III, V, and VII.
Salahuddin’s assignment of error relates solely to whether he received ineffective
assistance when he was advised to plead guilty to Count IX, to wit: aggravated
possession of fentanyl.
{¶ 7} We evaluate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments in light of the two-
pronged analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under that analysis, to reverse a conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was
deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and that the
defendant was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Id. at 668. State v. Bradley, 42
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). To succeed on such a claim, there must be a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
defendant's trial would have been different. Id.{¶ 8} A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. State v. Faulkner, 2d Dist.
Champaign No. 2013-CA-43, 2015-Ohio-2059, ¶ 9. Consequently, a guilty plea waives
all appealable errors, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the
extent that the errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
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entering his or her guilty plea. State v. Frazier, 2016-Ohio-727, 60 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 81 (2d
Dist.). If a defendant pleads guilty on the advice of counsel, he must demonstrate that
the advice was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases.” (Citations omitted.) Id. Furthermore, “[o]nly if there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but would have
insisted on going to trial will the judgment be reversed.” State v. Huddleson, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 20653, 2005-Ohio-4029, ¶ 9, citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 52–53,
106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). (Other citations omitted.)
{¶ 9} “For counsel to render effective assistance to a criminal defendant, [he or]
she should, at the least, understand the basis of the criminal charges and possible
defenses of those charges.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Dalton, 153 Ohio App.3d 286,
2003-Ohio-3813, 793 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.). “ ‘[I]f an attorney does not grasp the
basics of the charges and the potential defenses to them, an accused may well be
stripped of the very means that are essential to subject the prosecution's case to
adversarial testing.’ ” Id., quoting Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.1994).
{¶ 10} Put simply, due to his guilty plea, Salahuddin may raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on his counsel's advice to plead guilty to aggravated
possession of drugs only if his counsel's alleged error rendered his plea other than
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The reviewing court must therefore determine
whether the trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 in accepting the plea. State
v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). If the rule was complied with,
the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id.{¶ 11} Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, R.C. 2925.11(A) prohibits
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a person from knowingly obtaining, possessing or using a controlled substance or
controlled-substance analog. A violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) involving fentanyl
constitutes aggravated possession of drugs. R.C. 2925.11(C)(1); R.C. 3719.41 (Schedule
II(B)(9)).
{¶ 12} At Salahuddin’s plea hearing on July 12, 2017, the following exchange
occurred:
Trial Court: Alright. I have some questions to ask about your
representation to make sure you are satisfied. Have you and your attorney
had a chance to talk about your case?
Salahuddin: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you and he for example talked about the nature of the
charges; potential defenses that might be available; the fact that you don’t
have to plead guilty today; in fact, you can fight the case and have a trial;
things like that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is it safe for me to conclude that you’re completely satisfied with
the advice, representation, and counsel you have received from your
attorney?
A: Yes, sir.
***
Q: So today I understand you’re pleading guilty to Count 3,
Trafficking in Heroin, in violation of Ohio Revised Code section
2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the 4th degree; Count 5, Trafficking in Heroin, in
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violation of Ohio Revised Code section 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the 5th
degree; Count 7, Trafficking in Heroin, in violation of Ohio Revised Code
section 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the 3rd degree;
As well as Count 9, Aggravated Possession of Drugs1, in violation of
Ohio Revised Code section 2925.11(A), a felony of the 5th degree; as well
as the Forfeiture Specification.
***
Salahuddin: Yes, sir.
The Court: Did you understand what I read?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And is that what you are planning to plead guilty to today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you understand that if you plead guilty to these offenses you’re
making a complete admission that you committed the allegations contained
in the charges?
A: Yes, sir.
***
Trial Court: *** How do you plead?
Salahuddin: Guilty.
Q: And are you making those pleas of guilty of your own free will?
1 Although the trial court did not say fentanyl at this juncture, the trial court correctly
identified the Ohio Revised Code section and level of offense. We note that
Salahuddin’s indictment identified fentanyl as the substance and he was served with a
copy of the indictment on May 1, 2017.
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A: Yes, sir.
Q: Knowingly?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Intelligently?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And voluntarily?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Let the record reflect that the Defendant, Mr. Salahuddin, is
making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily [sic] decision to withdraw her
[sic] earlier not guilty pleas and tender pleas of guilty to the charges just
read into the record and reflected in the Rule 11 Notification Waiver Form.
The Court finds that the Defendant has been informed of all of his
constitutional rights and that he understands the nature of the charges, the
effects of the guilty pleas, as well as the possible penalties which could be
imposed.
Therefore the Court accepts the Defendant’s pleas of guilty and finds
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to the charges read into the record
and reflected in the Rule 11 Notification and Waiver Plea form; and again
said findings of guilt on all counts being beyond a reasonable doubt.
Let the record also reflect that the Court has complied with all of the
requirements in Criminal Rule 11.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 13} The trial court informed Salahuddin of the nature of the charges against him,
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the maximum sentences that he faced, and the constitutional rights that he waived by
foregoing a trial. Prior to accepting the plea, the trial court asked Salahuddin whether he
understood what he was doing, whether he was acting of his own free will and not as the
result of any promises aside from those incorporated in the plea agreement, and whether
he wanted the court to accept the plea. Salahuddin responded to all of these questions
in the affirmative. Salahuddin acknowledged that he had discussed his case with his
attorney, including the elements of the offenses with which he was charged, and, most
importantly, his potential defenses. Salahuddin stated that his attorney had gone over
the plea forms with him and that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation.
{¶ 14} Upon review, we conclude that the record reflects that Salahuddin
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement, which provided
significant benefits to him. The State dismissed several of the felony charges against
Salahuddin, which allowed him to face a significantly lesser sentence than if he had been
convicted of all of the charges against him. At no point did Salahuddin express any
confusion regarding any of the information provided by the trial court in its Crim.R. 11
colloquy. Rather, Salahuddin affirmatively stated that he understood the rights, both
constitutional and non-constitutional, he was waiving by pleading guilty. During the plea
colloquy, the trial court identified the offenses to which Salahuddin would be pleading
guilty and confirmed with him that these were the offenses to which he was agreeing to
plead. The trial court also identified the potential penalties associated with each offense.
{¶ 15} Salahuddin did not claim he was innocent at the plea hearing, he did not
ask any questions at the plea hearing, and there is nothing else in the transcript from the
plea hearing that suggests that he was confused or under any type of duress prior to
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entering his guilty pleas. Moreover, at no point before or subsequent to sentencing did
Salahuddin file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we find that Salahuddin’s guilty pleas were knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently made, and there is no evidence in the record that his counsel
was in any way ineffective for advising him to enter guilty pleas to any of the charged
offenses, specifically Count IX, aggravated possession of drugs.
{¶ 17} Salahuddin’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 18} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
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WELBAUM, P.J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Nathaniel Luken
Phillip Hoover
Hon. Michael A. Buckwalter