State v. Hanners

[Cite as State v. Hanners, 2022-Ohio-4114.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 29375
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2020-CRB-3626
:
SHAWN A. HANNERS : (Criminal Appeal from
: Municipal Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 18th day of November, 2022.
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STEPHANIE L. COOK, Atty. Reg. No. 0067101 & ALISSA SCHRINER, Atty. Reg. No.
0089388, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, City of Dayton Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate
Division, 335 West Third Street, Room 372, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
V. GAYLE MILLER, Atty. Reg. No. 0091528, 120 West Second Street, Suite 320, Dayton,
Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
LEWIS, J.
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{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Shawn A. Hanners appeals from his conviction
following a jury trial for one count of menacing, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. For
the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
I. Procedural History and Facts
{¶ 2} On November 24, 2020, Hanners was charged by way of complaint in the
Dayton Municipal Court with one count of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C.
2903.21(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree, and one count of menacing in violation of
R.C. 2903.22, a misdemeanor of the second degree. The charges arose from an
incident that was alleged to have occurred on November 21, 2020, in the City of Dayton.
{¶ 3} Hanners entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment and was appointed
counsel. Jessica Musselman was charged as a co-defendant as a result of the same
incident for similar offenses. Consequently, the State filed a motion to consolidate the
two cases for trial, which was granted. The case proceeded to a joint jury trial on October
20-21, 2021. Dayton Municipal Court Magistrate Colette Moorman presided over the
trial as acting judge.
{¶ 4} Duiene Stanfield testified first for the State. She stated that on the evening
of November 21, 2020, she was in a car with her husband, Christopher Stanfield, near
the intersection of Linden and Smithville heading toward their home. 1 While at the
stoplight, she observed four unknown black teenagers in the parking lot of a gas station,
which was on one of the corners of the intersection. She also saw two white males, one
of whom was later identified as Hanners, and a white female, later identified as
1
For ease of discussion, we will refer to the Stanfields by their first names throughout
this opinion.
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Musselman, in a yard behind a white house that sat behind the gas station. Duiene saw
the teenagers and the adults yelling at each other. Although Duiene and Christopher
turned at the light to head home, they decided to turn around and go back to intervene.
When Duiene and Christopher returned to the gas station parking lot, Christopher got out
of the car and told Duiene to call 911, which she did. Duiene observed the two white
males throwing things (chairs, lighter fluid, and bricks) and observed Musselman with a
butcher knife. While the teenagers were standing in the parking lot, Hanners hit one of
them in the chest with a brick, resulting in some bleeding. Christopher got the teenagers
further away from the yard to talk to them and to tend to the teenager who was injured.
{¶ 5} While Duiene was standing just outside her car on the phone with 911,
Musselman began screaming at Duiene. Musselman yelled profanities at Duiene, told
her to stay out of their business, and stated “I’ll kill you b****.” Trial Tr. 56. Additionally,
while holding the butcher knife above her head and moving it side to side, Musselman
repeatedly told Duiene “I see you,” that she could see her car, and that she could see her
license plate. They did not know each other prior to their interaction that evening.
{¶ 6} Although the unknown white male had gone into the house, he returned
outside with a large white pit bull. Hanners, who was holding the dog’s chain, let the
chain go and told the dog to “get the kids.” Duiene testified she was scared and
concerned for her husband’s safety, because he was standing near the kids when the
dog was let loose. Meanwhile, Musselman continued to yell derogatory insults at Duiene
and again screamed that she would kill her even after the police arrived at the scene. Id.
at 58.
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{¶ 7} According to Duiene, while police were at the scene, Hanners put the dog
back inside the house and then came outside and threw a chair. During that time,
Hanners was screaming “I don’t give a f***. I’ll f*** all of you up.” Id. at 59. Duiene
stated that the threats from Hanners scared her and that she was still scared while
testifying at court. Duiene explained that she was very afraid because even after the
police arrived, she had been scared that Hanners and Musselman were going to charge
her and that she would get hit. Id. at 60.
{¶ 8} Christopher Stanfield also testified for the State. He stated that he and
Duiene were driving home and saw the group of kids and the two adults “jawing” at each
other, and they all appeared angry. Based on what he saw, he and Duiene turned their
car around and parked in the gas station parking lot to intervene. Once they parked their
car, they could hear the teenagers and the adult males screaming back and forth.
Christopher got out of the car and yelled at the kids to get back and told his wife to call
911. Two of the kids came back toward Christopher, but the other two stayed up by the
backyard and continued yelling with the adults. According to Christopher, one of the
male adults threw a rock and hit one of the kids in the chest. At that point, Christopher
was scared for his own safety. Christopher also observed Musselman outside with a
knife, screaming and yelling. Christopher heard Musselman threaten to kill his wife.
Although Christopher saw a chair get thrown, he did not identify who threw the chair. He
also observed the dog outside but was unaware of how it got outside.
{¶ 9} The last witness for the State was Dayton Police Officer Christopher White.
White testified that he had responded to the 911 call around 4:30 p.m. to the gas station
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on Smithville Road. When he arrived, he observed the parties yelling at each other, and
they were all very agitated. Although he did not recall specifically what anyone had been
yelling, he did recall that Hanners had yelled at him to leave the property and had stated
that they did not want police help. White testified that both Musselman and Hanners
were very unpleasant and angry. White observed an abrasion on the side juvenile who
had been injured.
{¶ 10} At the conclusion of the State’s case, Hanners made a Crim.R. 29 motion
for acquittal, which was overruled. He also requested a jury instruction for the lesser
included offense of disorderly conduct, in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), a minor
misdemeanor. The trial court denied Hanners’ requested instruction.
{¶ 11} Hanners elected not to testify, but Musselman testified on her own behalf.
Musselman claimed that she had not seen the Stanfields until after the police arrived and
that she had not been paying any attention to them because her focus was on the
juveniles. Musselman indicated she was terrified for herself and her child’s life, who
remained inside the house. She did not see any weapons on the Stanfields, and they
never approached her property. Musselman denied doing anything Duiene testified to
during trial, although she later admitted that she was outraged and yelled profanities
during the incident.
{¶ 12} The jury found Hanners not guilty of aggravated menacing but guilty of
menacing. After a presentence investigation report was completed, Hanners was
sentenced to 30 days in jail, all of which was suspended, was ordered to: complete six
months of community control under basic supervision, complete “PAC” and anger
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management, and pay a fine of $100 and court costs. That same day, a “Final
Appealable Entry & Order” was filed reflecting the above-imposed sentence.
{¶ 13} Hanners filed a request to stay his sentence for purposes of appeal, which
the trial court granted. Hanners then filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. No Consent Needed for Jury Trial
{¶ 14} In his first assignment of error, Hanners alleges that the trial court erred in
failing to obtain his written consent before proceeding to a jury trial before a magistrate.
However, because the record reflects that he was tried before an acting judge, there was
no requirement to obtain consent, and his argument lacks merit.
{¶ 15} Although Hanners couched his argument in terms of Civ.R. 53(C)(1)(c),
Crim.R. 19(C)(1)(h) governs criminal trials presided over by magistrates in municipal
court. In criminal cases, magistrates are authorized to “conduct the trial of any
misdemeanor case that will not be tried to a jury. If the offense charged is an offense for
which imprisonment is a possible penalty, the matter may be referred only with unanimous
consent of the parties in writing or on the record in open court.” Crim.R. 19(C)(1)(h).
{¶ 16} Meanwhile, R.C. 1901.121 addresses the appointment of an acting judge in
a municipal court. R.C. 1901.121(C) provides that when there is a vacancy in a
municipal court with three or more judges (such as the Dayton Municipal Court), “the
court's presiding judge has the option to either appoint an appropriate substitute as ‘acting
judge’ or to request that the Supreme Court of Ohio assign a sitting judge of another court
or a retired judge to temporarily serve as an ‘assigned judge.’ ” State v. Armstrong-
Carter, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 28571 and 28576, 2021-Ohio-1110, ¶ 65. Pursuant
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to that statute, if a judge of the municipal court is incapacitated, unavailable, or temporarily
absent, the presiding judge may appoint a qualified substitute if no other judge of the court
is available to perform the duties of the judge. R.C. 1901.121(C)(1). The appointee
shall be designated as “acting judge” and “shall have the jurisdiction and adjudicatory
powers conferred upon the judge of the municipal court.” R.C. 1901.121(C)(1) and (E).
{¶ 17} In this case, Magistrate Moorman was appointed by the presiding judge to
act as acting judge of the Dayton Municipal Court on October 20, 2021, October 21, 2021,
and January 5, 2022. Collectively, the dates covered both the jury trial, the sentencing
hearing, and the sentencing entry. The entries appointing Moorman as acting judge
further indicated that the appointment of an acting judge was necessary for those dates
due to the absence of Judge Henderson. Because the jury trial was conducted by
Moorman in her capacity as acting judge and not in her capacity as magistrate, there was
no need to obtain unanimous consent of the parties to have her preside over the trial.
As such, Hanners’ first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Motion for Mistrial
{¶ 18} Hanners’ second assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to grant a mistrial following the prosecutor’s improper statement during her
closing argument. Although the prosecutor’s statement was improper, it did not
prejudicially affect Hanners’ substantial right to a fair trial due to the swift corrective
measures taken by the trial court.
{¶ 19} “The test regarding prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is
whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected
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substantial rights of the defendant.” State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d
883 (1984), citing United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.1981). “Prosecutors
are granted wide latitude in closing argument, and the effect of any conduct of the
prosecutor during closing argument must be considered in light of the entire case to
determine whether the accused was denied a fair trial.” (Citation omitted.) State v.
Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 149. “Prosecutorial
misconduct should only result in a mistrial if, after a curative instruction, the effect of the
comments would still result in a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Ward, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 18211, 2001 WL 220244, *4 (Mar. 2, 2001), citing State v. Gardner, 127
Ohio App.3d 538, 540, 713 N.E.2d 473 (5th Dist.1998). “The touchstone * * * is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).
{¶ 20} The grant or denial of a motion for a mistrial rests in a trial court's sound
discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.
State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 480, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). To establish an abuse
of discretion for failing to grant a mistrial, a defendant must demonstrate material
prejudice. State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 198.
“Mistrials need be declared only when the ends of justice so require and a fair trial is no
longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991).
Reviewing courts grant “great deference to the trial court's discretion in this area, in
recognition of the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the
situation in his courtroom warrants the declaration of a mistrial.” State v. Glover, 35 Ohio
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St.3d 18, 19, 517 N.E.2d 900 (1988).
{¶ 21} Hanners’ motion for a mistrial was based on the prosecutor’s statement
during closing argument that “Miss Stanfield also told you about how Shawn Hanners
threatened to kill her.” Trial Tr. 140. Hanners immediately objected. The jury left the
courtroom, and the parties replayed the testimony of Duiene. A review of the testimony
revealed that Duiene testified that Hanners stated “I’ll f*** you all up” and did not state “I
will kill you.” Id. at 141. Hanners immediately requested a mistrial. The trial court
denied the motion for a mistrial and provided the following additional instructions upon
the jury’s return to the courtroom:
The Court: * * * To members of the jury, final arguments of counsel are an
opportunity for each side’s attorney to summarize the evidence and argue
their respective positions. They are not evidence and the side with the
burden of proof will be the state. The attorney[s] have to argue the facts
that are in evidence and the court is going to tell you we went back to play
a portion of the tape to make sure that I had heard everything correctly.
There is no testimony on the record that the defendant, Mr. Hanners, said
the words […]
[Defense attorney]: That I will kill you[.]
The Court: That I will [sic] you. The prosecutor has misstated that. That
is not in evidence and it was very improper for her to say so. I’m going to
ask you to disregard that. It is not in the evidence. It’s not in the record.
You, as the jury, decides what facts you believe and you want to find to be
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credible, the witnesses to be credible, and what facts you want to ugh
commenting recollection [sic] with each other believe what you heard. That
is not going to be one of them. It’s gonna be stricken from the record and
there is no allegation there that he said those words. I’m going to caution
the prosecutor to not misstate what was said and I will allow you to continue.
Id. at 142-143. Thereafter, the prosecutor apologized and continued with closing
arguments.
{¶ 22} After reviewing the record, we conclude that the prosecutor improperly
attributed the statement to Hanners, which was prejudicial. Although Duiene Stanfield
did not testify that Hanners made the statement, she did testify that Hanners’ co-
defendant, Musselman, made the statement multiple times. Christopher also testified
that he heard Musselman threaten to kill Duiene. Thus, the statement was in evidence
but, unfortunately, the prosecutor attributed it to the wrong defendant.
{¶ 23} Even though we find the statement by the prosecutor to have been improper
and prejudicial, we must still determine whether the remark was so prejudicial as to deny
Hanners a fair trial. We are unpersuaded that the prosecutor’s misstatement so infected
Hanners’ trial with unfairness that his conviction violated his due process rights. Notably,
the court's instructions immediately following the prosecutor's misstatement mitigated any
harm caused by it. “Curative instructions are generally viewed as sufficient to remedy
the risk of undue prejudice.” State v. Gray, 2d Dist. Darke No. 2019-CA-7, 2020-Ohio-
1402, ¶ 48. The jury was informed prior to closing arguments and again in the jury
instructions that the arguments of counsel were not to be considered as evidence. “It is
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presumed that the jury obeys the instructions of the trial court.” State v. Hancock, 108
Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 54. While not all misconduct can be
cured by an instruction, in this case, not only did the trial court instruct the jury to disregard
the statement, but it also corrected the statement, ordered that the misstatement be
stricken from the record, and admonished the prosecutor in front of the jury immediately
following the misconduct. The significant steps taken in this case by the trial court
minimized any prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s isolated misstatement. Therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Hanners’ request for a mistrial.
His second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Jury Instructions
{¶ 24} In his final assignment of error, Hanners claims that the trial court erred
when it refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of disorderly conduct.
Although Hanners requested the instruction, the trial court found that the evidence did not
warrant giving it. We agree with the trial court.
{¶ 25} Both Crim.R. 31(C) and R.C. 2945.74 provide that a jury may find a
defendant not guilty of the offense charged but guilty of a lesser included offense.
Deciding whether a lesser included offense jury instruction is warranted involves a two-
step analysis. State v. Deanda, 136 Ohio St.3d 18, 2013-Ohio-1722, 989 N.E.2d 986,
¶ 6. The first step is a purely legal question wherein the court must determine whether
one offense constitutes a lesser included offense of the charged offense. Id., citing State
v. Kidder, 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 513 N.E.2d 311 (1987). The second step requires the
court to considers the evidence presented in the particular case and determine whether
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“a jury could reasonably find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense, but could
convict the defendant of the lesser included offense.” Id. at ¶ 6, quoting State v. Evans,
122 Ohio St.3d 381, 2009-Ohio-2974, 911 N.E.2d 889, ¶ 13. Thus, “[e]ven though an
offense may be statutorily defined as a lesser included offense of another, a charge on
such lesser included offense is required only where the evidence presented at trial would
reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the
lesser included offense.” State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286 (1988),
paragraph two of the syllabus. When making that determination, “the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.” State v. Monroe, 105
Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 827 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 37.
{¶ 26} “A trial court has broad discretion to decide how to fashion jury instructions,
but it must ‘fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are relevant and
necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact finder.’ ”
State v. White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, 29 N.E.3d 939, ¶ 46, quoting State
v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 553 N.E.2d 640 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus. “A
defendant is only entitled to have his proposed jury instructions given when they are
correct statements of the law, pertinent to the evidence in the record or to material issues,
and are timely presented and not already included in the substance of the jury charge.”
State v. Elliott, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26104, 2014-Ohio-4958, ¶ 23, citing State v.
Guster, 66 Ohio St.2d 266, 269, 421 N.E.2d 157 (1981). “When reviewing the trial court's
jury instructions, the proper standard of review is whether the trial court's decision to give
or exclude a particular jury instruction was an abuse of discretion under the facts and
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circumstances of the case.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Fair, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
24388, 2011-Ohio-4454, ¶ 65. An “abuse of discretion” has been defined as an attitude
that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19
Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248 (1985).
{¶ 27} In this case, Hanners was charged and convicted of menacing, in violation
of R.C. 2903.22(A), a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.2 That statute provides that
“[n]o person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical
harm to the person or property of the other person, * * * or a member of the other person's
immediate family.” R.C. 2903.22(A).
{¶ 28} Hanners requested a jury instruction for disorderly conduct, in violation of
R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), a minor misdemeanor. R.C. 2917.11(A)(1) provides that “[n]o
person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by * * *
[e]ngaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property, or in violent or turbulent
behavior.” We first consider whether disorderly conduct under R.C. 2917.11(A)(1)
constitutes a lesser included offense of menacing.
{¶ 29} The Ohio Supreme Court has articulated a three-pronged test to determine
whether a criminal offense is a lesser included offense of another. “An offense may be
a lesser included offense of another if (i) the offense carries a lesser penalty than the
other; (ii) the greater offense cannot, as statutorily defined, ever be committed without the
lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being committed; and (iii) some element of the
2 We acknowledge that Hanners was also charged with aggravated menacing, but
considering he was found not guilty of that charge, we find the argument moot as to that
offense.
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greater offense is not required to prove the commission of the lesser offense.” State v.
Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Using this analysis, we find that disorderly conduct, as specified in R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), is
a lesser included offense to menacing.
{¶ 30} First, disorderly conduct is a minor misdemeanor, which carries a lesser
penalty than menacing, a fourth-degree misdemeanor. See, generally, R.C. 2929.27
and R.C. 2929.28. Second, menacing contains the element of threatening physical
harm, which cannot be committed without at the same time causing annoyance or alarm
to the victim. See State v. Shumaker, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1332, 1994 WL 47676, *7 (Feb.
18, 1994) (finding that threatening serious physical harm under an aggravated menacing
charge cannot be committed without at the same time causing annoyance or alarm to the
victim by threatening harm). Third, “the greater mental state of knowingly is required for
menacing, but not for disorderly conduct and for menacing, the offender must cause
another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm, while disorderly conduct
requires only that inconvenience, annoyance or alarm be caused.” State v. Ozias, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2003-04-102, 2003-Ohio-5431, ¶ 14.
{¶ 31} Nonetheless, a trial court is not always required to instruct the jury on a
lesser included offense even if the elements of the offense would be met. Rather, it is
only required when “the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support an acquittal
on the crime charged and a conviction on the lesser included offense.” State v. Allen,
73 Ohio St. 3d 626, 637, 653 N.E.2d 675 (1995). Thus, we must consider whether the
jury could have reasonably acquitted Hanners of menacing but convicted him of disorderly
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conduct.
{¶ 32} We conclude that the evidence presented at trial cannot reasonably support
a conviction for disorderly conduct under R.C. 2917.11(A)(1) and an acquittal on
menacing. A conviction for disorderly conduct and an acquittal for menacing would have
required the jury to find that Hanners recklessly caused inconvenience, annoyance, or
alarm to Duiene by engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to Duiene or her property, or
acting in a violent or turbulent behavior, but that Hanners did not knowingly cause Duiene
to believe that Hanners would cause her physical harm. The culpable mental states for
“knowingly” and “recklessly” are defined in R.C. 2901.22(B) and (C), respectively, as
follows:
(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances
when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is
a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
(C) A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be
of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances
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when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are
likely to exist.
{¶ 33} As it relates to Hanners’ conduct and statements, the jury was only
presented with one version of events – that testified to by the Stanfields. Considering
the conduct and statements of Hanners during the entirety of the incident, the evidence
presented demonstrated that Hanners acted knowingly, not recklessly. Thus, if the jury
believed the Stanfields, Hanners was guilty of menacing.
{¶ 34} The incident occurred around 4:30 p.m. in broad daylight. Duiene testified
she was approximately 20 feet away from Hanners during the incident and was located
near her husband and the juveniles in the gas station parking lot. Hanners was observed
by both the Stanfields throwing chairs and lighter fluid, as well as a brick/rock that struck
one of the teenagers in the chest and resulted in an injury. Additionally, Hanners
released a large pit bull and told the dog to “get the kids.” The 911 call was consistent
with Duiene’s testimony that chairs, lighter fluid, and bricks were being thrown and that
the dog was sent out to get the kids. Duiene testified she was scared for herself and
concerned for her husband’s safety as well. Significantly, while police were on the
scene, Hanners threw a chair and screamed “I don’t give a f***. I’ll f*** all of you up.”
Trial Tr. 59. This conduct occurred after having already injured one of the juveniles by
throwing other objects and telling police he did not need their help. Duiene stated that
the threats from Hanners scared her and she was afraid that he was going to charge
toward her and hit her. Id. at 60.
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{¶ 35} Based on the facts in evidence in this case, a reasonable jury would not
have acquitted Hanners of the menacing charge but convicted him of disorderly conduct.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
give an instruction on disorderly conduct. We overrule Hanners’ third assignment of
error.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 36} Having overruled all of Hanners’ assignments of error, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
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TUCKER, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Stephanie L. Cook
Alissa Schriner
V. Gayle Miller
Hon. Colette Moorman, Acting Judge