State v. Blair

[Cite as State v. Blair, 2023-Ohio-88.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 29378
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. CRB2101259
:
WILLIAM L. BLAIR, JR. : (Criminal Appeal from
: Municipal Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 13th day of January, 2023.
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KAREN B. GROSETH, Atty. Reg. No. 0090201, Prosecuting Attorney, Miamisburg
Municipal Court, 130 West Second Street, Suite 1818, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
RICHARD L. KAPLAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0029406, P.O. Box 751192, Dayton, Ohio 45475
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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EPLEY, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant William L. Blair, Jr., appeals from his conviction in the
Miamisburg Municipal Court after he was found guilty of obstructing official business,
persistent disorderly conduct, and failure to disclose personal information. For the
reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed in part and vacated in part.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In the early morning hours of October 16, 2021, Officer Josh Labensky was
on foot patrol at the Yellow Rose Nightclub, a bar in West Carrollton. He frequently
patrolled there around closing time to ensure that patrons exited the establishment and
departed in a relatively orderly and safe fashion. On that particular night, he was
summoned inside the bar, where he witnessed two males, Bruce Denney (the manager
of the bar) and a man later identified as Blair, struggling on the ground. When Officer
Labensky got to the spot where the men were skirmishing, Denney let Blair up and
released him into Officer Labensky’s custody. Blair was still uncooperative and
aggressive, even with officers, so he was placed in handcuffs and led to a police cruiser
to cool off; Officer Labensky came back inside and investigated what had just transpired.
{¶ 3} Officer Labensky spoke with Denney, who explained that he had had multiple
run-ins with Blair that night. The first was a simple dress code violation – Blair had a hood
up inside the establishment – and when Denney tried to address it, Blair was “very
militant, very hostile.” Trial Tr. at 80. The situation that led to the altercation between Blair
and Denney started with Denney’s trying to resolve an argument that Blair’s brother was
having with some girls. While Denney was trying to sort things out, Blair inserted himself
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into the situation with an empty glass in his hand that he was “holding kind of like a
baseball.” Blair’s aggressive posture concerned Denney, so he grabbed the glass away
from him. This caused Blair to “square up” with Denney, and the fight ensued.
{¶ 4} Denney indicated that he did not want criminal charges filed. Officer
Labensky returned to the cruiser to release Blair from custody. As soon as he opened the
cruiser’s door, however, “[Blair] was * * * very aggressive and hostile.” Trial Tr. at 108.
Officer Labensky repeatedly tried to calm Blair down and remove the handcuffs, but
Blair’s aggressiveness was escalating. Blair’s brother and other friends also tried to calm
him down, but he would not listen to them either; instead, he accused the police of
abducting and kidnapping him. Other officers arrived on scene and likewise failed to calm
Blair down. Finally, Sergeant Jeremy Branham determined that “enough was enough,”
and Blair was arrested for persistent disorderly conduct and transported to the West
Carrollton police station for processing.
{¶ 5} At the police station, Blair continued to demonstrate aggression and non-
compliance. Officers again tried to release Blair from the handcuffs, but he became
unresponsive and threw himself onto the floor, lying in the fetal position; he refused to
answer basic identification questions and continued to accuse the officers of various
crimes. Due to his non-compliance, Blair was dragged out of the processing room and
transported to the Montgomery County Jail.
{¶ 6} On October 18, 2021, Blair was charged by way of criminal complaint with
obstructing official business, a second-degree misdemeanor; persistent disorderly
conduct, a fourth-degree misdemeanor; and failure to disclose personal information, a
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fourth-degree misdemeanor. The case proceeded to a jury trial on December 15, 2021.
During trial, the State presented testimony from Denney and three West Carrollton police
officers involved in the case. Officer Labensky’s body-camera video as well as video from
the processing room at the West Carrollton police station were also admitted as exhibits.
{¶ 7} Ultimately, the jury found Blair guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to
90 days in jail with 60 days suspended; he was also given credit for one day served. On
February 1, 2022, Blair filed this appeal, which raises two assignments of error. We will
address the assignments in a manner that facilitates our analysis.
II. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 8} In this appeal, Blair raises two related assignments of error – that his
convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence and based upon insufficient
evidence. We will consider them together.
{¶ 9} “[S]ufficiency is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to
determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient
to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
386, N.E.2d 541 (1997). It is essentially a test of adequacy: whether the evidence is
legally sufficient to support a verdict is a question of law. Id.{¶ 10} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Marshall, 191 Ohio App.3d 444,
2010-Ohio-5160, 946 N.E.2d 762, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d
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259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. The relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational
trier of fact could have found the crime’s essential elements proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.{¶ 11} On the other hand, when an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record,
weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A
case should not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence except
“‘in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction.’” (Emphasis added.) Id.{¶ 12} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts,
manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that
a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a
finding of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-
881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11. Accord State v. Winbush, 2017-Ohio-696, 85 N.E.3d 501,
¶ 58 (2d Dist.). As a result, a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight
of the evidence will also be dispositive of sufficiency. State v. Farra, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 28950, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 50.
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Persistent Disorderly Conduct
{¶ 13} According to R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), a person shall not recklessly cause
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another by engaging in fighting, threatening to
harm persons or property, or in violent/turbulent behavior. “Turbulent behavior” is
“tumultuous behavior” or “unruly conduct” characterized by a violent disturbance or
commotion. State v. Street, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26501, 2015-Ohio-2789, ¶ 25.
{¶ 14} Typically, disorderly conduct is a minor misdemeanor, however, if the
offender persists in the conduct after a reasonable warning or request, the offense
becomes a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. R.C. 2917.11(E)(3)(a).
{¶ 15} In this case, Blair was guilty of disorderly conduct. Officer Labensky testified
that after learning that Denney did not want to pursue charges against Blair, he went back
to his cruiser to release him. However, Labensky was unable to explain the situation to
Blair because “as soon as [he] opened the door, [Blair] was verbal, very aggressive and
hostile toward [him].” Trial Tr. at 108. Officers tried over and over to remove the handcuffs
from Blair’s wrists, but he was so aggressive that they could not. Sergeant Branham
recounted that officers made at least ten attempts to get Blair to calm down so they could
remove the handcuffs, but when he still would not comply, the decision was made to
arrest Blair. The body camera footage affirms this testimony. The video showed Officer
Labensky try to calm Blair down and explain that he was not in trouble and that he was
not going to jail, but Blair continued to be aggressive and non-compliant. At one point,
another officer attempted to remove Blair’s handcuffs, and he physically jerked away. On
multiple occasions Blair even accused the officers of kidnapping and abducting him.
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{¶ 16} Blair’s repeated refusals to cooperate were an inconvenience to the officers
and constituted “tumultuous behavior” and “unruly conduct” characterized by a violent
disturbance. Blair’s conviction for persistent disorderly conduct was supported by
sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Obstructing Official Business
{¶ 17} According to R.C. 2921.31(A), “[n]o person without privilege to do so and
with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any
authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or
impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties.” The
offense of obstructing official business, therefore, includes five essential elements: “(1)
an act by the defendant, (2) done with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay a public
official, (3) that actually hampers or impedes a public official, (4) while the official is acting
in the performance of a lawful duty, and (5) the defendant so acts without privilege.”
(Citations omitted.) State v. Body, 2018-Ohio-3395, 117 N.E.3d 1024, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.),
citing State v. Kates, 2006-Ohio-6779, 865 N.E.2d 66, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 18} Further, to violate the statute, a defendant must engage in an affirmative or
overt act that impedes a public official in the performance of his or her duties. State v.
Prestel, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20822, 2005-Ohio-5236, ¶ 16. A single refusal to
respond to an officer’s request does not constitute obstructing official business, but
continued uncooperative behavior can amount to a violation. See State v. Crawford, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 25506, 2013-Ohio-4398, ¶ 17; Street, 2d Dist. Montgomery, No.
26501, 2015-Ohio-2789, at ¶ 23.
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{¶ 19} Here, Blair repeatedly refused to cooperate with officers. Blair walked under
his own power into the police station, but as soon as he got to the processing room and
his handcuffs were removed, he collapsed on the floor in the fetal position and refused to
respond to basic booking questions or sit in the chair as requested. Blair’s behavior made
any attempt at processing him impossible and forced the officers to physically carry him
to their police cruiser and then transport him to the Montgomery County Jail, where there
would be more assistance.
{¶ 20} Blair’s conviction for obstructing official business was supported by
sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Failure to Disclose Personal Information
{¶ 21} Pursuant to R.C. 2921.29(A)(1), “[n]o person who is in a public place shall
refuse to disclose the person’s name, address, or date of birth, when requested by a law
enforcement officer who reasonably suspects [that] the person is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a criminal offense.” This subsection of R.C. 2921.29
applies to questioning in the context of an investigative detention and not to questions
asked during a consensual encounter. State v. Crump, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190636,
2021-Ohio-2574, ¶ 17.
{¶ 22} The resolution of this argument revolves around the definition of a “public
place.” “Public place” is not defined in R.C. 2921.29, the failure to disclose personal
information law, nor is it explained in R.C. 2901.01, the section of the Revised Code that
gives definitions for words used in our criminal statutes. In fact, our research has only
found “public place” defined once in the entirety of the Ohio Revised Code: in R.C.
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3794.01, the definitional section of Ohio’s public smoking ban. It defines “public place” as
“an enclosed area to which the public is invited or in which the public is permitted and that
is not a private residence.” R.C. 3794.01(B). Black’s Law Dictionary gives us a similar
definition. It states that a “public place” is “any location that the local, state, or national
government maintains for the use of the public, such as a highway, park, or public
building.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). By synthesizing those definitions, we
can conclude that in this case, a “public place” is a building where the public – ordinary
citizens – are regularly permitted to be.
{¶ 23} Here, there is little evidence, either from the trial transcript or body camera
videos, that officers asked Blair to identify himself at the Yellow Rose. At the 24:03 minute
mark of the body camera video, Officer Labensky tells another officer “[h]e won’t give me
his name. I don’t have his name,” (see also Trial Tr. at 125) and, while that could imply
that Officer Labensky had asked for Blair’s identification, the body camera video, which
was recording the entire time Officer Labensky and Blair interacted, did not show that
Blair was ever asked to identify himself. In fact, during his trial testimony, Officer Labensky
admitted that he did not ask Blair to identify himself prior to being driven to the police
station. Trial Tr. at 145. The State. in its brief, argues that the “record is clear that officers
asked for Appellant’s information on scene at the Yellow Rose[,]” but that contention is
belied by the record.
{¶ 24} Officers, though, did ask Blair to identify himself once in the processing
room at the police station. The question before us, therefore, is whether the processing
room inside the police station is a “public place.”
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{¶ 25} Using the definition that we suggested earlier that a “public place” is
somewhere ordinary citizens are regularly permitted to be, it is evident that part – but not
all – of a police station is a public place. For instance, the lobby or front desk area of a
police station would likely be considered a public place; citizens can come and go freely,
and it is a space maintained for the public. The secure locations inside the police station
– places that ordinary citizens cannot go or can go only when accompanied by authorized
personnel (i.e., police officers) – are not “public places.”
{¶ 26} In this case, Blair was escorted by Officer Paige Callahan and Officer
Labensky inside a locked back door of the West Carrollton police headquarters and into
a secure room. Once the door they entered through was closed and the officers had
deposited their firearms into a lock box, the trio went through another locked door, down
a secure hallway, and into the processing room. It was in the processing room that,
according to the body camera video, Officer Callahan first asked Blair to identify himself
and he refused.
{¶ 27} Because Blair was asked and refused to identify himself in a place that was
not public, we conclude that his conviction for failure to disclose personal information was
not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 28} Because we find that Blair’s convictions for persistent disorderly conduct
and obstructing official business were supported by sufficient evidence and were not
against the manifest weight of the evidence, his assignments of error are overruled as to
those counts. Blair’s conviction for failure to disclose personal information was not
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supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence,
and therefore, the assignments of error are sustained as to that count.
{¶ 29} Blair’s conviction for failure to disclose personal information will be vacated.
The trial court’s judgment as to persistent disorderly conduct and obstructing official
business will be affirmed.
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WELBAUM, J., and LEWIS, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Karen B. Groseth
Richard L. Kaplan
William H. Wolff, Jr., Visiting Judge