Giovanini v. Bailey

[Cite as Giovanini v. Bailey, 2018-Ohio-369.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
MATTHEW GIOVANINI C.A. Nos. 28631
28676
Appellant
v.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
AMANDA BAILEY ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Appellee COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE No. DR-2014-11-3084
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 31, 2018
TEODOSIO, Judge.
{¶1} Matthew J. Giovanini appeals the judgment entered by the Summit County Court
of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division on April 12, 2017, ruling on objections to the
magistrate’s decision and designating Amanda Bailey as the primary residential parent and legal
custodian of their child. We affirm.
I.
{¶2} In November 2014, Mr. Giovanini filed a complaint for parentage, allocation of
parental rights and responsibilities, and parenting time with regard to a child of which he was the
biological father and Amanda K. Bailey was the biological mother. The couple had never been
married. A hearing was held before the magistrate on December 16, 2015, January 20, 2016, and
February 23, 2016. Prior to the magistrate issuing a decision, Mr. Giovanini filed a motion to
reopen the proceedings, alleging that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred after the
adjournment of the proceedings in February. The motion was set for hearing.
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{¶3} On October 6, 2016, the magistrate issued a decision establishing a parent-child
relationship between Mr. Giovanini and the child, and designating Ms. Bailey as the primary
residential parent and legal custodian of the child and as the medical decision maker for the
child. The decision also established parenting time and child support, and determined that the
child’s surname remain “Bailey.” Mr. Giovanini filed his objections to the magistrate’s decision,
and the magistrate cancelled the hearing that had been set on his motion to reopen the
proceedings, noting that the magistrate’s decision was currently under objection.
{¶4} On April 12, 2017, the trial court ruled on the objections to the magistrate’s
decision, with the journal entry establishing a parent-child relationship between Mr. Giovanini
and the child, designating Ms. Bailey as the primary residential parent and legal custodian of the
child and as the medical decision maker for the child, and establishing parenting time and child
support. Three of Mr. Giovanini’s fifteen objections were sustained, with the trial court
modifying the magistrate’s decision by changing the child’s surname to Giovanini, awarding the
dependent tax exemption to Mr. Giovanini, and dividing court costs evenly. On May 10, 2017,
Mr. Giovanini appealed the judgment to this Court, raising four assignments of error under the
28631 case number.
{¶5} On May 12, 2017, Ms. Bailey filed a motion for clarification regarding summer
parenting time and for injunctive relief. The trial court ruled on the motion on June 1, 2017, with
Mr. Giovanini appealing the order to this Court on June 14, 2017, raising one assignment of error
under the 28676 case number. The two appeals have been consolidated for our review.
II.
{¶6} We note that for the purposes of clarity Mr. Giovanini’s single assignment of
error under case number 28676 has been renumbered as assignment of error five.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS FINDING THAT
THE MINOR CHILD’S BEST INTEREST[] IS FOR AMANDA TO BE THE
RESIDENTIAL PARENT AND LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE CHILD AND
IN ITS ORDER DESIGNATING AMANDA AS THE PRIMARY
RESIDENTIAL PARENT AND LEGAL CUSTODIAN AUTHORIZED TO
MAKE ALL MEDICAL DECISIONS FOR THE CHILD EXCEPT IN CASES
OF EMERGENCY.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Giovanini argues the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that it was in the best interest of the child for Ms. Bailey to be the residential
parent and legal custodian and in designating Ms. Bailey as the primary residential parent and
legal custodian authorized to make all medical decisions for the child except in cases of
emergency. We disagree.
{¶8} “When allocating parental rights and responsibilities, the court must take into
account the best interest of the children.” Bentley v. Rojas, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009776,
2010–Ohio–6243, ¶ 19, citing R.C. 3109.04(B)(1). In determining the best interest of the
children for purposes of allocating parental rights and responsibilities, a court must consider the
factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Patton v. Hickling–Patton, 9th Dist. Medina No.
13CA0071–M, 2014–Ohio–2862, ¶ 8. Those factors include: (1) the wishes of the children’s
parents; (2) the wishes of the children, if the court interviews the children; (3) the children’s
interaction and interrelationship with their parents, siblings, and anyone else who may
significantly affect their best interest; (4) the children’s adjustment to home, school, and
community; (5) the mental and physical health of all persons involved; (6) the parent more likely
to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights; (7) whether either parent has failed
to make child support payments; (8) whether either parent or any household member previously
has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in
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a child being an abused child or a neglected child; (9) whether one of the parents has
continuously and willfully denied the other’s right to parenting time; and (10) whether either
parent has established a residence, or is planning to establish a residence, outside Ohio. R.C.
3109.04(F)(1)(a)-(j).
{¶9} “A trial court possesses broad discretion with respect to its determination of the
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, and its decision will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion.” Kokoski v. Kokoski, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010202, 2013–Ohio–3567,
¶ 26. An abuse of discretion means more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the
trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court
is precluded from simply substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio
State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). “[A] trial court’s determination in custody
matters ‘should be accorded the utmost respect’ because ‘[t]he knowledge a trial court gains
through observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a
reviewing court by a printed record.’” Baxter v. Baxter, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009927,
2011-Ohio-4034, ¶ 6, quoting Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74.
{¶10} While a trial court’s decision regarding allocation of parental rights will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s factual
findings under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. See Wallace v. Wallace, 195 Ohio
App.3d 314, 2011–Ohio–4487, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). “[B]efore an appellate court will reverse a
judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence in a civil context, the court must
determine whether the trier of fact, in resolving evidentiary conflicts and making credibility
determinations, clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. Only in the
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exceptional case, where the evidence presented weighs heavily in favor of the party seeking
reversal, will the appellate court reverse.” Boreman v. Boreman, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
01CA0034, 2002–Ohio–2320, ¶ 10. Manifest weight of the evidence pertains to the burden of
persuasion. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012–Ohio–2179, ¶ 19. “In weighing the
evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder
of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶11} Mr. Giovanini contends that the trial court did not consider all relevant factors
under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), which he specifically identifies as the mental health of Ms. Bailey, the
testimony and recommendation of the guardian ad litem, and Ms. Bailey’s “lack of self-
sufficiency.” While “the mental and physical health of all persons involved” is one of the
enumerated factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), the testimony of a guardian ad litem and the issue
of “self-sufficiency” are not specifically listed as factors. Rather, Mr. Giovanini’s contention
appears to be that the court failed to mention or overlooked certain evidence relating to the
relevant factors when it determined the best interest of the child.
{¶12} With regard to the mental health of Ms. Bailey, Mr. Giovanini states:
[T]he trial court clearly did not give consideration to [the] particular facts.
Instead, the trial court arbitrarily found that [Ms. Bailey’s] ‘current mental health
provider believes that she was misdiagnosed, and that receiving inappropriate
psychotropic medication led to a psychiatric hospitalization.’ That finding by the
trial court is arbitrary and unconscionable because [Ms. Bailey] did not offer any
evidence by a health care provider to support that finding.
Mr. Giovanni also contends that the trial court disregarded the testimony and report of the
guardian ad litem. He comes to this conclusion because “[t]he only statement by the trial court
pertaining to the [g]uardian is set forth in Decision No. 26 in which the Court states that ‘[t]he
[m]agistrate acknowledged that the [guardian ad litem] had testified.’” Mr. Giovanini further
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contends the trial court failed to consider Ms. Bailey’s lack of employment and her dependency
upon her parents.
{¶13} A trial court is not required to explicitly make findings of fact as to the factors
under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). I.C.-R. v. N.R., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27671, 2016-Ohio-1329, ¶ 43.
“While [R.C. 3109.04] does mandate consideration of each factor by the trial court, the court
need not explicitly reiterate its findings with regard to those factors absent a Civ.R. 52 request
for findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Matis v. Matis, 9th Dist. Medina No. 04CA0025-M,
2005-Ohio-72, ¶ 6. “Instead, it must be apparent from the record that the trial court considered
the best interest factors in its decision.” Phillips v. Phillips, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 13CA010358,
2014-Ohio-248, ¶ 8. “[I]t is not necessary for the [trial] court to set forth its analysis as to each
factor * * *.” Bunten v. Bunten, 126 Ohio App.3d 443, 447 (3d Dist.1998).
{¶14} In the case now before us, the trial court did not specifically reference R.C.
3109.04(F)(1), however it stated that it considered “[t]he statutory factors which apply to this
case” and it proceeded to enumerate its findings under each of the best interest factors. This
included consideration of the physical and mental health of both Mr. Giovanini and Ms. Bailey
under finding of fact 7(e), with the trial court noting that Ms. Bailey “was previously diagnosed
with bi-polar disorder, but her current mental health provider believes that she was
misdiagnosed, and that receiving inappropriate medication led to a psychiatric hospitalization.”
As Mr. Giovanini correctly notes, there was no expert testimony as to her diagnosis. However,
the trial court is neither making nor confirming a diagnosis for Ms. Bailey; it is merely restating
testimony given by Ms. Bailey, her mother, and the guardian ad litem. As such, the finding by
the trial court is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, nor does it constitute an abuse
of discretion.
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{¶15} As Mr. Giovanini did not make a Civ.R. 52 request to the trial court for findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court was not obligated to explicitly address all of the
statutory factors and all of the evidence relevant to the custody award. See I.C.-R. v. N.R. at ¶
44. Moreover, the fact that the trial court did not specifically reference a particular fact in its
entry is not evidence that it overlooked that fact. We note, however, that the trial court’s journal
entry: (1) specifically considers Mr. Giovanini’s objection as to the magistrate’s alleged failure
to consider the testimony and report of the guardian ad litem; (2) acknowledges Mr. Giovanini’s
concerns about Ms. Bailey’s dependency upon her parents; and (3) notes Ms. Bailey’s lack of
employment in sustaining Mr. Giovanini’s third objection regarding the dependent tax
exemption. Consequently, it appears the trial court did not fail to consider these issues.
{¶16} It is apparent from the record that the trial court considered the best interest
factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) in making its decision. We conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that it was in the best interest of the child for Ms. Bailey to be the
residential parent and legal custodian and in authorizing Ms. Bailey to make all medical
decisions for the child except in cases of emergency.
{¶17} Mr. Giovanini’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ITS FAILURE AND
REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF THE
GUARDIAN AD LITEM.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY ITS FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE AND PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED BEFORE
THE MAGISTRATE ON DECEMBER 16, 2015, JANUARY 20, 2016, AND
FEBRUARY 23, 2016.
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{¶18} In his second assignment or error, Mr. Giovanini argues the testimony of the
guardian ad litem was “essentially disregarded by the trial court” and that the trial court did not
conduct an independent review of the guardian ad litem’s testimony. In his third assignment of
error, Mr. Giovanini argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an
independent review of the evidence and proceedings. We disagree with both arguments.
{¶19} Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides: “In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an
independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly
determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” “The independent review that
is required of the trial court has two components: (1) whether, with respect to the objected
matters, the magistrate properly determined the factual issues before it, and (2) whether the
magistrate appropriately applied the law to those factual determinations.” Lakota v. Lakota, 9th
Dist. Medina No. 10CA0122-M, 2012-Ohio-2555, ¶ 14. “The independent review requirement
of Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) * * * does not prohibit the trial court from deferring to the magistrate’s
resolution of credibility because the magistrate retains a superior position, as the trier of fact, to
consider the demeanor of witnesses and evaluate their credibility.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 9th
Dist. Medina No. 08CA0049-M, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 14.
{¶20} “An appellate court reviewing a lower court’s judgment indulges in a presumption
of regularity of the proceedings below.” Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1993). “Appellate
courts thus presume that a trial court conducted an independent analysis in reviewing a
magistrate’s decision in accordance with Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d).” Faulks v. Flynn, 4th Dist. Scioto
No. 13CA3568, 2014-Ohio-1610, ¶ 27. “Accordingly, a party asserting error bears the burden of
affirmatively demonstrating the trial court’s failure to perform its Civ.R. 53(E) duty of
independent analysis.” Freeman v. Freeman, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 07CA0036, 2007-Ohio-6400,
9
¶ 53. “An affirmative duty requires more than a mere inference, it requires appellant to provide
the reviewing court with facts to rebut our general presumption.” In re Taylor G., 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-05-1197, 2006-Ohio-1992, ¶ 21.
{¶21} “[T]he mere fact the trial court did not cite any specific portion of a transcript or
exhibit does not demonstrate the court failed to conduct an independent review of the objected
matters as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d).” In re G.C., 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2016-12-237,
CA2016-12-238, CA2016-12-239, & CA2016-12-240, 2017-Ohio-4226, ¶ 18. “While citing
such material would tend to demonstrate that the trial court conducted the requisite independent
review, there is no requirement in Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) that the trial court do so.” Hampton v.
Hampton, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2007-03-033, 2008-Ohio-868, ¶ 17.
{¶22} With regard to his second assignment of error, Mr. Giovanini contends his
argument is supported by the fact that the order of the trial court only briefly referred to the
guardian ad litem when it overruled his seventh objection to the magistrate’s decision, stating:
“The Magistrate acknowledged that the Guardian ad Litem had testified.” From this, Mr.
Giovanini concludes the trial court did not conduct an independent review of the guardian ad
litem’s testimony. With regard to his third assignment of error, Mr. Giovanini contends that the
statement by the trial court that “the Magistrate correctly made factual findings based on all of
the evidence presented to her” is also indicative of an abuse of discretion. Mr. Giovanini further
contends that the trial court’s statement that the “mother terminated her employment prior to
these proceedings to move with father to Arizona” is taken out of context by the trial court, and
that this provides an example of the trial court’s failure to conduct an independent review of the
facts.
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{¶23} These statements by the trial court are not facts that rebut our general assumption
that the trial court conducted the required independent analysis. There is no requirement that a
trial court must cite to a specific portion of the transcript or a specific exhibit, such as the
guardian ad litem’s testimony or report, and a failure to do so does not demonstrate the court
failed to conduct an independent review of the objected matters. See In re G.C. at ¶ 18.
Likewise, we cannot conclude that the trial court did not conduct an independent review simply
because it did not discuss every conceivable characterization of the evidence. See Brandon v.
Brandon, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-08-13, 2009-Ohio-3818, ¶ 35.
{¶24} Furthermore, the trial court’s journal entry of June 13, 2017, ruling on objections
and entering judgment directly states that the court considered the objections, pleadings,
affidavits, transcript, and other documents in the record. The entry then goes on to make fifteen
findings of fact. The trial court addresses each of Mr. Giovanini’s objections separately, and
sustains objections two, three, and fifteen, thereby modifying the decision of the magistrate. The
trial court specifically references parts of the record, including the magistrate’s decision, the
memorandum filed by Mr. Giovanini, and Court Exhibit 2. These facts all support this Court’s
presumption that the trial court conducted an independent review.
{¶25} Mr. Giovanini provides us with no clear evidence that the trial court failed to
conduct an independent review, and likewise, there is nothing in the trial court’s journal entry
that indicates it did not conduct an independent review of the testimony. He has therefore failed
to demonstrate that the trial court did not conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s
decision.
{¶26} Mr. Giovanini’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ITS FAILURE AND
REFUSAL TO RE[]OPEN THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE TO HEAR
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO AMANDA’S CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT OCCURRED AFTER FEBRUARY 23, 2016.
{¶27} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Giovanini argues the trial court erred by not
reopening the proceedings to hear additional evidence on alleged changes of circumstances with
regard to Ms. Bailey that occurred after the close of the February 2016 hearing. We disagree.
{¶28} “A determination by a trial court whether to reopen a record for the submission of
further evidence rests within the sound discretion of the court.” Askin v. Askin, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 94APF05-720, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 313, *20, citing Pyle v. Pyle, 11 Ohio
App.3d 31, 37 (8th Dist.1983). See also Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372 (1922), paragraph
three of the syllabus; Nozik v. Mentor Lagoons, 11th Dist. Lake No. 93-L-057, 1994 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1957, *6; Schindler v. Schindler, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-88-18, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS
3583, *11. Such a decision “will not be disturbed in the absence of abuse of discretion.” Pyle at
37. This corresponds to the sound principle that “[t]he admission or exclusion of relevant
evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173(1987), paragraph two of the syllabus; see also Ohmer v. Renn-Ohmer, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2012-02-020, 2013-Ohio-330, ¶ 17.
{¶29} An abuse of discretion means more than an error of judgment; it implies that the
trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court
is precluded from simply substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio
State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).
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{¶30} Mr. Giovanini’s motion, unaccompanied by affidavit, alleged that Ms. Bailey
changed her residence, married, became pregnant, was no longer enrolled as a nursing student,
and was unemployed. The trial court stated that even if the allegations in support of the motion
were proven, it would not change the decision of the trial court.
{¶31} The decision whether to reopen the proceedings for additional evidence was
within the sound discretion of the trial court. We conclude that the decision of the trial court was
not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, and therefore it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to deny Mr. Giovanini’s motion to reopen the trial.
{¶32} Mr. Giovanini’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MAY
25, 2017, ON AMANDA’S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF
MATTHEW’S SUMMER VISITATION WITH BENJAMIN AND IN ITS
ORDER MODIFYING MATTHEW’S SUMMER VACATION WITH
BENJAMIN SET FORTH IN THE ORDER DATED APRIL 12, 2017.
{¶33} In his fifth assignment of error, Mr. Giovanini argues the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to conduct a hearing on Ms. Bailey’s motion for clarification because he had filed a
notice of appeal prior to the filing of her motion. He contends that, as a result, the June 1, 2017,
order of the trial court is void and of no legal effect. We disagree.
{¶34} As a general rule, courts will not resolve issues which are moot. Miner v. Witt, 82
Ohio St. 237 (1910) syllabus. “The doctrine of mootness is rooted both in the ‘case’ or
‘controversy’ language of Section 2, Article III[,] of the United States Constitution and in the
general notion of judicial restraint.” (Citations omitted.) James A. Keller, Inc. v. Flaherty, 74
Ohio App.3d 788, 791 (10th Dist.1991).
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The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It
necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower
court, and without any fault of the [appellee], an event occurs which renders it
impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of the [appellants],
to grant [them] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a
formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. And such a fact, when not
appearing on the record, may be proved by extrinsic evidence.
Frank Novak Sons, Inc. v. Avon Lake Bd. of Edn., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 01CA007835, 2001 Ohio
App. LEXIS 5359, *2-3 (Dec. 5, 2001), quoting Miner at 238.
{¶35} There are, however, exceptions to the mootness doctrine. An appellate court may
consider a moot appeal where it finds that the issues raised are capable of repetition yet evade
review. State ex rel. Bona v. Village of Orange, 85 Ohio St.3d 18, 21 (1999). “This exception
applies when the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated before its
cessation or expiration, and there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
will be subject to the same action again.” State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Louden, 91 Ohio
St.3d 61, 64 (2001). In addition, a court may consider the appeal if the appeal concerns a matter
of public or great general interest. In re Appeal of Suspension of Huffer from Circleville High
School, 47 Ohio St.3d 12, 14 (1989).
{¶36} With regard to Mr. Giovanini’s fifth assignment of error, there is no remedy this
Court could grant that would affect the matter at issue before us. Even if this Court were to
agree with Mr. Giovanini that the June 1, 2017, order of the trial court was void and of no legal
effect, it would have no consequence as the order was limited in its applicability to the year
2017, and that year has now passed. Therefore an order reversing or affirming the decision of
the trial court would be a vain act. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue before us is moot.
We also conclude that neither of the exceptions to the doctrine of mootness applies. This is not
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an issue that concerns a matter of public or great general interest, and there is not a reasonable
expectation that Mr. Giovanini will be subject to the same action again.
{¶37} Mr. Giovanini’s fifth assignment of error is moot.
III.
{¶38} Mr. Giovanini’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT
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SCHAFER, P. J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ARTHUR AXNER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
TODD A. MAZZOLA and LISA CAREY DEAN, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.