State v. Dabney

[Cite as State v. Dabney, 2023-Ohio-28.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-22-019
Appellee Trial Court No. 2021CR0443
v.
Shantyanna Dabney DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 6, 2023
*****
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
David T. Harold, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Jeffrey P. Nunnari, for appellant.
*****
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a March 2, 2022 judgment of the Wood County Court
of Common Pleas, sentencing appellant to a 30-month term of incarceration, with the
possibility of early release after six months, following appellant’s plea to one count of
failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in violation of R.C.
2921.331(B), as enhanced to a felony of the third degree pursuant to R.C.
2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii), based upon the trial court’s finding that that the offense “caused a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property”.
{¶ 2} Appellant, Shantyanna Dabney, sets forth the following sole assignment of
error:
“Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law.”
{¶ 3} We note at the outset that this appeal is procedural in nature. It is not
alleged, nor does the record reflect, that the underlying sentence was unlawful on any
substantive basis. Rather, appellant asserts that the sentence should be construed as
unlawful based upon the procedural claim that a voluntary plea entered to an enhanced,
felony-level failure to comply offense of R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(5)(a)(ii), by
definition, cannot demonstrate “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” of the “creating a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property” enhancement element in
the absence of a trial.
{¶ 4} Appellant argues on appeal that, “Since Dabney had no trial, as she entered a
guilty plea, she could be found guilty of only a misdemeanor of the first degree.”
{¶ 5} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On the afternoon
of August 25, 2021, a trooper on patrol with the Ohio State Highway Patrol observed a
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vehicle traveling southbound on I-75 in Wood County at a rate of speed of approximately
84 m.p.h. in a 70 m.p.h. zone. Appellant was a passenger in the vehicle.
{¶ 6} The trooper initiated a traffic stop due to the speeding infraction. During the
course of the traffic stop, the driver of the vehicle was placed in the back of the trooper’s
vehicle following the discovery of bags of marijuana in the vehicle’s glove compartment.
The trooper requested additional officers be dispatched to the scene to assist in the
investigation.
{¶ 7} Following the arrival of the additional officers at the scene, the trooper
requested that they carefully observe appellant, the passenger who had remained inside
the stopped vehicle, as the trooper had observed appellant erratically moving about inside
the vehicle.
{¶ 8} Shortly thereafter, appellant jumped into the driver’s seat of the vehicle and
sped away from the scene fleeing at a high rate of speed. This culminated in a 16-mile,
high speed chase which covered broad territory, encompassing freeways, state routes, and
local roads. The officers subsequently discovered that appellant was on felony parole in
the state of Michigan and had unlawfully left Michigan in violation of the terms of her
parole.
{¶ 9} During the course of the pursuit, appellant drove at speeds exceeding 100
m.p.h., ran through multiple stop signs and traffic lights, and nearly struck multiple
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vehicles travelling on the affected roadways, which included State Rt. 25, Sand Ridge
Rd., State Rt. 6, and I-75.
{¶ 10} Stop sticks were deployed by law enforcement and blew out one of the
front tires on the vehicle. Appellant persisted in fleeing, now driving with a blown out
tire. Upon re-entering I-75, traveling at approximately 100 m.p.h. with a flattened front
tire, appellant lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a guardrail. Upon crashing,
appellant jumped from the vehicle and fled into a nearby ditch on foot. One of the
pursuing troopers commenced a foot pursuit and captured appellant shortly thereafter.
{¶ 11} On October 7, 2021, appellant was indicted on one count of failure to
comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), as
enhanced to a felony of the third degree pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) based
upon appellant’s conduct “creating a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons
or property”, the statutory enhancement language which elevates the offense from a
misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree. On October 13, 2021,
appellant was arraigned and counsel was appointed.
{¶ 12} On January 18, 2022, by and through appointed counsel, appellant
voluntarily entered a guilty plea to the offense and executed the corresponding written
plea documentation memorializing the agreement.
{¶ 13} The transcripts of proceedings reflect that during the change of plea
colloquy, the trial court conveyed to appellant, “In a moment I will have the State of Ohio
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present the facts that underlie the offense for which you are pleading guilty. By pleading
guilty you are saying those are the true facts. Do you understand?” Appellant replied,
“Yes.” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 14} In conjunction, the trial court thoroughly inquired of appellant during the
change of pea colloquy, repeatedly verifying her understanding of the ramifications of the
plea and the corresponding plea documents, while she executed same, to which appellant
consistently and unambiguously affirmed her understanding.
{¶ 15} At this juncture, the trial court instructed appellee to recite the statement of
facts comprising appellant’s offense, regarding which appellant had just acknowledged
would reflect her admission to the truth of those facts.
{¶ 16} Appellee conveyed, “On August 25, 2021, at approximately 3:30 p.m., the
Highway Patrol pulled over a vehicle on I-75 southbound * * * going 84 miles an hour in
a 70 mile an hour zone * * * [the dash cam] video shows appellant sitting in the
passenger seat. She gets somewhat agitated. Eventually she moves into the driver’s seat
and she takes off.”
Appellee next elaborated,
Officers tried to get her to stop * * * she continued heading down I-75 at a
high rate of speed * * * they were able to actually drop stop sticks and
actually deflated one of the tires of the vehicle. She continued and then
got back on the interstate southbound going at an extremely high rate of
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speed, sometimes in excess of 100 mph, weaving in and out of traffic, and
thus creating a substantial risk of serious physical harm not only to
persons including herself but the property of the other drivers on the road.
She eventually then got off at State Route 25. She then ran the stop sign
and got onto the entrance ramp going southbound * * * [S]he lost control
of the vehicle and crashed into the guardrail. She exited the vehicle,
jumped the guardrail, attempted to flee, but was caught after a foot chase.
(Emphasis added).
{¶ 17} Following appellee’s recitation of the facts underlying appellant’s offense
onto the record during the change of plea hearing, both substantively reflecting and
specifically stating the actions “caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to
persons or property”, the trial court inquired of appellant, “Ms. Dabney, are those the
facts you are entering a plea of guilty to?” Appellant replied, “Yes.” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 18} A presentence investigation was ordered and the matter was scheduled for
sentencing. On March 1, 2022, the sentencing hearing was conducted. At sentencing, it
was noted that appellant possesses an extensive criminal history, including six prior
felony convictions. In addition, it was noted that appellant was on felony parole in the
state of Michigan, and she was aware and concerned about being unlawfully outside of
the state of Michigan at the time of these events.
Appellee conveyed to the trial court at sentencing,
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I believe that her driving and the length of the chase that occurred does
qualify and it created a substantial risk of serious physical harm either to
persons or property * * * they deployed stop sticks * * * they disabled one
of the tires on the vehicle * * * she got back on I-75 and drove recklessly
and almost caused accidents that could have caused serious physical harm
to persons or property * * * she then got off at the Cygnet Road exit and
she then ran because she couldn’t control the car anymore. She ran into a
railing, disabling the vehicle. That didn’t stop her either. She was going to
continue to run and she fled on foot. She was captured after a foot pursuit
* * * she was trying to flee so she wouldn’t get in trouble.
{¶ 19} Following appellee’s recitation of the facts onto the record again during the
sentencing hearing, the trial court conveyed,
There are some findings I need to make pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(B) and
(C)(5)(a)(ii) of the statute. In particular the duration of the pursuit in this
matter. These are considerations the court needs to make in determining
sentencing. It was about 17 minutes. The distance was about 16 miles.
The rate of speed of which the motor vehicle was operated exceeded 100
m.p.h. There was a failure to stop for traffic lights and stop signs * * *
moving violations. Yes. There were several of them * * * Almost crashed
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into several vehicles as you turned from I-75 to Route 6. In addition,
traveling over 100 m.p.h. without a front tire at the time.
{¶ 20} Appellant was then sentenced to a 30-month term of incarceration, with the
possibility of early release after six months. This appeal ensued.
{¶ 21} In the sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court sentence
was contrary to law.
{¶ 22} Specifically, appellant argues, “[A] violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) is a
misdemeanor of the first degree unless certain statutory criteria are proven beyond a
reasonable doubt * * *. Since [appellant] had no trial, as she entered a guilty plea, she
could be found guilty of only a misdemeanor of the first degree by operation of the plain
wording of the statute.” We do not concur.
{¶ 23} As held by this court in State v. Johnson, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-20-037,
2021-Ohio-3380, ¶ 39, “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) governs appellate felony sentence review *
* * [It] establishes that an appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate and
remand a disputed sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds either that the record does
not support the sentencing court’s [relevant statutory] findings [or] that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.”
{¶ 24} As applied to this case, the sole basis of appellant’s appeal alleging that the
sentence was unlawful is that appellant voluntarily entered a plea, negating the need for a
trial, and, therefore, according to appellant’s rationale, it was not possible to establish
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beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant’s conduct “caused a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to persons or property,” so as to properly enhance the offense from a
misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree. We are not persuaded.
{¶ 25} It is well-settled law that a guilty plea acts as a complete admission of
factual guilt. State v. Brimacomble, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, 960 N.E.2d
1042, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), citing Crim.R. 11.1(B)(1); State v. Barnett, 73 Ohio App.3d 244,
248, 596 N.E.2d 1101 (2d Dist., 1991). “As a complete admission of guilt, it embraced
not only the discreet acts alleged, but the totality of the substantive conduct involved in
committing the crime.” Id. Therefore, the guilty plea subsumes any right related to the
state’s ability to prove factual guilt. State v. Luna, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-18-017, 2020-
Ohio-3211, ¶ 7, citing State v. Morgan, 181 Ohio App.3d 747, 2009-Ohio-1370, 910
N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 23 (1st. Dist.).
{¶ 26} As held in State v. Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106090, 2018-Ohio-1849,
¶ 10-11, in rejecting an analogous argument upon appeal, the court held,
[W]hile R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a) generally requires the trier of fact to make
specific findings, a defendant’s guilty plea to the charges demonstrates an
admission sufficient to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a) *
* * Guilty pleas constitute a complete admission of factual and substantive
guilt. Here, through his guilty plea, [appellant] admitted the findings
required by R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a) * * * including a statement that ‘the
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operation of the motor vehicle by [appellant] caused a substantial risk of
serious physical harm to persons or property.’ (Emphasis added).
{¶ 27} Consistently, as held in State v. Carter, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-017,
2019-Ohio-3443, ¶ 48, in rejecting an analogous argument upon appeal, “[Appellant]
cannot now complain it is error to sentence him for a specification [that] he affirmatively
consented to when he pleaded guilty.”
{¶ 28} As applied to the instant case, the record reflects that appellant likewise
entered a plea and an admission, as reflected in the above-quoted portions of the
transcripts, to the subject offense and to facts “causing a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to persons or property”, including factual statements of the conduct
containing the precise specification language.
{¶ 29} The record reflects, as quoted-above, that the trial court made a separate,
uncontested R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) finding that appellant’s actions “caused a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property.” We have previously
found sufficient facts in similar circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 6th Dist. Lucas
No. L-21-1148, 2022-Ohio-2908, ¶ 30 (conduct created substantial risk of physical harm
to persons or property where defendant drives at a high rate of speed through
neighborhoods, running stop signs to elude police pursuit).
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{¶ 30} We find that the record clearly reflects that the statutory enhancement
requirement set forth in R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) was shown beyond a reasonable doubt
in this case regardless of the resolution of the case through a voluntary plea agreement.
{¶ 31} Based upon the foregoing, we find that appellant’s assignment of error is
without merit. Wherefore, the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is
hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.
24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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