State v. Guthrie

[Cite as State v. Guthrie, 2020-Ohio-501.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-180661
TRIAL NO. 18CRB-25280A
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
JILL GUTHRIE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 14, 2020
Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, William T. Horsely, Interim City Prosecutor,
and Scott Crowley, Assistant City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
CROUSE, Judge.
{¶1} In an apparent road-rage incident with Beverley Renadette,
defendant-appellant Jill Guthrie was charged with criminal damaging and menacing.
After a bench trial, Guthrie was acquitted of the menacing charge, but was convicted
of criminal damaging and was ordered to pay restitution.
{¶2} In two assignments of error, Guthrie argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in ordering restitution without conducting a hearing on the amount of
restitution under R.C. 2929.08(A)(1), and that her conviction for criminal damaging
was based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We overrule Guthrie’s assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Factual Background
{¶3} Renadette testified that she was attempting to merge onto Columbia
Parkway when Guthrie sped around her and attempted to get in front of her, nearly
causing a collision. Renadette claimed that Guthrie then got out of her car,
approached Renadette’s car, and started beating on her driver’s side window.
Renadette testified that Guthrie “slammed” Renadette’s driver’s side mirror, causing
the plastic covering around the mirror to break. Guthrie got back into her car and
drove away. Renadette testified that her mirror had a crack in the plastic covering
prior to her encounter with Guthrie, but that Guthrie’s actions caused the previously
cracked plastic covering to break apart.
{¶4} Officer Pete Faillace testified that Renadette came to the police station
to file a report a few days after the incident. He examined her car briefly and noted
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the damage to the mirror, although he could not remember what the damage looked
like.
{¶5} Guthrie testified that Renadette was sitting in the middle of the road
not paying attention, and so she tried to go around Renadette. Guthrie testified that
Renadette “rammed” Guthrie’s car twice before slamming into the back of it. Guthrie
testified that she got out of her car in order to get Renadette’s insurance information.
She denied having any physical contact with Renadette’s car. Guthrie drove away
and filed a report with her insurance company, but not the police. At trial, Guthrie
produced photos of the alleged damage to her vehicle, which consisted of a “little
bump.”
Sufficiency of the Evidence/ Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶6} For ease of discussion, we analyze Guthrie’s assignments of error out
of order. In Guthrie’s second assignment of error, she argues that her conviction for
criminal damaging was based upon insufficient evidence and against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
{¶7} The test for determining if the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction is whether “after viewing the probative evidence and inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. MacDonald, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180310, 2019-
Ohio-3595, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717
(1st Dist.1983). It is a question of law for the court to determine, the court is not to
weigh the evidence. MacDonald at ¶ 12.
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{¶8} To convict Guthrie of criminal damaging, the state was required to
prove that Guthrie knowingly caused, or created, a substantial risk of physical harm
to Renadette’s property without Renadette’s consent. See R.C. 2909.06(A)(1).
{¶9} Guthrie argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that she acted knowingly. A person acts knowingly when the person “is aware that
the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware
that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶10} Guthrie contends that Renadette’s testimony shows that Guthrie
pushed Renadette’s driver’s side mirror inward in accordance with normal use, i.e.,
side mirrors are designed to fold inward. She argues that she could not have known
that pushing the mirror inward would probably cause the plastic covering to break
apart.
{¶11} However, we must look at the evidence and inferences reasonably
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Although Renadette
testified that Guthrie “pushed [the mirror] into the car,” she also testified that
Guthrie “slammed in the [mirror],” which can be inferred to not be in accordance
with normal use. The state also presented photographic evidence of the damaged
mirror. See State v. Lowe, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170494, C-170495, C-170498
and C-170505, 2018-Ohio-3916, ¶ 15 (despite defendant’s testimony that he did not
act knowingly, the court held that his criminal-damaging conviction was based upon
sufficient evidence where the state offered the testimony of the victim and produced
photographic evidence of damage).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} Once we determine that there was sufficient evidence presented to
sustain the conviction, we consider Guthrie’s manifest-weight-of-the-evidence claim.
In doing so, “we review the record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact
‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be overturned.’ ” MacDonald, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180310,
2019-Ohio-3595, at ¶ 24, quoting Martin 20 Ohio App. 3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717.
Reversal of a conviction and a grant of a new trial should only be done in
“exceptional cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”
MacDonald at ¶ 24.
{¶13} Guthrie testified that she did not make contact with Renadette’s car,
and that in fact Renadette “rammed” into the back of her car. The trial court was
presented with photographs of the damage to both cars, Officer Faillace’s testimony,
and the conflicting testimonies of Renadette and Guthrie. As discussed above, there
was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find Guthrie guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The evidence presented by Guthrie does not make this one of those
exceptional cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. The
trial court did not err in believing Renadatte’s version of events and finding that
Guthrie knowingly damaged Renadette’s mirror. Guthrie’s second assignment of
error is overruled.
Restitution
{¶14} In her first assignment of error, Guthrie argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by ordering her to pay restitution without conducting a hearing
under R.C. 2929.08(A)(1) to determine the amount of restitution to be paid.
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{¶15} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s award of restitution in a
misdemeanor case for an abuse of discretion. State v. Adams, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C-180337, 2019-Ohio-3597, ¶ 14.
{¶16} R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) requires that the amount of restitution “not exceed
the amount of economic loss suffered by the victim,” and that an evidentiary hearing
must be conducted by the trial court when the amount of restitution is in dispute.
{¶17} The state requested $327.55 in restitution for the damage done to
Renadette’s side mirror, based on an estimate obtained by Renadette. The reflective
glass itself was not damaged, but the plastic casing around it was broken. The
estimate obtained by Renadette would put the plastic around the mirror in “new
condition.”
{¶18} During the sentencing hearing, Guthrie’s attorney argued against
restitution, stating “if the Court is inclined to impose restitution, that again that
restitution be through the appropriate methods of insurance because both of the
parties involved do have insurance.” Later, Guthrie’s attorney stated,
there’s a dispute here with regard to any damage. I don’t think that,
although she has an insurance adjustment or estimate made, I think the
appropriate method for the restitution as in the statute is that if there is a
dispute, it should be handled through their insurance company and not
be ordered that cash be handed to Miss Renadette because she had an
estimate done.
The trial court acknowledged that the “damage was disputed,” but then ordered
Guthrie to pay $327.55 in restitution.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶19} On appeal, Guthrie argues that $327.55 does not represent the actual
economic loss caused by her actions because the cost covers replacing the mirror and
the plastic, and the mirror itself was not actually damaged. Therefore, Guthrie
argues that she was entitled to present evidence to reflect the cost of the harm she
actually caused. However, Guthrie did not make this argument to the trial court.
{¶20} In State v. Andrews, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110735, 2012-Ohio-
4664, ¶ 26, this court held that where the defendant did not expressly object to the
amount of restitution ordered, the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary
hearing. (Emphasis added.) The defendant in Andrews merely objected to the
imposition of restitution because it was not part of the plea deal he agreed to. Id. at ¶
15. Similarly, the state argues that Guthrie only objected to the fact that restitution
was ordered, not the amount of restitution ordered, and therefore, the amount was
not actually in dispute so as to trigger a hearing.
{¶21} Guthrie cites to State v. Norman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104936,
2017-Ohio-752, ¶ 14, for the proposition that any dispute as to damage is sufficient to
put the amount of restitution in dispute. In Norman, the record was devoid of any
evidence to support the court’s award of $1,500 in restitution. Id. at ¶ 15. The
defendant objected, stating “we are disputing any restitution at this time without any
actual proof of what was paid out of pocket for any kind of repairs.” Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶22} The present case is distinguishable from Norman, and is akin to
Andrews. In the present case, there was evidence in the record, in the form of the
repair estimate obtained by Renadette, supporting the amount of restitution ordered.
Guthrie’s objections concerned the fact that both parties had insurance. She argued
that Renadette should have recovered from the insurance company, not through
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
restitution. Although Guthrie argued that there was a question as to “any damage,”
she did not object to the amount of damage. Similarly, the court acknowledged that
the “damage was disputed,” but then found that there was damage. Guthrie failed to
object to the amount of restitution, and so the court was not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing.
{¶23} Guthrie also argues that the amount of restitution ordered was
improper because $327.55 includes the cost to replace the mirror and the plastic
cover, and that she only damaged the plastic cover.
A trial court has discretion to order restitution in an appropriate case and
may base the amount it orders on a recommendation of the victim, the
offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts
indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other
information, but the amount ordered cannot be greater than the amount
of economic loss suffered as a direct and proximate result of the
commission of the offense.
State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St. 3d 248, 2013-Ohio-3093, 994 N.E.2d 423, paragraph
one of the syllabus; R.C. 2929.28(A)(1).
{¶24} The trial court found that Guthrie broke Renadette’s side mirror by
smashing it and causing the plastic to break apart. That Guthrie did not break each
individual piece of the mirror (i.e., the reflective glass itself) does not mean that she
should not be held responsible for paying to replace the mirror as a whole. The trial
court based its award on the estimate submitted by Renadette. There is no evidence
that a sufficient repair could have been accomplished for less than $327.55. The
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court’s order that Guthrie pay restitution in the amount of $327.55 was not arbitrary
or unreasonable, and thus was not an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
{¶25} Guthrie’s assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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