DocketNumber: Case No. 97-CA-0135
Judges: <italic>Gwin, J.</italic>
Filed Date: 10/26/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II.APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT HIM A SEPARATE TRIAL ON EACH COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SIMPLE AND DIRECT AND THE OTHER ACTS WOULD NOT BE ADMISSIBLE IN EACH TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLEI , SECTION10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III.THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND A FAIR TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE PROSECUTOR'S NONFLAGRANT IMPROPERLY IMPLIED THAT THE DEFENSE EXPERT WAS DISHONEST, THAT THE ACCUSED HAD A BURDEN TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE AND THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE DID NOT CONTINUE DURING THE JURY'S DELIBERATIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLEI , SECTION10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV.THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE AND/OR PRESERVE THE ERRORS LISTED IN ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS ONE AND TWO, SUPRA, IN VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLEI , SECTION10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V.THE JURY VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE THEREBY VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLEI , SECTION10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
APPLICATION OF THE SO-CALLED SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT, R.C.
2950.01 THROUGH2950.14 , TO MR. MUSGRAVE'S CASE VIOLATES PROHIBITION AGAINST PASSAGE OF EX POST FACTO LAWS PROVIDED IN ARTICLEI , SECTION9 OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The record indicates appellant and his family spent summer weekends at a camping resort in Marlboro Township, Stark County, Ohio. Appellant had numerous children visiting his camper on a regular basis, both during the day and at night. Some of the children were invited to sleep in appellant's bedroom while his wife slept in a separate room. Appellant also volunteered in numerous activities involving children. Appellant was accused of sexually abusing four children on several occasions.
In his defense, appellant presented the testimony of his wife and daughter, who acknowledged the children would regularly visit them at the residence and at the camper. Neither had observed appellant acting inappropriately with children. Appellant also presented testimony of his doctor who testified regarding various diseases from which appellant suffered.
Joinders are governed by Crim.R 8, which provides offenses may be joined if they are of the same or similar character, are based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or part of a common scheme or course of criminal conduct. Joinder is liberally permitted to conserve judicial resources, reduce the chance of incongruous results in successive trials, and diminishing inconvenience to witnesses, see State v. Torres (1981),
If similar offenses are properly joined pursuant to Crim.R 8 (A), the accused can still move to sever the charges pursuant to Crim.R 14. In a motion to sever, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate his rights would be prejudiced by the joinder, seeState v. Strobel (1988),
The State points out appellant moved to sever prior to trial, and did not renew the motion at the close of the State's case and at the conclusion of all evidence. Some Ohio courts have held a failure to renew the motion to sever constitutes a waiver,Strobel, supra, at 33; State v. Owens (1975),
Applying the test enunciated in Schaim, supra, we find appellant has not met his burden of demonstrating abuse of discretion.
In his motion to sever, filed January 3, 1997, the appellant asserted the witnesses who would testify in the joined indictment would testify to facts distinct and dissimilar in time. Appellant urged if the counts were joined, there would be a substantial danger the jury would convict him solely because it assumed appellant had a propensity to commit criminal acts or deserved punishment, regardless of whether appellant committed the crime charged in the indictment, see State v. Curry (1975),
The State argues the evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated appellant's common scheme or plan. The State argues appellant used the same method of attracting his victims by establishing friendships with the children through his volunteer work and by showing an interest in topics interesting to children. All criminal acts occurred at the same location and occurred within a one-year time frame. Three of the four victims were of similar age and the criminal acts performed on all the victims were very similar.
Evid.R. 404(B) permits evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to be admitted if the evidence shows proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The Rule precludes admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or other acts merely to prove the character of a person in order to show the person acted in conformity with the character on a given occasion.
R.C.
Appellant's defense was simply, that none of the acts occurred and the four children who testified were not credible. Appellant attempted to show he was neither physically nor emotionally able to commit the acts.
We have reviewed the record on appeal, and we find appellant has not demonstrated the court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the charges for trial.
The first assignment of error is overruled.
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor's conduct at trial was improper and prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the defendant, see State v.Lott (1990),
We find the prosecutor's remarks regarding Dr. Ferreri were within the scope of final argument.
Regarding the allegation the prosecutor attempted to shift the burden of proof to appellant and inappropriately commented on the presumption of innocence, these alleged incidents of misconduct occurred during the prosecutor's rebuttal. The prosecutor explicitly informed the jury he was not trying to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Instead, the prosecutor urged the State had met its burden of proof because defense counsel was unable to challenge the weight of the State's evidence. Defense counsel objected and the court sustained the objection and cautioned the prosecutor.
The prosecutor also informed the jury on rebuttal the defendant was entitled to the presumption of innocence, but because the presentation of evidence was then over, the presumption of innocence was no longer necessary. Defense counsel did not object to this statement.
The trial court instructed the jury prior to closing arguments neither the prosecutor's nor the defense counsel's statements constituted evidence. The court reminded the jury prior to closing arguments that the defendant is presumed innocent until guilt is established, and this meant an acquittal is required unless the State convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt on every essential element of the offense charged. After closing arguments, the court again reminded the jurors of their duty to weigh the evidence as objectively as possible.
We find the prosecutor did not commit any misconduct regarding his discussion of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, given the trial court's handling these issues.
Finally, the prosecutor did indeed suggest there could be more victims in the case. In closing argument, the prosecutor picked up on a statement by one of the defendant's witnesses, appellant's wife. Appellant's wife testified at both the camper and the parties' home, there was "a steady steam of children". Unfortunately, the prosecutor enlarged on her comment by saying there were several children, not just the ones brought in to testify. Defense counsel did not object at this point, but when the prosecutor apparently showed a picture of the defendant with a number of children and asked "how many more victims are in that picture" the court sustained counsel's objection and instructed the jury to disregard it.
We find the prosecutor exceeded the bounds of proper closing argument in making this argument to the jury. However, we also find appellant has failed to demonstrate how this misconduct prejudicially affected his substantial rights. Given the overwhelming evidence against appellant, this court cannot find this single instance of improper remark, corrected by the trial court, so prejudicial as to affect appellant's substantial rights.
The second assignment of error is overruled.
The errors of which appellant complains are those set forth in I and II, supra. Because we find no error, it follows counsel did not perform ineffectively in those portions of the trial. We conclude appellant has failed to demonstrate either ineffective assistance of counsel, or prejudice.
The third assignment of error is overruled.
In State v. Thompkins (1997),
We have reviewed the record, and we find the evidence presented by the State was sufficient as a matter of law to permit to submit the case to the jury for final resolution. We further find the jury's verdict is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, such that the jury could reasonably conclude the State had met its burden of proof on each essential element of the crimes charged.
The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
In State v. Cook (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___, announced September 30, 1998, the Ohio Supreme Court held:
Syllabus by the court, paragraph two.R.C.
2950.09 (B)(1), as applied to conduct prior to the effective date of the statute, does not violate the ex post facto clause of Section 10, ArticleI of the United States Constitution.
The Ohio Supreme Court held the requirements of the statute are de minimis procedural requirements necessary to meet the statute's goals. The court found them remedial in nature.
On authority of Cook, supra, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.
For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed and the cause is remanded to that court for execution of sentence.
By Gwin, J., Farmer, P.J., and Reader, J., concur.
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum-Opinion on file, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to that court for execution of sentence. Costs to appellant.