State v. Williams

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2018-Ohio-3615.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-18-06
v.
LAYNE D. WILLIAMS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR17-09-0299
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 10, 2018
APPEARANCES:
Samantha L. Berkhofer for Appellant
Sarah J. Warren for Appellee
Case No. 8-18-06
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Layne D. Williams (“Williams”), appeals the
February 7, 2018 judgment entry of sentence of the Logan County Court of
Common Pleas. We affirm.
{¶2} On September 12, 2017, the Logan County Grand Jury indicted
Williams on seven counts: Count One of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(a),
a first-degree felony; Count Two of unlawful sexual contact with a minor in
violation of R.C. 2907.04(A), a fourth-degree felony; Count Three of pandering
obscenity involving a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.32(A)(1), a second-degree
felony; Count Four of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or
performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1), a second-degree felony; Count
Five of corrupting another with drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(1), a second-
degree felony; Count Six of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree
felony; and Count Seven of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or
performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1), a second-degree felony. (Doc.
No. 2). On September 15, 2017, Williams appeared for arraignment and entered
pleas of not guilty. (Doc. No. 9). The State filed a bill of particulars on October 20,
2017. (Doc. No. 34).
{¶3} On December 29, 2017, a change-of-plea hearing was held. (Doc. No.
50). Williams withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered guilty pleas, under a
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negotiated plea agreement, to Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five of the indictment.
(Id.). In exchange for his change of pleas, the State agreed to dismiss Counts One,
Six, and Seven of the indictment. (Id.). The trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11
colloquy, accepted Williams’s guilty pleas, found him guilty, and ordered a
presentence investigation. (Id.). The trial court also dismissed Counts One, Six,
and Seven. (Id.).
{¶4} On January 25, 2018, Williams filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas. (Doc. No. 53). The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Williams’s
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on February 2, 2018. (Doc. No. 55). On
February 2, 2018, the trial court denied Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas and proceeded to sentencing that same day. (Doc. No. 58). The trial court
sentenced Williams to 12 months in prison on Count Two, 6 years in prison on
Count Three, 6 years in prison on Count Four, and 6 years in prison on Count Five.
(Id.). The trail court ordered that Williams serve the prison terms under Counts
Two, Four, and Five consecutively, and serve the prison term under Count Three
concurrently to the terms under Counts Two, Four, and Five for an aggregate
sentence of 13 years in prison. (Id.). The trial court also concluded that Williams
is a Tier II sex offender. (Id.). The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence
on February 7, 2018. (Id.).
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{¶5} Williams filed his notice of appeal on February 12, 2018. (Doc. No.
68). He raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to
allow a change of plea?1
{¶6} In his assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶7} A defendant may file a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Crim.R. 32.1. Although a trial court should freely grant such a motion, a defendant
does not maintain an absolute right to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. State
v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526 (1992). Instead, a trial court must hold a hearing to
determine whether a “reasonable and legitimate basis” exists for the withdrawal. Id.at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶8} We consider several factors when reviewing a trial court’s decision to
grant or deny a defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw a plea, including: (1)
whether the withdrawal will prejudice the prosecution; (2) the representation
afforded to the defendant by counsel; (3) the extent of the hearing held pursuant to
1
Williams’s brief contains different versions of his assignment of error. Notwithstanding the caption of his
assignment of error directly preceding his argument alleging that the trial court erred by not permitting him
to change his plea, Williams previously asserts in his brief that he is assigning as error, “Whether the trial
court erred by denying his motion to suppress the identification evidence?” (See Appellant’s Brief at III, 2).
However, based on the argument presented in the body of his assignment of error, it is apparent that Williams
is actually challenging the trial court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Accordingly, we will address that argument.
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Crim.R. 11; (4) the extent of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea; (5)
whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration of the motion; (6) whether
the timing of the motion was reasonable; (7) the stated reasons for the motion; (8)
whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges and potential sentences;
and (9) whether the accused was perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense to the
charges. State v. Lane, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-10, 2010-Ohio-4819, ¶ 21, citing
State v. Griffin, 141 Ohio App.3d 551, 554 (7th Dist.2001). See also State v. Fish,
104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240 (1st Dist.1995), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Sims, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160856, 2017-Ohio-8379. “None of the factors is
determinative on its own and there may be numerous additional aspects ‘weighed’
in each case.” State v. North, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-18, 2015-Ohio-720, ¶ 16,
citing Griffin at 554 and Fish at 240.
{¶9} Ultimately, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to
determine what circumstances justify granting a presentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea. Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus. Therefore, appellate review of a
trial court’s decision to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Nathan, 99 Ohio
App.3d 722, 725 (3d Dist.1995), citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977).
An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
unconscionably. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980). When
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applying this standard, a reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court. State v. Adams, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-09-16, 2009-Ohio-
6863, ¶ 33.
{¶10} An examination of the reasonable-and-legitimate-basis factors
supports that the trial court’s decision to deny Williams’s presentence motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas.
{¶11} As to the first factor, despite contending that it would be prejudiced if
the trial court were to allow Williams to withdraw his guilty pleas in its
memorandum in opposition to Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the
State concedes in its brief “that prejudice would be minimal if any.” (Appellee’s
Brief at 5). The trial court concluded that the State would be prejudiced by
permitting Williams to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court
is prejudiced by that because we now have yet another trial packed
into an already busy trial schedule, and we had this time set aside for
this case as well as the venue for the case, and * * * you basically are
now trying to push it into a time frame where we’re already booked.
(Feb. 2, 2018 Tr. at 8-9). Not only does the articulated prejudice relate to prejudice
to the trial court instead of the State, the trial court’s articulated prejudice also
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appears to relate “only to the inconvenience of having to prosecute [the] case, rather
than relating to actual, articulated prejudice.” State v. Zimmerman, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 09AP-866, 2010-Ohio-4087, ¶ 24. Because “the prejudice must relate
‘solely’ to the entering of the plea [agreement],” the trial court’s articulated
prejudice is not a legitimate consideration when determining whether a defendant
may withdraw his guilty pleas prior to sentencing. Id. at ¶ 23. Also, the State
concedes that the sixth factor—the timeliness of Williams’s motion—weighs in his
favor. (Appellee’s Brief at 6). Therefore, the first and sixth factors weigh in favor
of granting Williams’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
{¶12} Nevertheless, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances of this
case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Williams’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See State v. Rickman,
3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-13-15, 2014-Ohio-260, ¶ 13 (reviewing the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying
Rickman’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea); State v. Fields, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-090648, 2010-Ohio-4114, ¶ 14. See also North, 2015-Ohio-720, at ¶ 27
(concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling North’s
presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea even though there was a lack of
prejudice to the prosecution and the timing of his motion was reasonable).
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{¶13} As Williams concedes, the second, third, and eighth factors do not
weigh in his favor. Apart from Williams’s concession that the second factor does
not weigh in his favor, it is pertinent to note for our totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis that two attorneys were appointed to represent Williams in this matter.
(Doc. Nos. 9, 45). (See Feb. 2, 2018 Tr. at 9). The favorable negotiated plea
agreement in which the State agreed to dismiss three of the seven counts of the
indictment, including the two most serious charges Williams was facing—the first-
degree-felony-rape charges—is also evidence that Williams was represented by
competent trial counsel. Compare State v. Ferdinandsen, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-
15-08, 2016-Ohio-7172, ¶ 31 (concluding that the second factor did not weigh in
Ferdinandsen’s favor because he “was offered a very favorable negotiated plea
agreement”).
{¶14} We conclude that the fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth factors do not
weigh in Williams’s favor. As to the fourth and fifth factors, although it was
conducted just before the sentencing hearing, the trial court conducted a hearing on
Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, during which both parties had the
opportunity to speak and present their evidence. (Feb. 2, 2018 Tr. at 7-17).
Compare State v. Motley, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-040430 and C-040431, 2005-
Ohio-2450, ¶ 12 (noting that the trial court permitted Motley “a full opportunity to
speak on why his Crim.R. 32.1 motion should have been granted” “[a]t the
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sentencing hearing”). See also Rickman at ¶ 21; State v. Hill, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-
12-11, 2013-Ohio-3873, ¶ 17 (“Moreover, the record establishes that the trial court
provided Hill with an opportunity to address his arguments regarding his reasons
for wanting to withdraw his guilty plea and that the trial court gave full and fair
consideration of Hill’s reasons.”); Zimmerman, 2010-Ohio-4087, at ¶ 16
(concluding that the fourth factor weighed against Zimmerman’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court “conducted a complete inquiry into
the grounds for [Zimmerman’s] motion to withdraw” his guilty plea). Likewise, the
trial court gave full and fair consideration of Williams’s reasons to withdraw his
guilty pleas. Indeed, the trial court dedicated nearly ten pages of transcript
discussing the propriety of Williams’s motion, while addressing the reasonable-and-
legitimate-basis factors. (See Feb. 2, 2018 Tr. at 7-17).
{¶15} Turning to the remaining factors, to determine whether the seventh
factor—the stated reasons for the motion—weighs in his favor, we must examine it
in conjunction with the ninth factor—whether Williams is perhaps not guilty or has
a complete defense to the charges. Based on our review of the record, Williams did
not present any reasonable and legitimate basis for his motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas and his claims of innocence are not substantiated by the record. See North,
2015-Ohio-720, at ¶ 27. In his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, Williams states,
without further explanation, that the reason for his motion is simply “to correct
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manifest injustice.” (Doc. No. 53). Because his stated reason was ambiguous, the
trial court inquired of Williams as to the reasons for his motion at the hearing
regarding his motion. In response to the trial court’s inquiry, Williams stated, “I
just feel like I’m not guilty on all those charges. I feel like I’m only guilty of one
F2 and one F4.” (Feb. 2, 2018 Tr. at 12). Williams further stated, “I just feel like I
was forced into not -- not really forced to take a plea deal, but scared into taking the
plea deal.” (Id. at 13).
{¶16} “In weighing the ninth factor, ‘the trial judge must determine whether
the claim of innocence is anything more than the defendant’s change of heart about
the plea agreement.’” State v. Davis, 5th Dist. Richland No. 15CA6, 2015-Ohio-
5196, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Davison, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008-CA-00082, 2008-
Ohio-7037, ¶ 45, citing State v. Kramer, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 01-CA-107, 2002-
Ohio-4176, ¶ 58. “‘A change of heart or mistaken belief about pleading guilty is
not a reasonable basis for withdrawal of a guilty plea.’” State v. Jones, 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 09 MA 50, 2011-Ohio-2903, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Smith, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 94419, 2010-Ohio-5784, ¶ 9. Claims of innocence must be
substantiated. North at ¶ 27.
{¶17} Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas is nothing more than a
change of heart—that is, Williams’s stated reasons for his motion do not amount to
a claim of innocence and any claim of innocence is unsubstantiated.
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Notwithstanding Williams’s statement that he does not “feel like” he is guilty,—
which does not amount to a claim of innocence—Williams’s subsequent statement
that he is guilty of a second-degree and fourth-degree felony at least partially
equivocates any claim of innocence. Further, to the extent that Williams’s claims
could be construed as a claim of innocence, his claims are not substantiated by the
record. Rather, Williams’s claims of innocence are contradicted by his statements
at the change-of-plea hearing and in the PSI. See Motley, 2005-Ohio-2450, at ¶ 10.
At the change-of-plea hearing, Williams’s trial counsel represented to the trial court
that it was likely that Williams would be found guilty of the charges to which he
was pleading guilty if the case were to proceed to trial. (Dec. 29, 2017 Tr. at 9).
Williams did not protest his trial counsel’s statement. Rather, after the State
specifically described Williams’s conduct as it related to Counts Two, Three, Four,
and Five of the indictment, Williams voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly
admitted guilt to those counts. (Id. at 11-22).
{¶18} Moreover, the PSI reflects that Williams told the investigator, “‘I am
not guilty of rape, I am not guilty of forcing drugs on her, but I am guilty of the
rest.’” (PSI at 5). According to the PSI, Williams admitted to the investigator to
smoking marijuana and using cocaine with the victim. (Id.). In addition, the PSI
reflects that Williams expresses remorse for his conduct because he thought that the
victim was 16 years old—not 14 years old—and that he “thought the age of 16 was
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ok.” (Id.). The PSI further reflects that Williams admitted to law enforcement to
engaging in sexual conduct with the victim, to smoking marijuana and using cocaine
with the victim, and to taking pictures of the victim at her insistence. (Id.).
However, the PSI reflects that Williams denied to law enforcement that he
distributed any pictures or videos depicting the victim. (Id.). Despite that denial,
the PSI reflects that law enforcement interviewed witnesses who indicated that they
received pictures and videos from Williams depicting the victim. (Id.). For these
reasons, we conclude the record does not substantiate that Williams pleaded guilty
to crimes that he did not commit. See State v. Calloway, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
040066, 2004-Ohio-5613, ¶ 15
{¶19} To the extent that Williams argues that he was pressured into pleading
guilty under the negotiated plea agreement, we do not find Williams’s argument
persuasive. Other than Williams’s statement during the trial court’s hearing on his
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, there is no evidence that Williams was
pressured to agree to the plea agreement. Indeed, as we discussed above, our review
of the change-of-plea hearing reflects that Williams’s pleas were knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. (See Dec. 29, 2017 Tr.). As such, the seventh and ninth
factors do not weigh in Williams’s favor.
{¶20} Therefore, despite our conclusions that the first and sixth factors weigh
in Williams’s favor, we conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
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Williams did not have a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw his guilty pleas.
See Jones, 2011-Ohio-2903, at ¶ 20 (“‘When none of the [] factors weigh heavily in
the defendant’s favor regarding the presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea, a strong
inference arises that the plea is being withdrawn merely because of a change of heart
about entering the plea.’”), quoting State v. Moore, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 06
CO 74, 2008-Ohio-1039, ¶ 13. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶21} Williams’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶22} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
/jlr
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