State v. Williams

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2018-Ohio-1040.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-170014
TRIAL NO. B-1602991
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
JAMYA WILLIAMS, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 21, 2018
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Demetra Stamatakos,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MYERS, Judge.
{¶1} In 2006, defendant-appellee Jamya Williams was convicted of
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and classified as a sexually-oriented offender
under former R.C. Chapter 2950 (“Megan’s Law”), which required him to register
with the sheriff annually for ten years. On May 27, 2015, Williams appeared in
person at the Hamilton County sheriff’s office and registered his address as
“homeless under bridge West Liberty near Western Ave., Cincinnati, OH.” His next
verification date of April 5, 2016, was provided at that time.
{¶2} Williams did not verify his address on April 5, 2016. The sheriff sent a
warning letter addressed to “Jamya Williams Under Bridge West Liberty Near
Western Av.” The letter was dated April 6, 2016, but the evidence showed that the
letter was mailed on April 7, 2016. The letter stated that Williams had to verify his
address by April 13, 2016. The letter was returned to the sheriff as undeliverable.
Williams did not verify his address on April 13, 2016.
{¶3} On June 7, 2016, Williams was indicted for failing to provide
verification of his current address in violation of R.C. 2950.06. Williams filed a
motion to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court granted on the ground that
the sheriff had failed to strictly comply with R.C. 2950.06(G)’s requirement that the
warning letter be sent to Williams’s last known address, because the sheriff had sent
the letter to an “undeliverable address.” The court did not address Williams’s
argument that the letter also failed to comply with the time constraints of R.C.
2950.06(G)(1). The state has appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment.
{¶4} The state’s sole assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in
dismissing the indictment “based upon its determination that a warning letter sent to
the detailed description of the place where a registered sexually oriented offender
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last indicated he was staying did not strictly comply with R.C. 2950.06(G).” We do
not address the state’s argument, because the seven-day warning letter sent to
Williams failed to comply with R.C. 2950.06(G)’s time constraints.
{¶5} If an offender fails to verify his address, R.C. 2950.06(G)(1) requires
that the sheriff send, on the day following the date required for verification, a written
warning to the offender’s last known address. R.C. 2950.06(G)(1)(c) provides that
the warning must “[c]onspicuously state that the offender * * * has seven days from
the date on which the warning is sent to verify the current address * * * with the
sheriff who sent the warning[.]” Pursuant to R.C. 2950.06(G)(1)(e) and (f), the
written warning must state that if the offender verifies his address within that seven-
day period, he will not be prosecuted for failure to timely verify a current address,
but if the offender does not verify his current address within the seven-day period, he
will be prosecuted for failure to timely verify a current address. Because the relevant
statutes are criminal in nature, they must be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. State v. Williams, 114 Ohio St. 3d 103, 2007-Ohio-
3268, 868 N.E.2d 969, ¶ 1 and 10. In determining that R.C. 2950.06 must be strictly
construed, the Williams court stated,
R.C. 2950.06(F) forbids the state to prosecute before the time
specified in R.C. 2950.06(G) expires; both R.C. 2950.06(G)(1) and (2)
link the seven-day period to the mailing of a written warning to a sex
offender. Specifically, R.C. 2950.06(G)(1)(c) requires the written
warning to include a statement that the sex offender “has seven days
from the date on which the warning is sent to verify” a current address.
In addition, R.C. 2950.06(G)(2) prohibits a prosecution for a violation
of R.C. 2950.06(F) “unless the seven-day period subsequent to that
date that the offender * * * is provided under division (G)(1) of this
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section to verify the current address has expired.” (Emphasis added.)
Because the statute clearly states that the offender must be given a new
compliance date (which is seven days from the date the warning is
sent), an R.C. 2950.06(F) prosecution is dependent on the sending of
that notification.
Id. at ¶ 11.
{¶6} In State v. Doyle, 188 Ohio App. 3d 434, 2010-Ohio-3339, 935 N.E.2d
892 (2d Dist.), Doyle had verified his address on June 8, 2009. At that time, he
received written notice to again verify his address by September 5, 2009. The office
where he was supposed to verify his address was closed on September 5, 2009, which
was a Saturday, and Doyle did not verify his address. The office remained closed
through Monday, September 7, 2009, which was Labor Day. However, an employee
worked on Labor Day and prepared a seven-day warning letter for Doyle. The letter
was dated September 7, 2009, and was sent by certified mail to Doyle’s address on
September 8, 2009. The letter instructed Doyle to verify his address by September
14, 2009, which Doyle did not do. Doyle was subsequently indicted for failure to
verify his current address in violation of R.C. 2950.06. The Second District stated,
Doyle had been ordered to verify his address no later than September
5, 2009, a Saturday. Because the office where he was supposed to go
was closed Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, the state concedes that he
actually had through Tuesday, September 8, 2009, to verify his
address. Under R.C. 2950.06(G)(1), the sheriff’s office should have
mailed Doyle a seven-day warning letter on Wednesday, September 9,
2009, the day following the date required for the verification, directing
him to verify his address no later than September 16, 2009.
***
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Williams establishes that R.C. 2950.06(G) must be strictly construed
against the state. The statute required the sheriff’s office to send Doyle
a warning letter on the day following the date required for verification.
It also required the letter to advise Doyle that he had an additional
seven days from the day of its mailing to verify his address. The letter
sent to Doyle did not satisfy these requirements. As set forth above, it
was sent by certified mail on September 8, 2009, when it should have
been sent on September 9, 2009. Moreover, the letter instructed
Doyle to verify his address by September 14, 2009, when he actually
had until September 16, 2009. The result is that the sheriff’s office
gave Doyle only an additional five days to verify his address, when R.C.
2950.06(G) required a seven-day grace period.
Id. at ¶ 16 and 19. The Second District held that by prematurely mailing the warning
letter, the sheriff’s office had failed to fulfill its statutory duty, and therefore, Doyle
could not be prosecuted for failing to verify his address. Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶7} In this case, the evidence showed that Williams’s warning letter had
been prepared and run through a postage machine on April 6, 2016. But the letter
was not sent until April 7, 2016. The letter stated that Williams had until April 13,
2016, to verify his current address. However, because the letter was not mailed until
April 7, Williams should have been given until April 14, 2016, to verify his address.
The record is clear that Williams was given only six days, and not the required seven,
to comply. Construing the statute strictly against the state, as we are required to do,
we hold that the sheriff did not comply with R.C. 2950.06(G)(1)’s time constraints,
and therefore, Williams cannot be prosecuted for failure to verify a current address.
{¶8} The state’s assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the
trial court dismissing the indictment is affirmed.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Judgment affirmed.
MOCK, P.J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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