Haddox v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth.

[Cite as Haddox v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth., 2023-Ohio-321.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Steven Haddox et al., :
Plaintiffs-Appellants, :
No. 21AP-539
v. : (C.P.C. No. 20CV-4315)
Central Ohio Transit Authority et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendants-Appellees. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on February 2, 2023
On brief: The Law Office of Wright & Assoc., LLC, and
Benjamin W. Wright, for appellant. Argued: Benjamin W.
Wright.
On brief: Central Ohio Transit Authority, Theodore Klecker,
and Aracely Tagliaventi, for appellee. Argued: Theodore L.
Klecker.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
MENTEL, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Steven Haddox, appeals from the decision of the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-
appellee, Central Ohio Transit Authority ("COTA"), on his intentional tort claim under
R.C. 2745.01. No evidence in the record showed that COTA deliberately intended to harm
Mr. Haddox after he was injured from a fall after attempting to sit in a broken office chair.
Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary in favor of COTA.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} Mr. Haddox is a mechanic who had worked at COTA for seven years. (Oct. 9,
2020 Haddox Dep. at 13-14.) On July 2, 2019, the vehicle maintenance supervisor, Harvey
No. 21AP-539 2
Richardson, asked him to come into his office to pick up bolts needed for a bus repair. Id.
at 19. In Mr. Haddox's estimation, mechanics would go to Mr. Richardson's office "three to
four times a day" to pick up parts and receive job assignments. Id. at 20. When he entered,
co-worker Brian Carter was in the office for a job assignment. Id. at 19.
{¶ 3} Mr. Carter asked Mr. Haddox to sit down in an empty chair.1 Id. at 35.
Mr. Carter described the offer as "a joke" that "[e]veryone acknowledged:" "I made a joke
that Steve should sit down since he was older than me." (Nov. 24, 2020 Carter Aff. at ¶ 6.)
The chair was "an office chair that had wheels on the bottom of it" and had no observable
defects. (Haddox Dep. at 30-31.) Mr. Haddox "grabbed" the chair and "pulled it out and
sat down" in it. Id. at 31. While sitting down, the chair "flew out from behind" him and he
"tried to grab" Mr. Richardson's desk as he fell, injuring his arm. Id. at 32. As a result of
the injury, he filed a workers' compensation claim. Id. at 46-47.
{¶ 4} Mr. Richardson "kept asking" if Mr. Haddox was okay and appeared "pretty
upset" about the incident. Id. at 32-33. He insisted that Mr. Haddox report the injury, even
though Mr. Haddox initially believed that he had "just pulled a muscle." Id. at 33.
Mr. Richardson said that he had "told them to throw that damn chair away, because it had
a broken wheel on it." Id. at 33-34. He then "immediately rolled it out of the office and
took it and threw it away." Id. at 34. Mr. Carter told Mr. Haddox that he "didn't realize that
[the chair] was broken" and that he "felt bad" about offering it to him. Id. at 35.
{¶ 5} Mr. Haddox subsequently discovered that two other employees had fallen out
of the same chair in the preceding days. Id. at 41. When asked if he thought that any COTA
employee had "deliberately intended" to injury him, Mr. Haddox replied: "I do not believe
that anybody would try to hurt me."2 Id. at 38. Mr. Haddox said there was no prank culture
1 Mr. Haddox initially testified that he was asked to sit in a chair in the office but could not remember if
Mr. Richardson or Mr. Carter had made the request. (Compare Oct. 9, 2020 Haddox Dep. at 19 (stating that
Mr. Richardson "said -- I think the phone rang or something. I can't remember. He said go ahead and sit
down") with id. at 26 ("Brian Carter was in there. He may have said, Steve, go ahead and sit down").)
Mr. Carter confirmed that he asked Mr. Haddox to sit in the chair while allowing for the possibility that
Mr. Richardson also "may have indicated Steve should sit." (Nov. 24, 2020 Carter Aff. at ¶ 6.)
2 Mr. Haddox provided several supplemental answers to other questions about COTA's "intent," but did not
amend his statement that he did "not believe that anybody would try to hurt me." (Haddox Dep. at 38.) For
example, one supplemental answer states: "While I do not know who put the chair in the office, somebody
had to make the decision to put or keep the chair in the office. As such, it was not an 'accident.' * * * Somebody
had to act 'intentionally' to put the chair in the office." (Nov. 16, 2020 Errata Sheet.)
No. 21AP-539 3
at COTA apart from when mechanics had "switched somebody's sockets around" in each of
their toolboxes. Id. at 39.
{¶ 6} On June 30, 2019, Nick Crawford, another COTA mechanic, sat in the chair
in Mr. Richardson's office, which "went back because one of the wheels or legs was broken."
(Nov. 17, 2020 Crawford Aff.) On July 2, 2019, another COTA mechanic, Brian Meyers,
attempted to sit in the chair in Mr. Richardson's office. (Oct. 29, 2020 Meyers Aff.) The
chair "slid out from beneath [him] because one of the wheels or legs was broken." Id.
{¶ 7} On July 1, 2019, Mr. Richardson heard "that somebody had an issue with the
chair" and requested that the facilities manager dispose of it. (Nov. 18, 2020 Richardson
Dep. at 7.) When he left work that day, he "noticed the chair was by the dumpster." Id.
Mr. Richardson did not witness Nick Crawford or Brian Meyers' attempts to sit in the chair.
Id. at 7, 10. After Mr. Haddox fell, Mr. Richardson "personally picked the chair up and
threw it in the dumpster." Id. at 10. He did not know how the chair had reappeared in his
office after seeing it by the dumpster the day before. Id. at 12.
{¶ 8} Mr. Haddox filed suit against COTA on July 2, 2020, alleging an intentional
tort claim against his employer.3 The claim alleged that COTA "acted with deliberate intent
to cause injury" to him by "among other things, deliberately exposing [him] to a known risk,
to wit, the chair that another employee had previously fallen out of and had subsequently
been discarded." (Sept. 3, 2020 Am. Compl. at ¶ 68-69.) COTA filed for summary
judgment on April 2, 2021 and the trial court granted the motion on September 23, 2021.
{¶ 9} Mr. Haddox appealed and asserts the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in
favor of, Central Ohio Transit Authority ("COTA" or
"Appellee") because genuine issues of fact exist that could lead
a reasonable jury to find that the COTA acted with a specific or
deliberate intent to cause injury to Appellant Steven Haddox
("Steve" or "Appellant.")
3 Mr. Haddox originally alleged a number of claims against COTA in the complaint and an amended complaint
but stipulated to or abandoned all of them except the intentional tort claim in the course of litigation. (Sept.
23, 2021 Decision & Entry Granting Def.'s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt. at 1, fn.1.)
No. 21AP-539 4
II. Standard of Review
{¶ 10} An appellate court applies a de novo standard when reviewing a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56. Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry.
Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, ¶ 24. Thus, we must "apply the same standard as
the trial court" when it ruled on appellees' motion. Id. Under Civ.R. 56(C), a court must
enter summary judgment if the evidence supporting the motion "show[s] that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." "A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the
evidence * * * that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party
being entitled to have the evidence * * * construed most strongly in the party's favor." Id.III. Analysis
{¶ 11} Mr. Haddox's sole surviving claim on appeal is an intentional tort claim
against COTA. When "an employee seeks damages resulting from an act or omission
committed by the employer with the intent to injure, the claim arises outside of the
employment relationship, and the workers' compensation system does not preempt the
employee's cause of action." Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. DTJ Ents., Inc., 143 Ohio St.3d 197,
2015-Ohio-843, ¶ 7, citing Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d 624 (1991),
paragraph one of the syllabus. However, the General Assembly limited the common law
cause of action for an employee seeking redress from an employer for an intentional harm
by passing R.C. 2745.01. See Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250,
2010-Ohio-1027 (detailing the history of the General Assembly's attempts to codify
employer intentional tort claims and holding that the current iteration, R.C. 2745.01, was
constitutional). The statute provides:
(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee,
or by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, for
damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the
employer during the course of employment, the employer shall
not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer
committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or
with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.
No. 21AP-539 5
(B) As used in this section, “substantially certain” means that
an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee
to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death.
{¶ 12} Mr. Haddox argues that the grant of summary judgment should be reversed
because the trial court "improperly weighed the evidence, judged the credibility of
witnesses, selected among reasonable inferences, and did not view the evidence most
strongly in" his favor. (Brief of Appellant at 13.) More specifically, he argues that the other
incidents of employees falling out of the chair and Mr. Carter's "joke" when asking him to
sit "raise[] an inference [that] COTA intended for someone to fall from" it. Id. at 15-16.
Acknowledging that "a joke does not necessarily imply an intent to injure," Mr. Haddox
nevertheless believes that the "back-to-back incidents" before his fall raise the "reasonable
inference" that COTA's actions created a "substantial certainty of harm." Id. at 16-17. Based
on a number of Mr. Richardson's statements, including his claim that he asked for the chair
to be removed, Mr. Haddox asserts that it "is reasonable to infer" that COTA had
"knowledge of the dangerous [condition]" of the chair. Id. at 18. Mr. Haddox also believes
that the trial court improperly credited Mr. Richardson's deposition testimony and
assertion that he had asked for the chair to be thrown out.4 Id. at 19-20. Finally, citing
Head v. Reilly Painting & Contracting, Inc., 8th Dist. No. 101718, 2015-Ohio-688, and
Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 453 Mich. 149 (1996), a case applying the Michigan
intentional tort statute, Mr. Haddox claims that the "critical question" of COTA's intent
should be framed as whether it "knew the circumstances were such that some injury would
occur." Id. at 22-26.
{¶ 13} Mr. Haddox's arguments rely on a fundamental misunderstanding of what he
must prove to show COTA's intent under R.C. 2745.01. In particular, any claim brought
under the statute purporting to rely on evidence showing that an employer acted "with the
4 Mr. Haddox also believes that the trial court "failed to draw an adverse inference based on the fact that COTA
did not produce exculpatory evidence of its intent." (Brief of Appellant at 21.) He heard mention of a video
recording that "may have been sufficient to show COTA did not act with intent." Id. This video never surfaced
during discovery. COTA did not have the burden of producing exculpatory evidence of its intent to show that
it was entitled to summary judgment, only that the undisputed evidence in the record did not prove
Mr. Haddox's intentional tort claim. See Civ.R. 56(C). Furthermore, Mr. Haddox stipulated to the dismissal
of his spoliation of evidence claim. (Jan. 7, 2021 Stip.) He is not entitled to an adverse inference arising from
his own speculation about the content of non-existent evidence.
No. 21AP-539 6
belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur" must satisfy its definition of
"substantially certain." Because the statute expressly defines "substantially certain," the
plaintiff may not rely on common law explanations of that phrase or any colloquial meaning
it invokes. R.C. 2745.01(B) states: "As used in this section, 'substantially certain' means
that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a
disease, a condition, or death." The Supreme Court of Ohio endorsed the following
explanation of the definition:
When we consider the definition of "substantial certainty" it
becomes apparent that an employee does not have two ways to
prove an intentional tort claim as R.C. 2745.01(A) suggests.
The employee's two options of proof become: (1) the employer
acted with intent to injure or (2) the employer acted with
deliberate intent to injure. Thus, under R.C. 2745.01, the only
way an employee can recover is if the employer acted with the
intent to cause injury.
Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 175 Ohio App.3d 227, 2008-Ohio-1521, ¶ 31 (7th
Dist.)
{¶ 14} The Supreme Court "agree[s]" with this interpretation. Kaminski at ¶ 56
(reversing the lower court's decision but stating that it "agree[s] with the court of appeals
that the General Assembly's intent in enacting R.C. 2745.01, as expressed particularly in
2745.01(B), is to permit recovery for employer intentional torts only when an employer acts
with specific intent to cause an injury"). To be sure, the wording of the statute has been
criticized. See Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.3d 595, 602-03 (6th Cir.2013) (describing
R.C. 2745.01 as "a statute at war with itself" because "what appears at first glance as two
distinct bases for liability is revealed on closer examination to be one and the same"). "The
upshot is that tort-law remedies for workplace injuries in Ohio are limited to those resulting
from the employer's deliberate intent to injure." Id.{¶ 15} Mr. Haddox's reference to evidence in the record of the reappearance of the
chair created, at best, an inference of knowledge of substantial certainty of harm. Given
that R.C. 2745.01 expressly requires proof that an employer acted with deliberate intent to
injure, this evidence does not resuscitate his intentional tort claim. Mr. Haddox even stated
in his deposition that he did "not believe that anybody would try to hurt [him]." (Haddox
Dep. at 38.) There was no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury might
No. 21AP-539 7
conclude that COTA intended to injure him. Once COTA demonstrated as much to the trial
court, the burden shifted to Mr. Haddox to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Civ.R. 56(E). Because he failed to do so, the trial court did not err
by granting summary judgment in favor of COTA.
{¶ 16} Mr. Haddox claims that the trial court failed to construe the evidence in his
favor because it improperly credited Mr. Richardson's statements. But Mr. Haddox points
to no contradiction between his deposition and that of Mr. Richardson that would require,
for purposes of summary judgment, construction in his favor. See Smathers v. Glass,
__Ohio St.3d.__, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 32 ("When factual ambiguities exist, inferences must
still be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party."). Even if we discredit Mr. Richardson's
assertion that he asked for the chair to be thrown out, the lack of evidence to demonstrate
COTA's deliberate intent to harm is still fatal to Mr. Haddox's claim.
{¶ 17} Finally, given that R.C. 2745.01 is unambiguous and the Supreme Court has
explained its application at length in Kaminski, we decline to apply Michigan caselaw or its
intentional tort statute to Mr. Haddox's claim. Nor does Head v. Reilly Painting &
Contracting, Inc., 8th Dist. No. 101718, 2015-Ohio-688, the other case Mr. Haddox cites,
support his assertion that the trial court erred. In Head, the Eighth District granted
summary judgment in favor of an employer on an employee's intentional tort claim under
R.C. 2745.01 and, applying Kaminski, recognized that the statute's "two definitions were
essentially the same" standard of intent. Id. at ¶ 13. There, even "a deliberate decision not
to use a piece of safety equipment" was insufficient to "show a specific intent to cause an
injury. To find otherwise would reinstate the past employer intentional tort paradigm that
the legislature so clearly rejected." Id. Mr. Haddox's claim suffers from a similar dearth of
evidence to demonstrate intent.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, the sole assignment of error is overruled and the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
KLATT and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.
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