DocketNumber: No. 07CA08.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 1742
Judges: FARMER, J.<page_number>Page 2</page_number>
Filed Date: 4/9/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} A jury trial commenced on April 10, 2007. By judgment entry filed April 23, 2007, the trial court sentenced appellant to four years in prison, plus three years for the firearm specification.
{¶ 3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
{¶ 9} The standard this issue must be measured against is set out inState v. Bradley (1989),
{¶ 10} "2. Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance. (State v. Lytle [1976],
{¶ 11} "3. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different."
{¶ 12} Appellant argues defense counsel disclosed to the state a corroborating witness for its case, Jodiah Berger, who was present in Ms. Price's apartment during the robbery. Appellant argues that by disclosing Ms. Berger, the state was given another *Page 4 witness to the robbery that was previously unknown to the state as the state had not disclosed Ms. Berger as a possible witness in its witness list filed February 6, 2007.
{¶ 13} Pursuant to Crim.R. 16, defense counsel was obligated to respond to the state's request for reciprocal discovery, and did so on April 4, 2007, naming Mr. Hull and appellant as possible witnesses. On April 6, 2007, the state provided in continuing response to discovery Ms. Berger's undated and unsigned statement claiming she was a witness to the incident. Ms. Berger was subpoenaed by the state on the same day.
{¶ 14} Appellant argues Ms. Berger was disclosed to the state via a telephone call on April 5, 2007, five days prior to the scheduled trial. The record does not support this argument. Ms. Price admitted during trial she did not tell the police that Ms. Berger was present during the incident until "last Thursday" which would have been April 5, 2007. T. at 138. We fail to find that appellant's argument as to Ms. Berger is supported by the record.
{¶ 15} Mr. Hull testified for the defense, stating he and appellant were "getting high" and the reason for going to Ms. Price's apartment was to "get dope" from Ms. Price. T. at 234-235. Mr. Hull admitted while he was incarcerated, he told the police via a second statement that appellant returned with "a substantial amount of crack and close to a hundred dollars." T. at 238. However, Mr. Hull testified appellant did not return with any money; he just said that because the detective said they found money on appellant and Mr. Hull was just "trying to get out of jail." Id. Mr. Hull also admitted he couldn't remember what was contained in his first statement to the police, and on cross-examination, admitted that whatever was included therein was incorrect. T. at 235, 241. Further on cross-examination, Mr. Hull testified that appellant had a handgun *Page 5 on the evening in question, but appellant threw it out the window of the vehicle sometime during the evening. T. at 242, 244. On redirect, Mr. Hull admitted to having faulty memory due to smoking crack, and maybe appellant "actually put the gun down in the floorboards." T. at 246.
{¶ 16} "Counsel's decisions regarding which witnesses to call and the line of questioning to pursue are debatable strategic and tactical decisions which do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."State v. Mosby, Knox App. No. 05-CA-33,
{¶ 17} Appellant also argues his counsel was deficient in failing to request a lesser included offense charge of robbery. All of the testimony established that appellant had a gun and pointed the gun during the robbery. The evidence did not support the giving of a lesser included offense charge (addressed in Assignments of Error II and III).
{¶ 18} Lastly, appellant argues his counsel failed to file an affidavit of indigency prior to sentencing requesting a waiver of costs. In State v. Threatt,
{¶ 19} "Costs must be assessed against all defendants. R.C.
{¶ 20} Appellant argues he was denied the opportunity to have this court review this issue because his counsel failed to file an affidavit of indigency and request a waiver of costs. Appellant was able to post a $50,000.00 surety bond and retain private counsel. See, Bond Posted July 3, 2006 and Notice of Substitution of Counsel filed February 1, 2007. We find defense counsel did not err in failing to file an affidavit of indigency.
{¶ 21} Furthermore, in State v. Clevenger,
{¶ 22} Upon review, we find the issues raised by this assignment are not supported by the record.
{¶ 23} Assignment of Error I is denied.
{¶ 25} On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Martin (1983),
{¶ 26} Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C.
{¶ 27} "(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section
{¶ 28} "(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it."
{¶ 29} Appellant was also convicted of a firearm specification in violation of R.C.
{¶ 30} "(A) Imposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an offender under division (D)(1)(a) of section
{¶ 31} R.C.
{¶ 32} Ms. Price and Ms. Berger both testified that appellant entered the apartment, pointed the gun at them, and threatened them. T. at 139-140, 170-171. Ms. Price testified appellant "cocked the gun back." T. at 140. Ms. Price gave appellant her money ($400.00). T. at 140, 171. Jason Carpenter, an acquaintance of appellant, testified appellant had a gun when he went to Ms. Price's apartment. T. at 107-109.
{¶ 33} Upon review, we find sufficient facts, if believed by the jury, to convict appellant on aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, and find no manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶ 34} Assignments of Error II and III are denied.
{¶ 36} Crim.R. 29 governs motion for acquittal. Subsection (A) states the following:
{¶ 37} "The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case."
{¶ 38} The standard to be employed by a trial court in determining a Crim.R. 29 motion is set out in State v. Bridgeman (1978),
{¶ 39} "Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
{¶ 40} During the state's case-in-chief, both Ms. Price and Ms. Berger testified that appellant robbed Ms. Price at gun point, and that he "cocked" and pointed the weapon at both of them in a threatening manner.
{¶ 41} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in denying the Crim.R. 29 motion.
{¶ 42} Assignment of Error IV is denied. *Page 10
{¶ 43} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Knox County, Ohio is hereby affirmed.
*Page 11Farmer, J., Hoffman, P.J. and Delaney, J. concur.