DocketNumber: C.A. Case No. 19901.
Judges: FAIN, P.J.
Filed Date: 4/2/2004
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} Russell also contends that the search of the van in this case was unlawful. We initially conclude that Russell was lawfully stopped by the police, because the police had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop based on an anonymous tip that was sufficiently corroborated when they arrived at the scene. Based on the totality of the circumstances including the tip, the police officer's observations, and furtive movements of the front-seat passenger after a police order to show his hands, reasonable suspicion existed for the police officer to remove Russell from the van, conduct a pat-down for weapons, and place him in a cruiser.
{¶ 3} Russell relies on State v. Henderson, Montgomery App. No. 16016, 1997 WL 691459, and State v. Perkins,
{¶ 4} We conclude that exigent circumstances existed, because the van was readily mobile at the time of the stop by the police. In light of other factors that existed in addition to the furtive movement by the front-seat passenger, after Officer Bullens had ordered the passengers to show their hands, we conclude that probable cause existed for the police to search the van in the area in which the front-seat passenger was reaching. Once a loaded hand gun was found by the police in that area, probable cause existed to search the entire van. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the search of the van was lawful.
{¶ 5} Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling Russell's motion to suppress. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
{¶ 7} Officer Bullens then approached the van and ordered the occupants to show their hands. All of the occupants complied with the request except the front-seat passenger, who made an overt motion to his left and low, reaching behind the driver's seat. Officer Bullens drew his weapon and again ordered the occupants to show their hands. The front-seat passenger then complied. Officer Bullens maintained his position and called for additional assistance. Officer Brian Dedrick arrived on the scene and assisted in removing the occupants from the van. Four people occupied the van, and Darrell Russell was in the driver's seat. Officer Bullens removed Russell from the van, patted him down for weapons, and placed him in the back seat of his cruiser. The other occupants were also removed and placed in cruisers.
{¶ 8} Russell did not have a driver's license on him, and it was determined that he was not the registered owner of the van. Officer Bullens determined that the van was registered to a female who was not at the scene. Officer Bullens was unsuccessful in trying to contact her. As a result, Officer Bullens was going to tow the van in accordance with Dayton Police Department Tow Policy. Prior to the tow, the police conducted a search of the van. Officer Bullens looked in the area in which the front-seat passenger had reached when asked to show his hands. Officer Bullens found a loaded hand gun in that area. Officer Bullens then found marijuana and a loaded hand gun underneath the driver's seat, where Russell had been seated. Officer Bullens went back to his cruiser and read Russell his Miranda rights. Russell then admitted that the loaded hand gun under the driver's seat was his, and that he had it for protection.
{¶ 9} Russell was subsequently arrested and was indicted for Carrying a Concealed Weapon, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 10} From his conviction and sentence, Russell appeals.
{¶ 12} "The trial court erred to appellant's prejudice in making its factual basis to support its ruling that appellant's motion to suppress should be overruled.
{¶ 13} "The trial court erred to appellant's prejudice in determining that the search of the motor vehicle was lawful."
{¶ 14} Russell first contends that the trial court erred in finding certain facts in support of its decision overruling Russell's motion to suppress. Russell contends that the trial court's factual findings are contradicted by the record.
{¶ 15} A trial court undertakes the position of the trier of fact in a motion to suppress evidence. State v. Retherford
(1994),
{¶ 16} Russell contends that the trial court erred in finding that "because police obtained information that none of the passengers owned the vehicle, the van could easily have been driven away." However, the record does not reflect this finding. The trial court listed several factors that supported its finding of probable cause to search the van. One factor considered by the trial court was "[t]he information that none of the van passengers was its owner." Another separately listed factor the trial court considered was that "[t]he van was parked on a public street, and could easily have been driven away."
{¶ 17} These factual findings are not contradicted by the record. Officer Bullens testified that he determined that the van was registered to a female who was not at the scene. Therefore, there was competent and credible evidence that "none of the van passengers was its owner." Officer Bullens also testified that the van was legally parked on the side of a public street. Officer Bullens testified that he parked in front of the van at an angle, and that Officer Shelton had parked to the left rear back of the van. Officer Bullens testified that the van was not sandwiched between the two cruisers. Officer Bullens testified that there were vehicles parked behind the van, and Officer Shelton was on the street in the lane of travel. Officer Bullens testified that he would normally not park in front of a suspect vehicle, but he pulled up in front of the van because the two pedestrians started to walk away from the van. Based on this testimony, we conclude that the trial court's finding that "[t]he van was parked on a public street, and could easily have been driven away," is supported by competent and credible evidence.
{¶ 18} Russell also contends that the trial court erred in finding that Russell was not under arrest when Officer Bullens conducted a pat-down search of Russell and then placed him in his cruiser to obtain Russell's identification.
{¶ 19} An arrest is effectuated where the following four requisite elements are met: "(1) an intent to arrest; (2) under real or assumed authority; (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure of the person; and, (4) which is so understood by the person arrested." State v. Hatch, Montgomery App. No. 18986, 2002-Ohio-55, 2002 WL 10449, at * 3, citingState v. Barker (1978),
{¶ 20} The record does not demonstrate that all four requisite elements for an arrest were met. After conducting a pat-down of Russell to check for weapons, Officer Bullens testified that he was then planning on placing Russell in the back seat of his cruiser in order to identify him. Officer Bullens testified that Russell did not have a driver's license with him. Officer Bullens testified that when Russell was placed in his cruiser, he was not under arrest, but was being briefly detained in order to determine his identity. Officer Bullens also testified that at the time the weapons were found in the van, Russell was not yet under arrest. We conclude that there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Officer Bullens manifested an intent to arrest Russell when he conducted a pat-down search of Russell and then placed Russell in his cruiser to obtain Russell's identification. Therefore, there is competent and credible evidence that Russell was not under arrest when he was subjected to a pat-down search for weapons by Officer Bullens and then placed in Officer Bullens's cruiser to be identified. Russell contends that the trial court erred in finding that Officer Bullens conducted an inventory search of the van only after he determined that none of the occupants would be permitted to drive the van. The trial court's finding of fact was as follows:
{¶ 21} "The van was registered to a woman not at the scene, and Bullens tried, but could not get in contact with her. He determined that none of the occupants would be permitted to drive the van, so he planned to have the van towed to a city garage area, after doing an inventory search in accordance with the Dayton Police Department Towing Policy."
{¶ 22} Officer Bullens testified that he determined that the van was registered to a female who was not at the scene, and that he was unsuccessful in trying to contact her. As a result, Officer Bullens testified that he was going to tow the van in accordance with Dayton Police Department Tow Policy. Officer Bullens testified that the van would be towed after conducting an inventory of the van. Officer Bullens also testified that Russell did not have a driver's license on him, and that he was not the registered owner of the van. Based on this testimony, we conclude that the trial court's finding is supported by competent and credible evidence.
{¶ 23} Russell contends that the trial court erred in finding that the police had not yet determined whether to allow Russell to return to the van at the time he was placed in Officer Bullens's cruiser. Officer Bullens testified that he placed Russell in the back seat of his cruiser in order to determine his identity. The record shows that Officer Bullens did not determine who Russell was and who the registered owner of the van was until after Russell was placed in the cruiser. Therefore, the trial court's finding that the police had not determined whether to allow Russell to return to the van at the time he was placed in the cruiser is supported by competent and credible evidence.
{¶ 24} After reading the transcript of the suppression hearing, we conclude that the trial court's factual findings are supported by competent and credible evidence.
{¶ 25} In Russell's second assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred to his prejudice in concluding that the search of the van was lawful.
{¶ 26} Upon accepting the trial court's factual findings as true, we must independently ascertain, as a matter of law, whether the facts meet the pertinent legal standard, without deference to the trial court's conclusion. Retherford,
{¶ 27} The first issue is whether Russell was lawfully stopped and detained by the police. In order to conduct an investigative stop, the police officer must "be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Terry v. Ohio (1968),
{¶ 28} The anonymous tip in this case indicated that two Black males were selling drugs out of a maroon van at 811 McCleary Street in Dayton. Officer Bullens testified that he went to 811 McCleary Street, and when he arrived, he observed a maroon van parked at 815 McCleary Street. Officer Bullens testified that upon arrival, he observed two pedestrians standing near the maroon van, and that they began walking away from the maroon van when Officer Bullens pulled up. Officer Bullens also testified that he observed four Black males in the maroon van. Officer Bullens testified that he had been an officer for thirteen years and had made arrests in the area before for drug offenses. In light of the anonymous tip and the observations of Officer Bullens, Officer Bullens could reasonably infer that a transaction had occurred between the two pedestrians and the occupants of the maroon van. We conclude that the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to demonstrate a sufficient indicia of reliability, providing reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop. Although the maroon van was located at 815 McCleary Street, rather than 811 McCleary Street, and there were four Black males, rather than two Black males, we find that this does not significantly detract from the reliability of the anonymous tip. Therefore, the initial stop of Russell by the police was lawful.
{¶ 29} We also conclude that the Officer Bullens's detention of Russell was lawful. Officer Bullens testified that when he approached the van, he ordered the occupants to show their hands for safety purposes. Officer Bullens testified that all of the occupants complied with the request except the front-seat passenger, who made an overt motion to his left and low, reaching behind the driver's seat. Officer Bullens testified that he drew his weapon and again gave an order that the occupants show their hands, to which the front seat passenger then complied. Officer Bullens testified that he maintained his position and called for additional assistance. After additional assistance arrived, Officer Bullens testified that he removed Russell from the van, patted him down for weapons, and placed him in the back seat of Bullens's cruiser. Officer Bullens testified that Russell was not under arrest at that time, but was being briefly detained in order to determine his identity. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the tip, Officer Bullens's observations, and the furtive movements of the front seat passenger, reasonable suspicion existed for Officer Bullens to remove Russell from the van, conduct a pat-down search for weapons, and place him in the cruiser.
{¶ 30} Russell contends that the search of the van was unlawful. Russell relies on State v. Henderson, supra, andState v. Perkins, supra, to support his argument that the police were not allowed to search the van, because the police had not made a determination whether any of the occupants were going to be able to re-enter the automobile.
{¶ 31} In Henderson, we held that "a police officer may search the interior of an automobile when the officer reasonably suspects that the individual has a weapon secreted in the automobile (as in the case of a furtive gesture) and the officer has made the determination that he or she is going to allow the individual to return to the vehicle. In that case, a search for the officer's safety is justified because the officer has confirmed that he or she is going to allow the individual to re-enter the vehicle wherein the individual could gain immediate control over a weapon. Until a police officer has finally decided to return the individual to the car, however, safety reasons cannot be used to justify the search." Henderson, at *4.
{¶ 32} We stood by this decision in Perkins and also declined to extend Henderson to hold "that a weapon secreted in a vehicle by a detainee poses ``danger to others,' and therefore an officer who has not decided whether to return a detainee to the car may still conduct a protective frisk for weapons to the interior portion of the vehicle." Perkins, at 586. We concluded that "there is no justification in permitting warrantless searches where it has not been determined that a detainee may return to a vehicle." Id. at 587. It was noted that the result inPerkins "might have been different if the state had sought to justify the search that led to the discovery of the firearm as a search for evidence of illegal drug activities, based upon probable cause, with sufficient exigency to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement." Id. (Fain, J., concurring).
{¶ 33} In this case, the State concedes that the search of the van cannot be justified as a Terry protective search. The State contends that probable cause existed for the police to search the van under the automobile exception to the
{¶ 34} The
{¶ 35} In this case, the maroon van was parked on a public street and was readily mobile at the time of the stop by the police. Officer Shelton was the first to arrive and Officer Bullens testified that Officer Shelton had parked to the left rear back of the van on the street in the lane of travel. Officer Bullens testified that he parked in front of the van at an angle when he pulled up a few minutes after Officer Shelton. Officer Bullens testified that there were vehicles parked behind the van, and that the van was not sandwiched between the two cruisers. We conclude that exigent circumstances existed here, because the van was readily mobile at the time of the stop by the police. Therefore, whether the search of van was valid turns on the issue of whether probable cause existed.
{¶ 36} Probable cause is "a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction." State v. Kessler (1978),
{¶ 37} In this case, there was a furtive movement made by the front-seat passenger, after Officer Bullens ordered the passengers to show their hands, and other factors existed. Other factors present in addition to the furtive movement include the anonymous tip, which was sufficiently corroborated, and Officer Bullens's observations and experience. There was an anonymous tip in this case indicating that two Black males were selling drugs out of a maroon van at 811 McCleary Street in Dayton. As discussed above, the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to have significant indicia of reliability. Officer Bullens testified that upon arrival, he observed two pedestrians standing near the maroon van, and that they began walking away from the van when Officer Bullens pulled up. Officer Bullens also testified that he had been an officer for thirteen years and had made arrests in that area before, within the last six months to a year, for drug offenses. Officer Bullens testified that "quite a bit goes on there." In light of the other factors that existed, in addition to the furtive movement by the front-seat passenger, after Officer Bullens ordered the passengers to show their hands, we conclude that probable cause existed for the police to search the van in the area to which the front-seat passenger was reaching. It was reasonable for Bullens to believe, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that the front-seat passenger was ignoring his order to show hands, in order to place illegal contraband or a weapon on the floor of the car behind the front seat. Once a loaded hand gun was found by the police in that area, probable cause existed to search the entire van.
{¶ 38} We conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that the search of the van was lawful.
{¶ 39} Russell's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
Brogan and Wolff, JJ., concur.