State v. Caldwell

[Cite as State v. Caldwell, 2023-Ohio-355.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MEIGS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 22CA2
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
RYAN CALDWELL, :
: RELEASED: 02/01/2023
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEARANCES:
Jeffery L. Finley, Gallipolis, Ohio, for Appellant.
James K. Stanley, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pat Story, Assistant
Meigs County Prosecutor, Pomeroy, Ohio, for Appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Ryan Caldwell (“Caldwell”), appeals a Meigs County Court
judgment entry ordering him to pay $16,613.26 in restitution.
{¶2} Caldwell asserts two assignments of error: (1) “the trial court abused
its discretion by awarding restitution whereas an award of restitution was not
supported by competent, credible evidence[,]” and (2) “the trial court abused its
discretion when awarding restitution by failing to apply the proper measure of
damages for a vehicle which is a total loss.”
{¶3} In response, the state asserts that “the order of restitution was not an
abuse of discretion. That order was reasonable and supported by testimonial
and documentary evidence[.]”
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 2
{¶4} After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable
law, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Caldwell to pay
restitution in the amount of $16,613.26. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s
judgment and remand the cause for the trial court to calculate restitution
consistent with our decision herein.
BACKGROUND
{¶5} The state charged Caldwell with the unauthorized use of Steven
Wandling’s 2000 Ford F-350 pickup truck in violation of R.C. 2913.03(A), which
was a first-degree misdemeanor in this case. The state alleged that Caldwell,
while operating the truck on June 6, 2020, crashed it, and the “cost to repair” was
$16,613.26.
{¶6} Caldwell pleaded guilty to the offense. The trial court accepted
Caldwell’s guilty plea, and sentenced him to pay a fine of $250, 180 days in jail,
all suspended, 24 months of non-reporting probation, and court costs of $120.
The court further set a restitution hearing for January 14, 2022.
{¶7} At the restitution hearing, Wandling testified that Caldwell stole and
crashed his 2000 Ford 350 crew-cab, dual-rear-wheeled, pickup truck (“truck”).1
Wandling testified that the truck was “a total loss.” Wandling obtained an
estimate from Superior Autobody (“Superior”), dated July 6, 2020, that itemized
the cost of the parts, paint, and labor needed to repair his truck, which totaled
$16,613.26. The estimate stated: “NOT A COPLETE [sic] ESTIMATE DAMAGE
EXCEEDS VALUE.” Counsel for Caldwell objected to the estimate as being
1
Wandling also testified that the pickup was a 2003 model. We assume his testimony in that
regard was merely a mistake.
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 3
hearsay. The judge overruled the objection. Wandling testified that “the total
damages [of $16,613.26] on this is, um, I know it exceeded the [value of the]
vehicle.” Wandling testified that he searched “Google” and determined that a
replacement for his truck would cost from $10,000 to $30,000.
{¶8} On cross-examination, Wandling testified that he acquired his truck
by way of a trade. He admitted that the estimate from Superior indicated that the
cost to repair his truck exceeded its value. However, he testified that he did not
agree with that conclusion. Wandling also testified that in June of 2020 he told
Caldwell that the truck was worth $8,000 to $10,000. He also testified that his
truck had approximately 230,000 miles on the odometer.
{¶9} Citing the evidence, including Superior’s repair estimate, the trial
court issued an entry ordering Caldwell to pay $16,613.26 in restitution. It is this
judgment that Caldwell appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING
RESTITUTION WHEREAS AN AWARD OF RESTITUTION WAS
NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
AWARDING RESTITUTION BY FAILING TO APPLY THE
PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR A VEHICLE WHICH IS
A TOTAL LOSS.
Caldwell’s Assignments of Error
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Caldwell claims that the evidence
showed that Wandling’s truck was destroyed in the accident, and Superior’s
estimate indicated that its $16,613.26 cost to repair the truck was greater than
the value of the truck. Therefore, consistent with Falter v. City of Toledo, 169
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 4
Ohio St. 238, 158 N.E.2d 238 (1959), Caldwell maintains that the state was
required to present evidence of the market value of Wandling’s truck immediately
prior to its destruction in the accident. Because the state presented no such
evidence, the state failed to satisfy its burden establishing the amount of
restitution to be ordered, and the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
restitution in an amount greater than Wandling’s economic loss. Therefore,
Caldwell asks this court to reverse the trial court’s judgment of restitution.
{¶11} In his second assignment of error, Caldwell claims that the trial court
failed to use the proper measure of damages in ordering him to pay $16,613.26
in restitution. Caldwell maintains Falter sets out the proper calculation to
determine the value of a vehicle that is damaged or destroyed in an accident.
More specifically, Falter provides that if a vehicle is destroyed in an accident the
value of the vehicle is its value immediately prior to the accident.
{¶12} In response, the state claims that R.C 2929.28(A)(1) authorizes a
court to order restitution based on an amount recommended by the victim of the
offense, as well as estimates and receipts indicating the cost of repair or
replacing the property. The state claims that it submitted testimony from the
victim, Wandling, as well as an estimate that indicated that repairing Wandling’s
truck would cost $16,613.26. Therefore, because the evidence supports the
amount of restitution ordered, the state maintains that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion so its judgment should be affirmed.
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 5
LAW
A. Standard of Review
{¶13} “[Appellate courts] review misdemeanor restitution orders for an
abuse of discretion.”2 State v. Laudermilk, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-0054,
2022-Ohio-659, ¶50, citing State v. Dent, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-110, 2021-
Ohio-2551, ¶ 15; State v. Wright, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3922, 2021-Ohio-
2692, ¶ 16; State v. Dolphin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25695, 2014-Ohio-3434, ¶
24; Columbus v. Repine, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-250, 2007-Ohio-5015, ¶
16 (French J., concurring). “An abuse of discretion consists of more than an
error of judgment; it connotes an attitude on the part of the trial court that is
unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Wyatt, 4th Dist. Pike No.
01CA672, 2002-Ohio-4479, ¶ 20, citing State v. Lessin, 67 Ohio St.3d 487, 620
N.E.2d 72 (1993), citing Rock v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 616 N.E.2d 218(1993). “ ‘An abuse of discretion includes a situation in which a trial court did not
engage in a “sound reasoning process”; this review is deferential and does not
permit an appellate court to simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court.’ ” State v. Inman, 4th Dist. Washington No. 19CA27, 2021-Ohio-1573, ¶ 7,
quoting State v. Felts, 2016-Ohio-2755, 52 N.E.3d 1223, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.), quoting
State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34.
{¶14} “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when it orders restitution that
does not bear a reasonable relationship to the actual financial loss suffered.’ ”
2
In contrast, the standard of review for felony restitution decisions is whether it is “contrary to
law.” See State v. Thornton, 2017-Ohio-4037, 91 N.E.3d 359, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 6
State v. Williams, 2d Dist. Greene No. 27072, 2017-Ohio-125, ¶ 14, quoting
State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26488, 2015-Ohio-3167, ¶ 11, citing,
State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24288, 2012-Ohio-01230, ¶ 11. “In
addition, a court abuses its discretion if the award of restitution is not supported
by competent, credible evidence in the record from which the court can discern
the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty. (Citations
omitted.)” Id., citing State v. Olson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25452, 2013-Ohio-
4403, ¶ 33.
B. Restitution
1. R.C. 2929.28(A)(1)
{¶15} “R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) provides a statutory mechanism for ordering
restitution in misdemeanor cases, allowing a court to impose financial sanctions
on a criminal offender that includes ‘restitution by the offender to the victim of the
offender's crime[.]’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Laudermilk, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-
0054, 2022-Ohio-659, ¶ 47, quoting State v. Dent, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-
110, 2021-Ohio-2551, ¶ 16. In pertinent part, R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) states:
If the court imposes restitution, the court shall determine
the amount of restitution to be paid by the offender. If the court
imposes restitution, the court may base the amount of restitution
it orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender,
a presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts
indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other
information, provided that the amount the court orders as
restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss
suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the
commission of the offense.
{¶16} R.C. 2929.01(L) defines “economic loss” in pertinent part, as “any
economic detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate result of the
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 7
commission of an offense * * *.” The amount of “restitution must be limited to the
actual economic loss caused by the illegal conduct for which the defendant was
convicted.” State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 69, 564 N.E.2d 18 (1990). “The
State bears the burden of establishing the restitution amount.” State v. Turner,
2d Dist. Champaign No. 2017-CA-15, 2018-Ohio-2860, ¶ 9, citing State v.
Granderson, 177 Ohio App.3d 424, 2008-Ohio-3757, 894 N.E.2d 1290 (5th
Dist.).
2. Assessing Value of a Damaged Motor Vehicle
{¶17} “With respect to a party's right to recover for damage to his or her
vehicle caused by the negligence of another * * * [t]he Ohio Supreme Court set
forth the general rule for calculating such damages in Falter v. Toledo, (1959),
169 Ohio St. 238, 240, 158 N.E.2d 893.” Rakich v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 172 Ohio App. 3d 523, 2007-Ohio-3739, 875 N.E.2d 993, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.).
In Falter, the Court held:
“The damages sustained by an automobile in a collision
may be established by showing the reasonable cost of the repairs
necessary to restore it to its former condition, although the general
rule is that the measure of damages to personal property is the
difference between its market value immediately before and
immediately after the injury. This rule is subject to the limitation *
* * that the cost of repairs must be less than the diminution in
market value due to the injury * * *. The plaintiff should not benefit
by the loss. * * * Where the automobile is totally destroyed, the
measure of damages is its reasonable market value immediately
before destruction. There can be no recovery beyond such value
for mere repairs.”
(Ellipses sic.) Falter, 169 Ohio St. at 240, 158 N.E.2d 893, quoting Gass v.
Agate Ice Cream, Inc., 264 N.Y. 141, 190 N.E. 323.
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 8
{¶18} Thus, “[i]n many instances, it is permissible for a party to seek the
reasonable cost of repairs.” Crawford v. Rinkes, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 870, 2002-
Ohio-5247, ¶ 12, citing Falter, 169 Ohio St. at 240. “However, if the damage to
the vehicle is so extensive that the cost of repairs exceeds the difference in
market value immediately before and after the accident, the party will not receive
the cost of repair but will be awarded the diminution in value.” Id., citing Falter at
paragraph two of the syllabus.
ANALYSIS
{¶19} Because Caldwell’s assignments of error are interrelated, we
address them together. We begin by addressing the applicability of Falter.
A. Falter v. Toledo is Instructive
{¶20} As a preliminary matter, we address Caldwell’s claim that a trial
court must utilize the damage formula set out in Falter to determine the amount
of restitution that it may order an offender to pay if the property damaged is an
automobile. Falter is a 1959 case that establishes a common law method of
calculating the damage of an automobile that has been involved in an accident.
In contrast, restitution for damage caused to property by a misdemeanor offense
is authorized by statute (R.C. 2929.28) that was effective January 1, 2004. The
Supreme Court instructs that
[s]tatutes be read and construed in the light of and with reference
to the rules and principles of the common law in force at the time
of their enactment, and in giving construction to a statute the
Legislature will not be presumed or held to have intended a repeal
of the settled rules of the common law, unless the language
employed by it clearly expresses or imports such intention.
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 9
State ex rel. Morris v. Sullivan, 81 Ohio St. 79, 90 N.E. 146 (1909), syllabus;
State v. Moore, 2020-Ohio-4321, 158 N.E.3d 111, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.).
{¶21} R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) provides the authority and method for calculating
restitution that includes a ceiling for the amount of restitution that may be
ordered. In pertinent part, it provides:
The court may base the amount of restitution it orders on an
amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence
investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of
repairing or replacing property, and other information, provided
that the amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the
amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and
proximate result of the commission of the offense.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
{¶22} Falter, which was decided in 1959, provides that if an automobile is
damaged in an accident, similar to restitution, its owner may recover cost to
repair the vehicle. Also similar to restitution, which limits the amount of restitution
to the victim’s “economic loss,” Falter provides that when the cost to repair the
vehicle exceeds its value, then the owner’s damages are limited to the value of
the vehicle immediately prior to the accident. And R.C. 2929.28 in no way
indicates any intention to overrule Falter. Sullivan, 81 Ohio St. 79, 90 N.E. 146(1909), syllabus.
{¶23} Therefore, we find that Falter’s damage calculation may offer
assistance to a court in calculating the amount of restitution when the property
damaged from an offense is an automobile.
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 10
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion
{¶24} The trial court ordered Caldwell to pay $16,631.26 in restitution,
which is the exact amount of Superior’s estimate to repair Wandling’s truck.3 A
court does not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution in the amount of a cost-
to-repair estimate if there is no evidence showing that the value of the vehicle is
less than the repair cost. See State v. Gordon, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170660,
2018-Ohio-3786.
{¶25} Unlike Gordon, Wandling testified that he told Caldwell in June of
2020 that his truck was worth $8,000 to $10,000. This was the amount of
economic loss that Wandling suffered from Caldwell’s unauthorized use of his
vehicle. Clearly, the $16,631.26 in restitution ordered by the court is significantly
more than the economic loss of $8,000 to $10,000 that Wandling suffered.
Where restitution “does not bear a reasonable relationship to the actual financial
loss suffered[,]” the court has abused its discretion. State v. Williams, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 27072, 2017-Ohio-125, ¶ 14, see also Falter (When the cost to
repair a vehicle exceeds its value, the recoverable damage is the vehicle’s value
immediately prior to the accident). Therefore, we find that the trial court abused
its discretion when it ordered restitution in the amount of $16,631.26.
3
Superior’s estimate to repair states it was “incomplete,” which suggests that Superior stopped
short of completing its estimate because at $16,621.23 it had already surpassed the value of the
truck.
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 11
CONCLUSION
{¶26} Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the
cause to determine restitution consistent with this decision.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Meigs App. No. 22CA2 12
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED and the CAUSE IS
REMANDED. Appellee shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.