DocketNumber: Case No. 2002CA00424.
Judges: Gwin, P.J.
Filed Date: 5/12/2003
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} "Trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied the second petition for post conviction relief when the first one was denied without determining the merits of the case.
{¶ 3} "When a criminal defendant submit's affidavit's that merit a oral hearing, did the trial court abuse it's discretion by not accepting the affidavit's [sic] as true."
{¶ 4} On March 7, 2002, appellant was stopped while driving a motor vehicle with fictitious license plates. Canton police officers determined that appellant had an expired operator's license during the course of the stop. Appellant was asked to exit the vehicle. Instead of complying, appellant fled in the vehicle at a high rate of speed, eventually crashing into a residence. Appellant fled from the scene, and was apprehended by police, who found cocaine in his possession.
{¶ 5} Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with two counts of possession of cocaine and one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to these charges in the Stark County Common Pleas Court, and was sentenced to a prison term of three years on the second degree felony charge of possession, a consecutive term of two years incarceration on the failure to comply charge, and a concurrent term of seventeen months incarceration on the charge of possession as a fourth degree felony. Appellant did not appeal his conviction and sentence.
{¶ 6} On July 25, 2002, nearly three months after sentencing, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 7} On October 10, 2002, appellant filed his second petition for post-conviction relief. In this petition, appellant again challenged the effectiveness of his trial counsel. He raised two claims, both dealing with counsel's alleged failure to prepare adequately for trial, the same claim raised in his first petition. However, appellant supported his petition with affidavits. In the affidavits, appellant asserted that he communicated to his trial counsel an adequate defense, that the police, during the chase, came at him with the police cruiser, causing him substantial injury. The court summarily dismissed this petition also. Appellant appeals the judgment dismissing his second petition.
{¶ 9} R.C.
"(A) Whether a hearing is or is not held on a petition filed pursuant to section
2953.21 of the Revised Code, a court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) of that section or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless both of the following apply:
"(1) Either of the following applies:
"(a) The petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief.
(b) Subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section
2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right."(2) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence."
{¶ 10} In the instant case, appellant raised the same ineffectiveness claim that was raised his first petition. Appellant made no attempt to satisfy the requirements of R.C.
{¶ 11} The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 13} As discussed in Assignment of Error I, unless a petitioner demonstrates a second petition falls within the narrowly defined exceptions set forth in R.C.
{¶ 14} The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} The judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Costs to appellant.
By Gwin, P.J., Wise, J., and Boggins, J., concur.