DocketNumber: C.A. No. 21141.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 838
Judges: FAIN, J.
Filed Date: 2/24/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} We conclude that an indictment is sufficient, and not defective, if it uses the words of the statute establishing an offense to charge the offense. We further conclude that the record fails to establish that Landgraf's no-contest plea was other than knowing and intelligent, and also that the record affirmatively establishes that the trial court substantially complied with its duty to determine that Landgraf understood the nature of the charges to which he was pleading no contest. We conclude that the trial court had no duty to ascertain, before accepting Landgraf's no-contest plea, that he understood the earliest dates that he would be able to obtain judicial relief corresponding to each possible sentence that might be imposed. Finally, we conclude that Landgraf failed to make, in the trial court, the Equal Protection argument upon which his last claim depends, so that this argument has been waived, and that this claimed error, depending as it does upon a novel constitutional argument, is not sufficiently obvious to constitute plain error.
{¶ 3} Because we reject all of Landgraf's arguments, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.
{¶ 5} As a result of a plea bargain, Landgraf pled no contest to one count of Aggravated Robbery and one count of Failure to Comply with the Order or Signal of a Police Officer, and the other charges were dismissed. At a hearing, the trial court accepted Landgraf's no-contest pleas, and found him guilty of both offenses. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Landgraf to serve five years for Aggravated Robbery and three years for Failure to Comply with the Order or Signal of a Police Officer, to be served concurrently.
{¶ 6} From his conviction and sentence, Landgraf appeals.
{¶ 8} "THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, AND SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE, MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE INDICTMENT WAS DEFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR FAILING TO INCLUDE WHICH STATUTORY THEFT OFFENSE UNDERLIED [sic] THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE AND FAILED TO INCLUDE ANY MATERIAL, ESSENTIAL CULPABLE MENTAL STATE ELEMENT WHICH THEREBY DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE TRUE NATURE OF THE CRIME CHARGED[,] CONTRARY TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
{¶ 9} "THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, AND SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE, MUST BE REVERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO RENDER THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION DUE TO THE DEFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT."
{¶ 10} Both of these assignments of error depend upon Landgraf's argument that the Aggravated Robbery indictment is defective because it fails to specify a particular Theft offense, and because the indictment fails to specify a particular culpability state. Although the latter argument appears to be directed primarily against the Aggravated Robbery indictment, Landgraf may also be making a similar argument with regard to the Failure to Comply with an Order or Signal of a Police Officer indictment.
{¶ 11} Because a bill of particulars is available if the defendant requires more specific notice of the charge against him, an indictment is sufficient, under Crim.R. 7(B), if it alleges an offense using the words of the statute specifying the offense. State v. Landrum (1990),
{¶ 12} The same principle disposes of Landgraf's argument that the Aggravated Robbery and Failure to Comply with an Order or Signal of a Police Officer indictments are defective because they each fail to specify a particular mental culpability statute. Both counts use the words of the statute specifying the offense, and this is sufficient.
{¶ 13} Landgraf cites State v. Vanover (June 24, 2005), Clark App. No. 2004C-A-5, for the proposition that the omission of a specified culpability state renders an indictment defective. Upon close inspection, State v. Vanover, supra, is distinguishable. In that case, the defendant was charged with Intimidation of a Witness, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 14} In Vanover, we also opined that the defendant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, but it is clear that this was mere dictum, because we remanded the case to allow the State either to amend the indictment or to reindict the defendant, thereby mooting the issue of whether his subsequent plea was knowing and voluntary.
{¶ 15} The principle that an indictment is sufficient if it uses the words of the statute establishing the offense merely disposes of Landgraf's argument that the indictments are defective — it does not dispose of his argument that his no-contest plea to these counts was other than knowing and voluntary. This argument is addressed in Part IV, below, in connection with Landgraf's Fourth Assignment of Error.
{¶ 16} Landgraf's First and Second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 18} "THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, AND SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE, MUST BE REVERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT FACTS IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND FAILURE TO COMPLY DUE TO THE LACK OF STATE'S EXHIBITS 1 AND 2 BEING MADE PART OF THE RECORD."
{¶ 19} In this assignment of error, Landgraf contends that he should have been found not guilty of Aggravated Robbery, on his plea of no contest, because the circumstances recited do not support a finding of guilt. He relies upon the familiar principle that in a misdemeanor case, by virtue of R.C.
{¶ 20} Landgraf recognizes that there is no similar requirement for a finding of guilt on a no-contest plea to a felony.1 In fact, the trial court is required to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense if the indictment alleges sufficient facts to state felony offense, i.e., if the indictment is sufficient to state an offense. State v. Bird,
{¶ 21} Landgraf asserts, almost in passing, that there must be a similar requirement in felony cases for an explanation of circumstances sufficient for a finding of guilt, by virtue of the Equal Protection clause of the
{¶ 22} Landgraf's invocation of the Equal Protection clause to get around the inconvenient fact that the requirement of a sufficient explanation of circumstances exists for misdemeanor no-contest pleas, but not for felony no-contest pleas, is intriguing. He makes a plausible, if brief, argument that any rational distinction between the requirements for no-contest pleas in misdemeanor cases versus in felony cases would imposemore stringent requirements in felony cases, where the consequences to the defendant are greater, not less stringent requirements.
{¶ 23} Besides being intriguing, we understand Landgraf's Equal Protection argument to be novel; we are not aware of its having been made before in any Ohio court, despite the fact thatCity of Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers, supra, which established the requirement as a matter of substantive right in misdemeanor cases, has been extant for over twenty years.
{¶ 24} Landgraf did not argue in the trial court that, by virtue of the Equal Protection clause, the trial court was required to find him not guilty unless there was an adequate explanation of circumstances, despite the fact that he pled no contest to a felony, not to a misdemeanor. Therefore, he has waived all but plain error. "To be `plain' within the meaning of Crim.R. 52(B), an error must be an `obvious' defect in the trial proceedings." State v. Barnes (2002),
{¶ 25} Landgraf's Third Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶ 27} "THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, AND SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE, MUST BE REVERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTA-PPELLANT'S PLEAS WERE NOT MADE KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY PURSUANT TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
{¶ 28} To make out the constitutional violation asserted in connection with this assignment of error, Landgraf must demonstrate, from this record, that his pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Although not strictly within the scope of this assignment of error, Landgraf makes the further argument that the trial court erred, in violation of its duty under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), when it accepted his plea without determining that he understood the nature of the charges against him. With respect to both of these arguments, Landgraf relies upon his assertion that he was never adequately apprised of the nature of the charges against him.
{¶ 29} After the prosecutor recited the two charges to which Landgraf was pleading no contest, essentially in the words of the indictments, the following colloquy occurred:
{¶ 30} "THE COURT: Is that your understanding then about the nature of the two charges that you're pleading to in these two cases, Mr. Landgraf?
{¶ 31} "MR. REZABEK [representing Landgraf]: Do you understand the nature of the pleas?
{¶ 32} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
{¶ 33} "THE COURT: All right. Have you discussed all of the elements of each of those offenses and all possible defenses to them with your attorney, Mr. Rezabek?
{¶ 34} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
{¶ 35} "THE COURT: Are you satisfied with his representation of you in each of those matters?
{¶ 36} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir."
{¶ 37} To begin with, we find nothing in the record of the plea hearing that would demonstrate Landgraf's proposition that his tendering of his no-contest plea was other than knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
{¶ 38} With regard to Landgraf's claim that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), which requires the trial court to determine that a defendant understands the nature of the charge to which he is pleading no contest, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that substantial compliance is sufficient. State v. Nero (1991),
{¶ 39} Finally, Landgraf argues that his plea was other than knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, because he did not understand that although he was eligible for judicial release, he was not told that a sentence of five years, if imposed, would make it impossible for him to be judicially released until he had served at least four years of his sentence. In this connection, Landgraf cites State v. Pape (November 21, 2001), Clark App. No. 2000 CA 98, 2001-Ohio-1827. But, as Landgraf notes, in that case we merely held that the trial court must determine that a defendant understands that he is ineligible for judicial release (when, of course, he is in fact ineligible). In Landgraf's case, he is eligible for judicial release, so the trial court could not have erred by failing to have informed him that he was ineligible.
{¶ 40} The trial court could not have determined when Landgraf might first be judicially released until it knew his sentence. Because his sentence, when it was subsequently imposed, was five years, the earliest he could obtain judicial release was after four years. R.C.
{¶ 41} Had Landgraf indicated confusion, or a misunderstanding, concerning when he would be able to file a motion for, and obtain, judicial release, during his plea hearing, we might be prepared to hold that this would have had to have been cleared up before Landgraf could be found to have tendered his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. But Landgraf indicated no confusion or misunderstanding then. He contends that the record of the sentencing hearing reflects that he was confused about when he could seek judicial release, but even this is a stretch:
{¶ 42} "THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I got — I got a question.
{¶ 43} "Is there — they got thing [sic] that's judicial release? How do you — how do you file for that?"
{¶ 44} If Landgraf in fact misunderstood, as he now claims, that he could seek, and possibly obtain, judicial release immediately, that might serve as a basis, in the trial court's exercise of discretion, for a motion to withdraw his plea, but we are not of the view that the vacation of his plea should automatically ensue. Felony sentencing, including, generally, the consequences of a sentence — judicial release and post-release controls, for example — is complex. If a defendant's failure to completely understand all of the potential consequences of all of the possible sentences that might be imposed upon him for a felony were deemed to constitute grounds for an automatic reversal of his plea, defendants would, in many instances, be able to plead guilty, or no contest, and await sentencing, secure in the knowledge that if their sentence imposed is more severe than hoped, the plea can with certainty be vacated.
{¶ 45} Landgraf's Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.
Brogan, J., and Wolff, J., concur.