DocketNumber: CASE NO. 799
Judges: VUKOVICH, J.
Filed Date: 1/28/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
This appeal arises from the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas decision dismissing appellant's complaint. For the following reasons, the decision of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On July 14, 1992, appellant filed an application to reactivate her existing claim (C-85A). On her application appellant requested payment of medical bills, further medical services and an additional allowance of severe degenerative disc disease L4-5. This matter was heard by a District Hearing Officer (D.H.O.) on October 23, 1992. It was the decision of the D.H.O. to deny appellant's request for reactivation due to a lack of medical evidence. Appellant made timely appeal from this decision to the Canton Board of Review. The Board of Review affirmed the decision of the D.H.O. on March 1, 1993. Appellant then made appeal to the Industrial Commission of Ohio who denied said appeal on June 18, 1993.
As a result of the administrative denial of her request, appellant filed a notice of appeal and complaint in the Common Pleas Court of Monroe County seeking redress. Appellant subsequently voluntarily dismissed her initial complaint and then refiled on January 6, 1997. On January 24, 1997, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, dismissal pursuant to Civil Rule 12. Appellant filed a reply to appellee's motion on March 27, 1997. The trial court held a hearing on the matter on June 5, 1997, at which time oral arguments were heard from opposing counsel. A judgment entry was issued by the trial court on August 4, 1997, granting appellee's motion for summary judgment or in the alternative dismissal of appellant's complaint. Appellant filed a timely appeal of the trial court's decision to this court on September 3, 1997.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT."
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion as the trial court did in fact have jurisdiction in the matter presented to it. In her argument appellant asserts that a claim was properly established for the low back arising out of her 1985 injury. As such, she continues to be entitled to request additional conditions for that body part. Additionally, it is argued that any requests for additional conditions go to the right to participate rather than to the extent of disability. Finally, appellant asserts that she is not precluded from participating on statute of limitations grounds as she may request additional conditions as related to the allowed body part at any time. Appellant contends that the two year statute of limitations goes solely to "flow through" type injuries which involve a non-allowed body part rather than to additional conditions for recognized body parts.
Appellee presents a two-pronged argument. First, appellee argues that the requests made pursuant to the C-85A are questions as to extent of disability rather than right to participate. As such, appellant should be barred from recovery on jurisdictional grounds. Next, appellee argues that even if this is a right to participate issue, appellant is barred from recovery as a result of the two year statute of limitations established under R.C.
"[A] party seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party." Dresher v. Burt (1996),
75 Ohio St.3d 280 ,293 .
Due to the fact that summary judgment is designed to cut short the litigation process, courts must proceed cautiously and only award summary judgment when appropriate. Murray v.Murray (1993),
Similarly, dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate only when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle plaintiff to relief. O'Brien v. Univ.Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975),
"The claimant or the employer may appeal an order of the industrial commission * * * in any injury or occupational disease case, other than a decision as to the extent of disability, to the court of common pleas of the county in which the injury was inflicted or in which the contract of employment was made * * *." (Emphasis added).
Due to confusion at the trial court level regarding this statute, numerous appellate courts as well as the Ohio Supreme Court have frequently addressed the issue of what precisely is appealable to a court of common pleas. The leading case in this area is the Ohio Supreme Court decision Afrates v. Lorain
(1992),
Numerous cases following Afrates have attempted to provide clear guidance to the workers' compensation bar as to what matters are considered "right to participate issues" so as to enable the bar to effectively and efficiently conduct practice in the area of Workers' Compensation. It has been previously determined that when an order allows a claim for one injury but denies it for another arising out of the same accident, such a decision is appealable as a right to participate consideration.Felty v. ATT Technologies, Inc. (1992),
The Supreme Court has previously provided guidance specifically to this court on this issue in the decision ofMcClosky v. Regal Mining, Inc. (1997),
In next turning to the second issue on appeal, that being whether the request for an additional condition is barred by the statute of limitations, it is evident that the Ohio Supreme Court as well as the appellate districts have again had the opportunity to address this matter on numerous occasions. Statute of limitations concerns are addressed in R.C.
"(A)(1) In all cases of injury or death, claims for compensation or benefits for the specific part or parts of the body injured shall be forever barred unless, within two years after the injury or death:
* * *
(3) In the event the employer is a self-insuring employer, one of the following has occurred:
(a) Written notice of the specific part or parts of the body claimed to have been injured has been given to the commission or bureau or the employer has furnished treatment by a licensed physician in the employ of the employer, provided, however, that the furnishing of such treatment shall not constitute a recognition of a claim as compensable, but shall do no more than satisfy the requirements of this section;
(b) Compensation or benefits have been paid or furnished equal to or greater than those provided in sections
4123.52 ,4123.55 to4123.62 , and4123.64 to4123.67 of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added).
As R.C.
This court has addressed this very issue in Jones v. Trimble
(1995),
Upon appeal, this court followed Dent, supra, and held that the key for purposes of R.C.
Such reasoning by the Supreme Court is logical and well-reasoned. While appellant was initially granted the right to participate for benefits for the condition of contusion of back, her claim was subsequently denied for the condition of severe degenerative disc disease L4-5. By denying this condition, the Industrial Commission precluded appellant from participating and from seeking benefits for that specific condition. The denial of the additional condition eliminated any possibility for seeking treatment or benefits for this condition. As such appellant was prevented from the actual participation in the system.
Appellee's reliance on this court's decision in Stan v.Quarto Mining Co., et al., Monroe County Court of Appeals, Seventh District, Case No. 787 is misplaced. While this court initially found that seeking an additional condition in a claim went to extent of disability, upon reconsideration this court came to the conclusion that such an action was more properly considered a right to participate concern. Therefore, our decision in Stan, supra, gives further support to a finding that the pursuance of an additional condition in a Workers' Compensation claim goes to one's right to participate.
In remaining consistent with the prior decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court on this issue, we hold that on the basis of jurisdiction, the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion.
It is equally apparent that the trial court had no basis in law for finding that appellant's motion for an additional condition was not timely filed. The language of R.C.
Appellee's reliance upon Clementi v. Wean United, Inc.
(1988),
In the case sub judice, the additional condition being sought clearly relates to a body part which has already been formally recognized in the original claim. Appellant had an allowed claim which was recognized for the condition of "contusion of back." Subsequent to the initial allowance, appellant sought allowance of the additional condition of "severe degenerative disc disease L4-5." The additional condition sought affects the lumbar area which relates to the allowed body part, that being the back. Therefore, as outlined in Dent, supra, and Jones,supra, such additional conditions are not subject to the two year statute of limitations.
As such, appellant timely filed for the requested additional allowance. Thus, the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion and disposing of the case. The trial court had no grounds to grant either a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.
In light of the above discussion, the decision of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings on the merits of whether the additional condition sought arose out of the original injury sustained by appellant.
Donofrio, P.J., concurs.
Waite, J., concurs.
APPROVED:
-------------------------- JOSEPH J. VUKOVICH, JUDGE