DocketNumber: No. 2007-T-0096.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 2321
Judges: DIANE V. GRENDELL, P.J.
Filed Date: 5/9/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 63} While I concur in judgment, I write separately as the disposition of this appeal hinges simply on the inability of the trial court to recapture subject matter jurisdiction through the procedural device of a nunc pro tunc judgment entry.
{¶ 64} It is well-settled law, and specifically our court has stated: "The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to have the judgment of the court reflect its true action. The power to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has actually been taken. It does not extend beyond the power to make the journal entry speak the truth, and can be exercised only to supply omissions in the exercise of functions which are merely clerical. It is not made to show what the court might or should have decided, or intended to decide, but what it *Page 18
actually did decide." McKay v. McKay (1985),
{¶ 65} Further, "[w]hen a court exceeds its power in entering a purported nunc pro tunc order, that order is invalid." State v.Breedlove (1988),
{¶ 66} These principles were reaffirmed in our decision in Klammer v.Reimer (Nov. 4, 1994), 11th Dist. No. 93-L-208, 1994 Ohio App. Lexis 4981.
{¶ 67} There is no doubt that a court has the inherent power to issue such an entry, but that power must be exercised within its jurisdictional limits. As the Supreme Court of Ohio in Helle v.Public Utilities Comm. (1928),
{¶ 68} The common law rule has been codified by Civ. R. 60(A). InDentsply Intematl., Inc. v. Kostas (1985),
{¶ 69} Further, as we noted in Klammer, supra, "Civ. R. 60(B) provides ``the exclusive grounds which must be present and the procedure which must be followed in order for a court to vacate its own judgment.'McCue v. Insurance Co. (1979),
{¶ 70} The trial court's August 17, 2006 nunc pro tunc entry vacated and completely reversed its August 14, 2006 entry which terminated the guardianship, waived the final accounting, and revoked the letters of guardianship. The effect of the nunc pro tunc entry was to vacate a judgment which was final and conclusive and certainly constituted a substantial change of the final order entered August 14, 2006. As the nunc pro tunc entry went beyond correcting a clerical mistake and as there was no motion filed, neither Civ. R. 60(A) nor Civ. R. 60(B) provide safe harbors for the trial court.
{¶ 71} Thus it may be simply held that when the trial court attempted to "correct" its August 14, 2006 order terminating the case it exceeded its jurisdiction and acted in contradiction to the purpose of a nunc pro tunc order. *Page 1