DocketNumber: No. 11-92-5.
Citation Numbers: 615 N.E.2d 266, 83 Ohio App. 3d 457
Judges: THOMAS F. BRYANT, Judge.
Filed Date: 11/5/1992
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
This is an appeal from the default judgment entered by the Common Pleas Court of Paulding County, Juvenile Division, finding appellant, William Swanson, to be the father of appellee's child born in Houston, Texas and ordering payment of child support and appellee's expenses of pregnancy and for delivery of the child.
Appellant, currently a resident of the state of Tennessee, was served with summons and complaint in the Paulding County proceedings by certified mail, return receipt requested, while a resident of Oklahoma. Appellant moved to dismiss the action based on the fact that an identical action was pending in a Texas court. Appellant subsequently filed an amended motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Texas action was apparently dismissed as the common pleas court found that the instant case was "the only present action as to the paternity of the child in question."
In its separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, the common pleas court framed the issue to be decided as "`whether the Court may asset [sic] personal jurisdiction over an individual who has never maintained any contacts nor derived any benefits from the State of Ohio * * *.'" The court decided that issue by finding that it had jurisdiction over appellant.
Following the court's decision as to jurisdiction, appellant's counsel withdrew and appellant apparently made no further appearance in the action. In due course, appellee, Kathy R. Gaisford, n.k.a. Laney, filed a motion for default judgment, which was granted by the trial court. Following a subsequent hearing, the court entered an order for child support and medical expenses.
Appellant now appeals, asserting one assignment of error:
"The trial court erred as a matter of law in asserting personal jurisdiction over appellant since appellant has had no contacts whatsoever with the state of Ohio sufficient to create personal jurisdiction."
The trial court found that conception occurred in Texas, that appellant moved from Texas to Oklahoma prior to commencement of this action and the Texas action, that appellee and the child live in Paulding County, Ohio, and that *Page 459
appellee made no allegation that "the birth took place as a `tortious act.'" The court further found that R.C.
It is unclear what part of R.C.
We also disagree with the lower court's finding that R.C.
It has long been settled that a court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that requiring him or her to defend the action does not offend the "notions of fair play and substantial justice." Internatl.Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945),
The requirements of due process are pertinent in a paternity action. State ex rel. Stone v. Court (1984),
Long-arm jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident defendant only where one of the circumstances specified in R.C.
In the case sub judice, there is no evidence that appellant has ever been to Ohio. We find that requiring appellant to defend this action would not comport with the notions of fair play and substantial justice. Since appellant has not engaged in any conduct which falls within the parameters of R.C.
Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is sustained.
The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss this action against appellant.
Judgment reversedand cause remanded.
EVANS and SHAW, JJ., concur.