DocketNumber: No. E-97-140.
Judges: SHERCK, J.
Filed Date: 7/10/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Appellant Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Services, initially denied appellee's application for the reason that he did not have the statutorily required weeks of employment to qualify for benefits. This determination was later reversed on administrative appeal. However, the claim was again denied on a different ground. The hearing officer found that appellee had performed actual work for only five of the six weeks required by R.C.
The court of common pleas reversed the Board of Review concluding that R.C.
"The common pleas court erred in its decision reversing the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's finding that claimant did not have a valid application for determination of benefit rights as there is competent, credible evidence in the record that claimant did not meet the statutory requirements."
R.C.
"(R) `Benefit year' with respect to an individual means the fifty-two week period beginning with the first day of that week with respect to which the individual first files a valid application for determination of bene fit rights, and thereafter the fifty-two week period beginning with the first day of that week with respect to which the individual next files a valid application for determination of benefit rights after the termination of the individual's last preceding benefit year, except that the application shall not be considered valid unless the individual has had employment in six weeks that is subject to this chapter * * * and has, since the beginning of the individual's previous benefit year, in the employment earned three times the average weekly wage determined for the previous benefit year. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
This language appellant Administrator interprets to mean that, when a claimant files an application for benefits, he or she begins a period upon which subsequent filings are based, e.g., if the first day of the week appellant files his initial application for benefits is January 1, all subsequent benefit years begin on that date. For an application to be considered, the claimant must have "had employment" for at least six weeks of the new benefit period. No party to this action contests this interpretation. However, appellant Administrator further con strues the phrase "had employment" to mean that the claimant must have actually provided personal service — actually done work — for some employer during a minimum of six weeks in the new benefit period.
With respect to appellee, the Board of Review hearing officer found that during the benefit year appellee had worked only five weeks for an employer other than appellant Township and that the arbitrator's award of "back pay" from the Township did not satisfy the actual work requirement of the statute. For this reason, the hearing officer concluded that appellee's benefit application could not be considered. It was this determination that the court of common pleas found to be,
"* * * unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence because the referee erred when he found that the statute requires that the claimant must actually work an additional six weeks after a benefit year is established before a new benefit year is granted, and therefore erred in finding that the claimant did not actually work in the six weeks following the allowance of a prior benefit year."
The parties argue at length about the proper standard for our review, each advancing a position in favor of the test most advantageous to their respective causes. Appellants insist that, since this ultimately resolves to an evidentiary issue of whether appellant actually worked, the question is one of mani fest weight requiring only the presence of competent, credible evidence to support the hearing officer's findings. Appellee contends that the common pleas court's ruling was discretionary and ought not to be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Neither of these arguments is persuasive.
Clearly, the issue here is the proper interpretation of the words "had employment" in R.C.
The common pleas court concluded that R.C.
After resigning her prior position, Radcliffe was at her new job for only two weeks when she was terminated without just cause. She was, however, given an additional week of severance pay. Appellant Administrator denied her unemployment benefits on the ground that she had not "worked" for the new employer for three weeks.
In reviewing Radcliffe's case, the Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that R.C.
In this matter, the common pleas court found theRadcliffe logic persuasive. Citing Shepard v. Wearever-ProctorSilex, Inc. (1991),
We note that in the common pleas court appellant Administrator responded to appellee's argument by attempting to distinguish Radcliffe and Shepard as applicable only to other sections of R.C. Chapter 4141, or construing language not at issue. At no time before the common pleas court, indeed nowhere in the record prior to this appeal, did appellants provide any authority for the proposition that the R.C.
On appeal, for the first time, appellants suggest that the requirement derives from the definition of "work" provided by the United States Department of Labor in a 1992 memorandum interpreting a portion of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
The most significant distinction between Radcliffe and this case is that there R.C. 4141 contains no definition of the word "work" while R.C.
In this matter, the arbitrator ordered appellee compensated for the period of time he was wrongfully discharged and that he receive all benefits he was denied for that period. The requirement that all of appellee's benefits be restored would necessarily make the unpaid wages for this period subject to employer unemployment compensation contributions and, therefore, applying the Radcliffe reasoning, a period in which appellee "had employment."
Accordingly, the common pleas court determined, and we concur, that in this instance the period encompassed by the arbitration award satisfies the conditions set forth in R.C.
The decision of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Services for determination of whether appellee's termination was for just cause. Costs to appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
George M. Glasser, J. James R. Sherck, J. Richard W. Knepper, J.
CONCUR.