DocketNumber: No. 90605.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 6473
Judges: CHRISTINE T. McMONAGLE, J.<page_number>Page 3</page_number>
Filed Date: 12/11/2008
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} Toney entered a guilty plea to attempted burglary in case number CR-460725. During the plea colloquy, the trial court asked Toney if anyone had "made any promises or threats to induce you to enter this plea?" Toney responded "[n]o." Toney also entered guilty pleas to burglary and robbery, both with a one-year firearm specification, in case numbers CR-482862 and CR-484324. During the plea colloquy for those cases, the trial court asked Toney if anyone had "made any threats to induce you to enter this plea?" Toney responded "[n]o." All three cases, which were handled by the same judge, contained additional charges that were nolled.
{¶ 3} Toney seeks to vacate his burglary and robbery pleas because "the inquiry regarding any promises was conspicuously absent from the second plea colloquy."
{¶ 4} As an initial matter, we address whether the judgment Toney appealed from is a final appealable order in light of State v.Baker,
{¶ 5} In Baker, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[a] judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under R.C.
{¶ 6} The Ninth Appellate District had dismissed Baker's appeal, finding that it was not a final appealable order because the "judgment of conviction did not contain [Baker's] plea." Baker at ¶ 3. In reversing the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court held that Baker's judgment of conviction did not need to include the "plea entered at arraignment, but that it must include the sentence and the means of conviction." Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 7} The Supreme Court explained:
{¶ 8} "We first observe that we are discussing a judgment of conviction.' In State v. Tuomala,
{¶ 9} The Supreme Court determined that Baker's judgment of conviction was a final appealable order, despite the fact that it did not include the jury's verdict of not guilty on two other offenses, or the trial court's acquittal of three additional offenses. Id. at fn. 1.
{¶ 10} This court has recently held that under Baker, a judgment of conviction does not need to dispose of every charge in an indictment, including dismissed or nolled counts, or not guilty findings. But it must include the sentence and the "means of conviction" — meaning how the defendant was convicted of each charge (one of four ways: a defendant may plead guilty, plead no contest, be found guilty by a jury, or be found guilty in a bench trial). State v. Robinson, Cuyahoga App. No. 90731,
{¶ 11} Accordingly, we conclude that Toney's judgment of conviction (i.e., the sentencing order he is appealing) is a final appealable order even though it includes only the charges of which he was convicted (pled to), and not the charges of which he was exonerated (the nolled counts). We now consider the pleas. *Page 6
{¶ 12} Crim. R. 11 states in part:
{¶ 13} "(C)(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
{¶ 14} "(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or community sanctions.
{¶ 15} "(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶ 16} "(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself."
{¶ 17} With respect to constitutional rights (i.e., the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers), a trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea will be affirmed only if the trial court engaged in meaningful dialogue with the defendant which, in substance, *Page 7
explained the pertinent constitutional rights "in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant." State v. Ballard (1981),
{¶ 18} Under the broader standard for nonconstitutional rights, reviewing courts consider whether the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of Crim. R. 11(C)(2). Substantial compliance means that "under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving."State v. Nero (1990),
{¶ 19} After a complete review of the record, we conclude the trial court substantially complied with Crim. R. 11 in determining that no threats or promises were made to Toney to induce his plea. Accordingly, Toney's sole assignment of error is not well taken, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. *Page 8
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, A.J., and ANTHONY O. CALABRESE, JR., J., CONCUR.