DocketNumber: No. 4-94-12.
Citation Numbers: 654 N.E.2d 364, 100 Ohio App. 3d 466
Judges: EVANS, Judge.
Filed Date: 1/30/1995
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
Plaintiff-appellant Adam L. Barbee appeals from summary judgment granted against him in his medical malpractice action brought against defendant-appellee William M. Finerty, Jr., D.P.M. The appellant contends that the appellee exceeded the scope of the practice of podiatry, and therefore should be held to the standard of care of a medical doctor. The appellee submits that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice due to the appellant's failure to present expert testimony establishing a deviation from the requisite standard of care and skill a podiatrist owes in his treatment of a patient, or expert testimony establishing that the appellee exceeded the scope of practice as delineated by R.C.
In March 1984, the appellant was pushed at school and fell on his left side. He experienced pain in his left hip and visited the Defiance Memorial Hospital. X-rays taken of the appellant's left hip revealed a closed displaced fracture base of the neck of the left hip with new bone and non-union of the calcar portion of the fracture and absence of circulation to the left femoral head and neck on the proximal side of the fracture. The hospital's final discharge report concluded that the appellant sustained the fracture during his September 1983 fall.
On September 21, 1992, the appellant instituted a medical malpractice action in the Court of Common Pleas of Defiance County against the appellee and the Bryan Medical Group,1 alleging a failure to diagnose the fracture to the neck of the left femur, thereby allowing the appellant to walk for several months with an undetected, untreated, and nondisplaced fracture.
On August 30, 1993, the appellant moved for partial summary judgment on the issue that the appellee exceeded the scope of podiatry, and therefore should be held to the standard of care of a medical doctor. The appellee opposed the motion and also sought summary judgment, contending that the appellant: (1) failed to provide expert testimony demonstrating that the appellee exceeded the scope of the practice of podiatry; and (2) that the appellant failed to establish the requisite standard of care of a podiatrist. The trial court denied the appellant's motion for summary judgment and granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment. In granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee, the trial court ruled that expert testimony was required under the facts of this case to establish that the appellee rendered treatment within the meaning of R.C.
The appellee's affidavit in opposition to the foregoing facts stated that he did not treat the appellant. Also, in his motion package for summary judgment, the appellee attached the affidavits of two podiatrists, who both attested that: (1) the appellee did not exceed the scope of practice for podiatrists by seeing and examining the appellant's lower leg; and (2) that the appellee complied with the standards of practice and care for podiatrists. In particular, both of the appellee's expert affidavits indicated that R.C.
The appellant, in opposition to the appellee's motion for summary judgment, attached the deposition testimony and the affidavit of his expert, Mihran O. Tachdjian, M.D. Dr. Tachdjian's deposition testimony and affidavit indicate that the requisite standard of care for a physician requires a physician: (1) to conduct a careful clinical examination of the whole person (including his hip); (2) to x-ray the hip, which would have revealed the fractured hip; and (3) to subsequently diagnosis and treat the hip. In both his deposition testimony and his affidavit, Dr. Tachdjian criticized the appellee's care of the appellant. According to Dr. Tachdjian, the nonunion of the appellant's femoral neck was a direct and proximate result of the appellee's failure to diagnose and treat the appellant's left femoral neck fracture, which constituted a breach of the standard of care for a medical doctor.
On August 10, 1994, the trial court denied the appellant's motion for partial summary judgment, and granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment.
From this decision the appellant brings this appeal.
Since the appellant's three assignments of error are substantially connected, they will be addressed together. The appellant submits that under R.C.
Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is proper when "(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made."State ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994),
Under Ohio law, in order to establish a prima facie case of medical negligence, a plaintiff must establish the following through expert testimony: (1) the standard of care recognized by the medical community; (2) a failure of the defendant/physician to meet the standard of care; and (3) a direct causal connection between the negligent act and the injury sustained. Bruni v.Tatsumi (1976),
R.C.
"The practice of podiatry consists of the medical, mechanical, and surgical treatment of ailments of the foot, the muscles and tendons of the leg governing *Page 471
the functions of the foot; and superficial lesions of the hand other than those associated with trauma. Podiatrists are permitted the use of such preparations, medicines, and drugs as may be necessary for the treatment of such ailments. The podiatrist may treat the local manifestations of systemic diseases as they appear in the hand and foot, but the patient shall be concurrently referred to a doctor of medicine or a doctor of osteopathic medicine and surgery for the treatment of the systemic disease itself. General anaesthetics may be used under this section only in colleges of podiatry approved by the medical board pursuant to section
The appellant submits that R.C.
"It can be seen that a podiatrist, pursuant to such empowering statute [R.C.
Given the broad sweep of the statute, we are hard pressed to determine, in the absence of expert testimony from the appellant, whether the appellee engaged in the treatment of the appellant, or for that matter, whether the appellee exceeded the scope of the statute. As noted in Bruni,
The appellant's attempt to link the appellee's alleged deviation from the scope of practice with the definitional practice statute, R.C.
This medical negligence action involves the professional skill and judgment of the appellee. The appellant did not produce expert testimony demonstrating that the appellee proceeded in the treatment of the appellant; rather, the appellant merely points to the broadly written practice statute, R.C.
In this case, the appellant's expert testimony established only the standard of care for a medical doctor, not a podiatrist. While a medical doctor is qualified to give the applicable standard of care of a podiatrist, see, e.g.,Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr. (1978),
The affidavits submitted by the appellee attested to the requisite standard of care of a podiatrist, and stated that the appellee's examination of the appellant was performed in accordance with proper and accepted standards of podiatric care. Given the appellant's complete lack of pertinent expert testimony, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the appellee. See Hoffman v. Davidson,
The appellant's three assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
SHAW, P.J., and BRYANT, J., concur.