DocketNumber: Trial Court No. CR-98-1429. Court of Appeals No. L-98-1377.
Judges: HANDWORK, P.J.
Filed Date: 9/30/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Appellant sets forth the following two assignments of error:
"ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
"I. The defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel, as guaranteed under the
Fifth ,Sixth andFourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and ArticleI , Section10 of the Ohio Constitution."II. The trial court erred prejudicially in its own violation of the separation of witnesses rule."
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. Appellant was indicted on March 2, 1998 on one charge of possession of crack cocaine, in violation of R.C.
At the close of the state's case, appellant moved for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The motion was denied. The defense presented its case. Appellant testified that the third man to exit, not him, had thrown the plastic baggie. Appellant further testified that the first man to exit did not hit the floor until after he and the third man to exit had collided and turned. He also testified that when all the men were inside the house an officer inquired as to who had thrown the plastic bag. Appellant testified that he had earlier seen the third man to exit with plastic baggies.
The jury deliberated on September 15, 1998 and returned a guilty verdict on the offense charged. Appellant was sentenced to three years of community control, with six months at the correctional treatment facility. Appellant was also ordered to participate and successfully complete a drug/alcohol treatment program; obtain his GED/education; submit to periodic urinalysis; and seek and maintain gainful employment. Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal.
In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right of effective assistance of counsel. This court finds no merit in this assignment of error.
The standard for determining whether a trial attorney was ineffective requires appellant to show: (1) that the trial attorney made errors so egregious that the trial attorney was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed appellant under the
Furthermore, a court must be "highly deferential" and "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance" in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 689. A properly licensed attorney in Ohio is presumed to execute his duties in an ethical and competent manner. State v. Hamblin
(1988),
It is well established that the constitution does not guarantee a perfect trial or even the best available defense. The
Effective assistance of counsel does not guarantee results. State v. Longo (1982),
In his first assignment of error, appellant argues eleven instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel:
1. failure to conduct pre-trial investigation;
2. failure to file necessary pre-trial motions;
3. failure to inquire on voir dire into potential race bias;
4. failure to require as adequate foundation fora admission of photographs;
5. failure to protect the record adequately through proper objections;
6. failure to treat the client with dignity;
7. inadequate development of theory of case;
8. failure to exploit chain of custody deficiencies;
9. failure to protect the Defendant's right to appear in street clothes before a jury;
10. failure to object to the admissions of exhibits; and
11. error in closing argument.
In the first instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate visibility at the time and day in question through the request of police logs and information from the U.S. Weather Bureau. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
Appellant argues that visibility was so poor that one of the police detectives did not see the plastic baggie of drugs, but only saw an arm go out. Although appellant argues that it was due to lack of visibility that the detective did not see the plastic baggie of drugs, the detective's testimony was that he was further away and to the left of the detective who did see the plastic baggie of drugs leave appellant's hand. Both detectives testified that the police raid occurred at approximately 5:45 p.m. on the day in question and that it was still daylight. After a careful review of the record, we are not convinced that the trial result would have been any different had trial counsel requested police logs and information from the U.S. Weather Bureau regarding visibility at the time and day in question.
In the second instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to file the necessary pre-trial motions, specifically arguing the failure to file any motions testing the sufficiency of the warrant. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Dennis
(1997),
"Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may not be vicariously asserted by others. (Citations omitted.) A defendant bears the burden of proving not only that the search was illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. (Citation omitted.)
"Dennis has failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Morgan's residence. While an overnight guest has standing to challenge the legality of a search, (Citation omitted.) there was no evidence that Dennis stayed overnight or that he was residing at Morgan's home at the time of the search. * * *
"Dennis has failed to demonstrate that he had standing to object to the warrant or subsequent search. (Citation omitted.) * * *"
After a careful review of the record, this court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in the argued failure to file any motions testing the sufficiency of the warrant.
In the third instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to inquire on voir dire into potential race bias. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
Trial counsel does have a duty to conduct an adequate voir dire. In this case, counsel did not violate that duty. Trial counsel is given broad discretion in how to conduct voir dire and into what areas to inquire. Such discretion falls into the category of "trial tactics." State v. Clayton (1980),
In the fourth instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to require an adequate foundation for admission of photographs. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
Appellant argues that trial counsel failed to require any foundation for who took the photographs or created the sketch or when. Evid.R. 901(A) provides:
"The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
At trial, one detective testified that the photographs fairly and accurately depicted the scene as the officer observed it on the day of the raid. As noted in State v. Brooks (1995),
"* * * Such evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the photographs in question are what the proponent claims, photographs of the crime scene. The threshold standard for authentication in Evid.R. 901 was satisfied in this case. 2 Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence (Rev. 1988) 13-14, Section
901.16 .
After a careful review of the record, this court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in the argued failure to require an adequate foundation for admission of photographs.
In the fifth instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to protect the record adequately through proper objections to leading or speculative questions. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
Evid.R. 611(C) states:
"(C) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit the state to ask leading questions of its own witnesses. State v. Miller
(1988),
In the sixth instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to treat him with dignity. Specifically, appellant argues that his trial counsel insulted his intelligence during her questioning of one of the detectives.1 This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
The standard of review in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is limited concerning questions of trial strategy. Furthermore, appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not provide this court with carte blanche review of the trial tactics employed by counsel. If appellate courts second-guessed every strategy employed at each phase of a jury trial, the process of truth-seeking would grind to a halt. It is apparent upon reading the entire transcript that during the cross-examination of the police detective cited by appellant, appellant's trial counsel was not mocking the intelligence of her client. Rather, the cross-examination of the police detective was one in which people in general were discussed; the exchange did not specifically refer to appellant. Cross-examination always entails a degree of risk. After a careful review of the record, this court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in the argued failure to treat him with dignity.
In the seventh instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to adequately develop the theory of the case. Specifically, appellant argues that his trial counsel did very little to develop the defense of mistaken identity. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
At trial, appellant's trial counsel developed a consistent defense theory that appellant was innocent and another suspect, the third man to exit the house, was guilty. Appellant's trial counsel focused on developing this theory of mistaken identity. Appellant's conviction demonstrates that the jury simply accepted the state's interpretation of the evidence, and rejected the theory presented by the defense. Appellant's trial counsel's performance did not fall "below an objective standard of reasonable representation." State v. Bradley,
In the eighth instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to exploit chain of custody deficiencies. Specifically, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to exploit the fact that there was no testimony concerning who transferred the plastic baggie to the police property room. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
One of the police detectives testified that he recovered the plastic baggie at the crime scene and turned it over to the lead investigator at the crime scene who takes care of the evidence. The individual from the Toledo police forensic laboratory who conducted the chemical analysis on the drugs contained in the plastic baggie testified that, after receiving the request form from the detective on the case, he obtained the plastic baggie from the property room when he gave them a copy of the request. He identified the plastic baggie which he resealed, after completing his analysis, and on which he placed his initials.
A chain of custody may be established by direct testimony or by inference. State v. Conley (1971),
In the ninth instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to protect the appellant's right to appear in street clothing before a jury. Specifically, appellant argues he was entitled to appear in street clothing in his booking photograph that was an exhibit at trial. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
In support of this argument, appellant cites Estelle v.Williams (1976),
In the tenth instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to object to the admission of exhibits. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
It is well settled that trial counsel's failure to make objections are "within the realm of trial tactics" and do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Hunt
(1984),
In the eleventh instance cited as ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellant argues that his trial counsel erred in the closing argument. Specifically, appellant argues that trial counsel failed to expound on the weaknesses in the state's case. This court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in this argued instance.
Appellant has failed to establish that trial counsel's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonable representation. After a careful review of the record, this court cannot find that appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation in the closing argument.
It is an elemental proposition of law that parties are granted considerable latitude in closing arguments. State v. Frazier
(1995),
Appellant has not met the burden of proving that his trial counsel was ineffective. Furthermore, appellant has failed to show that his trial counsel's actions or inactions were prejudicial. In order to prevail on this assignment of error, appellant must show that "* * * there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. * * *" Strickland v. Washington (1984),
In its opinion in State v. Bradley (1989),
"* * * The alleged errors constituting ineffective assistance of counsel, even when viewed cumulatively, do not, in our view, show `that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' * * *"
After a careful review of the record, we are not convinced that the trial result would have been any different had counsel conducted the trial in the ways now argued by appellant. Counsel vigorously cross-examined the witnesses and pursued the theory of mistaken identity. Appellant has failed to prove that his counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and has failed to show any prejudicial result. Furthermore, "Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. * * *" Strickland,
In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in violating the separation of witnesses order by permitting a subsequent witness to see and use the same exhibit that a prior witness had marked. This court finds no merit in this assignment of error.
Evid.R. 615, requires the court, on its own motion, or that of any party to "order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses." Basically, Evid.R. 615 serves a number of purposes: (1) to prevent witnesses who have already testified from discussing testimony in courtroom events with those who have not; (2) to keep witnesses out of the courtroom before testifying; and (3) to prevent counsel from discussing evidence with witnesses who have not testified. These purposes, in turn, serve to aid in exposing of inconsistencies in testimony and to prevent witnesses from shaping their testimony to that of other witnesses. State v. Waddy (1992),
In the case sub judice, the use by a subsequent witness of an exhibit marked by a prior witness did not violate any of the purposes of Evid.R. 615. The two witnesses were asked different questions about the photograph. Moreover, appellant pointed to no specific instances that suggest shaping of testimony by the witnesses. On the contrary, the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of these two witnesses would tend to show that the second detective to testify did not attempt to conform his testimony to that of the first detective. There has been no showing that the witness's testimony would have been different but for the use of the previously marked exhibit.
Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is found not well-taken.
On consideration whereof, the court finds that the defendant was not prejudiced or prevented from having a fair trial, and the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. It is ordered that appellant pay court costs for this appeal.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Peter M. Handwork, P.J., James R. Sherck, J.,Richard W. Knepper, J., concur.
"Q. Did you know what it was when it was coming at you?
"A. Did I know it was crack cocaine, no. Did I know it was suspected crack cocaine, yes.
"Q. As opposed to anything else?
"A. As opposed to flour or salt or something like that, no.
"Q. As opposed to —
"A. In my experience, when we are executing warrants, people run out there throwing contraband, weapons.
"Q. Do they always throw it at the police?
"A. I'm sorry.
"Q. Do they always throw it at your face?
"A. Several times, yes.
"Q. Okay.
"A. They try to get rid of it any way they can.
"Q. Not very bright, is it? * * *"
Although appellant cited less in his brief than what appears above, this court believes that full context demonstrates that trial counsel was not insulting appellant's intelligence.