DocketNumber: No. L-08-1077.
Citation Numbers: 2009 Ohio 266
Judges: HANDWORK, J.
Filed Date: 1/23/2009
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} The indictment against appellant was filed on August 30, 2007, and his written guilty plea was journalized on December 12, 2007. On January 22, 2008, appellant filed a motion to vacate his sentencing date due to the fact that the recent amendment of R.C. Chapter
{¶ 3} Thereafter, appellant filed material in support of mitigating his sentence and a motion to exclude him from the requirement of community notification pursuant to the version of R.C.
{¶ 4} On February 29, 2008, the trial court held appellant's sentencing hearing. At the outset, the judge noted that she was going to impose sentence pursuant to S.B. 10. In her March 5, 2008 judgment entry, the judge imposed a sentence of three years on each conviction for sexual battery, to be served concurrently. She also determined that, under S.B. 10, appellant is a Tier III sex offender. *Page 3
{¶ 5} A Tier III sex offender is required to register with the local sheriff every 90 days for life and may be subject to community notification every 90 days for life. R.C.
{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DENYING MR. STOCKMAN'S MOTION FOR CLASSIFICATION BY PRIOR REVISED CODE CHAPTER 2950.
{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DENYING MR. STOCKMAN'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE HIM FROM COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION."
{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, appellant again argues that S.B. 10 is unconstitutional because it is applied retroactively, constitutes ex post facto law, and/or violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers. All of these issues were previously raised with regard to S.B. 10 in this court and rejected. See State v Bodyke, 6th Dist. Nos. H-07-040, H-07-041, H-07-042,
{¶ 9} In his second assignment of error, appellant complains that the lower court committed reversible error by denying his motion to exclude him from the community notification provisions of S.B. 10. Appellant claims that R.C.
{¶ 10} R.C.
{¶ 11} "(1) Except as provided in division (F)(2) of thissection, the duties to provide the notices described in divisions (A) and (C) of this section apply regarding any offender or delinquent child who is in any of the following categories:
{¶ 12} "(a) The offender is a tier III sex offender * * *.
{¶ 13} "(2) The notification provisions of this section do not apply to a person described in division (F)(1)(a), (b), or (c) of this section if a court finds at a hearing after considering the factors described in this division that the person would not be subject to the notification provisions of this section that were in the version of this section that existed immediately prior to the effective date of this amendment. * * *." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 14} In construing the terms of a particular statute, words must be given their usual, normal, and/or customary meanings. State v.Dorso (1983),
{¶ 15} As applied herein, the plain and unambiguous use of the word "court" rather than the "attorney general" plainly indicates that a court, after holding a hearing and applying the specific factors listed in R.C.
{¶ 16} Nonetheless, appellee contends that Williams controls the outcome of this appeal. In that case, the defendant was initially found by the trial court to be a sexually oriented offender. Id. at ¶ 3. The defendant appealed, and, due to a sentencing error, the Ninth Appellate District remanded the case for resentencing. Id. The defendant was resentenced but her classification remained the same. Id. In December 2007, the trial court ordered that Williams be resentenced again because it previously failed to advise her of postrelease control. Id. at ¶ 4.
{¶ 17} Prior to Williams' resentencing, S.B. 10 became effective. Ignoring R.C.
{¶ 18} Upon this review of Williams, we can only conclude that it is inapposite to the present cause because it involved the reclassification of a sexual offender rather than the initial classification of the same.
{¶ 19} As to the initial classification of a sexual offender, we find that R.C.
{¶ 20} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. This cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this judgment. Appellee, the state of Ohio, and appellant, Charles Stockman, are each ordered to pay one-half of the costs of this appeal.
*Page 7JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, IN PART, AND REVERSED, IN PART.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App. R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist. Loc. App. R. 4.
Peter M. Handwork, J., Mark L. Pietrykowski, P.J., Arlene Singer, J., CONCUR. *Page 1