DocketNumber: No. 81757.
Judges: COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.
Filed Date: 4/10/2003
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} In the underlying case, State of Ohio v. Jerry Moore, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-227207, the grand jury indicted Moore for aggravated murder with a firearm specification. In December 1988, a jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of murder with the firearm specification. The judge sentenced him to fifteen years to life for the murder charge and three years for the firearm specification, to run consecutively. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. Moore (Aug. 9 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 57223.
{¶ 3} The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondents must have a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief and (3) there must be no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Ney v.Niehaus (1987),
{¶ 4} In addition, the court exercises discretion in issuing the writ. In Pressley, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that "in considering the allowance or denial of the writ of mandamus on the merits, [the court] will exercise sound, legal and judicial discretion based upon all the facts and circumstances in the individual case and the justice to be done." The court elaborated that in exercising that discretion the court should consider "the exigency which calls for the exercise of such discretion, the nature and extent of the wrong or injury which would follow a refusal of the writ, and other facts which have a bearing on the particular case. * * * Among the facts and circumstances which the court will consider are the applicant's rights, the interests of third persons, the importance or unimportance of the case, the applicant's conduct, the equity and justice of the relator's case, public policy and the public's interest, whether the performance of the act by the respondent would give the relator any effective relief, and whether such act would be impossible, illegal, or useless."
{¶ 5} Most of the claims and issues which Moore raises are not remediable in mandamus, because there are or were adequate remedies at law, especially appeal, which Moore has already exercised. First, Moore complains that the prosecutor secured his indictment on perjured testimony.1 He claims that his search and seizure rights were violated, but does not specify how. He also claims that the indictment was deficient, because, inter alia, at least one material element was omitted. He argues that his conviction is void under double jeopardy, because when the jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of murder, it must have necessarily first found him not guilty of aggravated murder. Thus, at that moment he claims jeopardy attached and prevented him from being found guilty of murder.2 Moore further maintains that murder is not a lesser included offense of aggravated murder, and the judge erred in so instructing the jury or in allowing the prosecutor to amend the indictment at trial.3 He continues that he was tried on charges other than those for which he was extradited. He also intimates that the jury's "acquittal" on the aggravated murder charge proves that the jury found that the necessary mens rea was missing, and thus, the mens rea element must necessarily be missing from the murder charge. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had the purposeful intent to kill.4 Alternatively, Moore argues that the conflicting evidence precluded a finding of guilt. He also indicates that the indictment, its "amendment," and the corresponding statutes violated the ex post facto clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. All of these issues could have been raised on appeal; therefore, no relief in mandamus is available for these issues, even if they were meritorious.
{¶ 6} Moore also endeavors to state a claim in habeas corpus by stating that he should be released from prison because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Moore argues that double jeopardy bars his conviction for murder because the indictment was for aggravated murder, not simple murder. Errors regarding double jeopardy, lesser included offenses, and deficiencies in the indictment do not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction and certainly do not state claims for habeas corpus relief. As the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in Stateex rel. Hadlock v. McMackin (1991),
{¶ 7} Moore also argues that the APA is improperly treating him as an aggravated murderer, rather than a simple murderer, for purposes of parole. The APA recently adopted guidelines to promote a more consistent exercise of discretion and to enable fairer and more equitable decision-making without removing the opportunity for consideration of parole eligibility on an individual case basis. The heart of the guidelines is a chart, with offense categories ranging from 1, the least serious, to 13, the most serious, along the vertical axis, and four columns for criminal history/risk evaluation along the horizontal axis.5 The intersection of the two will show a range of months which the prisoner should serve before being eligible for parole. For example, category 11, murder,6 and a criminal history/risk factor of 0 or 1 produces a range of 180 to 240 months. The same offense category and a criminal history/risk factor of 6 produces a range from 240 to 300 months. In contrast, category 13, aggravated murder, and a criminal history/risk factor of 0 or 1 produces a range of 300 months to life before parole eligibility applies.
{¶ 8} Moore's claim is perplexing because he concedes that the APA placed his offense in category 11 and evaluated his criminal history/risk factor at 6. The APA's motion to dismiss confirms that, and Moore never rebutted that allegation. Thus, the APA properly categorized his offense as murder and did not classify him as an aggravated murderer for purposes of parole. This is as the Ohio Supreme Court required in Layne v. OhioAdult Parole Authority,
{¶ 9} To the extent that Moore misreads the chart, arguing that a convicted murderer may only be given 180 months before being eligible for parole, or that his fifteen years to life sentence with good time must make him eligible for parole at 180 months, or that the range of 240 to 300 months before parole eligibility is the de facto equivalent of treating him as an aggravated murderer, his arguments are unpersuasive. "There is no constitutional or inherent right * * * to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence." State ex rel. Hattiev. Goldhardt,
{¶ 10} Specifically for the case sub judice, the APA has the right to exercise its discretion such that it can keep Moore in prison until he dies. It has no duty to release him at the end of fifteen years or fifteen years minus time off for good behavior. It has properly categorized his offense as murder, the crime for which he was convicted, and has further evaluated his criminal history/risk factor as serious enough to be rated a 6. Thus, under its guidelines it has the right to wait 240 to 300 months before considering him for parole. Moore has no clear, legal right enforceable in mandamus to be considered for parole before that time.
{¶ 11} Moore also raises the issue of good time. He states the gravamen of this issue as follows: "Now, tell relator where does R.C.
{¶ 12} Moore also claims that the parole guidelines are invalid and may not be enforced because the APA did not follow R.C. Chapter 119 in adopting them. Assuming, arguendo, that Moore states an authentic mandamus claim and not a claim for declaratory judgment, it is not well founded. The parole guidelines are not administrative rules and need not be promulgated in accordance with R.C. Chapter 119. Poluka v. Ohio AdultParole Authority, Franklin App. No. 02AP-484, 2003-Ohio-153.
{¶ 13} To the extent that Moore endeavors to state any other claims, this court, in the exercise of its discretion, denies them. Moore's petition is irregularly written as a complaint, e.g., the "relief sought" section is on page eighteen of a forty-five page petition and is followed by additional arguments designated as "assignments of error." Furthermore, the arguments tend to be rambling and repetitive and plagued by inconsistencies and typographical errors. These factors often make it difficult to discern exactly what Moore is claiming. He has not clearly shown that the APA has the clear, legal duty to release him on parole or even to accelerate his next parole hearing. The thrust of his arguments are claimed errors of law arising from his trial; the APA has no authority to correct such matters, even if they were meritorious.
{¶ 14} Accordingly, this court grants the respondents' motion to dismiss and denies the application for a writ of mandamus and a writ of habeas corpus. Costs assessed against relator. The clerk is directed to serve upon the parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).
ANN DYKE, P.J. concurs; DIANE KARPINSKI, J. concurs, with separate concurring opinion.