DocketNumber: No. 07AP-54.
Citation Numbers: 2007 Ohio 5344
Judges: BRYANT, J.
Filed Date: 10/4/2007
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Paul Laurenzi, appeals from a judgment of the Ohio Court of Claims granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Transportation ("ODOT"). Plaintiff assigns a single error:
*Page 2THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, PAUL LAURENZI, IN ORDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.
Because the federal statute on which plaintiff relies for the proposition that ODOT is responsible for maintaining federal-aid highways does not create a private remedy, we affirm.
{¶ 2} According to the undisputed evidence, plaintiff was operating a motorcycle on the Rocky River Drive/Brookpark Road entrance ramp to southbound State Route 237 and I-480 on the night of September 3, 2003. Located within the Cleveland city limits, the road is a federal-aid highway built in part with funds that the Federal Highway Administration provided. As plaintiff merged onto State Route 237, his vehicle struck the end of an unpainted low barrier concrete wall, causing plaintiff to suffer personal injuries. Plaintiff asserts he was unable to see the barrier wall in the nighttime because the yellow pavement line painted in front of the wall was faded.
{¶ 3} Plaintiff filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims seeking compensatory damages from ODOT. Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, ODOT filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, contending it owed no duty to plaintiff under state law, as the city of Cleveland was responsible under R.C.
{¶ 4} An appellate court's review of summary judgment is conducted under a de novo review. Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. (1994),
{¶ 5} Summary judgment is appropriate only when (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978),
{¶ 6} Plaintiff's cause of action is a common law negligence claim. The Court of Claims Act permits plaintiff to proceed against ODOT with a lawsuit that would have been terminated at common law on the grounds of ODOT's defense of sovereign immunity. In order to prevail on his negligence claim, plaintiff must establish "the existence of a duty, the breach of the duty, and injury resulting proximately therefrom."Strother v. Hutchinson (1981),
{¶ 7} To the extent plaintiff attempts to premise his claims on state law, his efforts are unavailing. R.C.
{¶ 8} Rather, plaintiff looks to federal law to support his claim against ODOT. Plaintiff contends the Federal-Aid Highway Act, Section 101, Title 23, U.S. Code et seq. ("the Act") not only requires ODOT to maintain all parts of a federal-aid highway, but renders ODOT liable for its failure to comply with the maintenance requirements of that law. By contrast, ODOT acknowledges it remains responsible to the federal government for maintenance even though the municipality actually maintains the highway at issue, but it contends the federal statute imposing that burden upon ODOT does not create a private remedy. The issue then initially resolves to whether the Act imposes a duty on ODOT that creates a private remedy on which plaintiff may premise his negligence claims. Neither party disputes that the Act applies to the on-ramp or approach at issue, and so we assume its application for purposes of addressing plaintiff's assigned error.
{¶ 9} Plaintiff correctly asserts ODOT has a "federal" responsibility to maintain the federal-aid highway at issue: the federal legislation expressly states that "[i]t shall be the duty of the State transportation department to maintain, or cause to be maintained, any project constructed under the provisions of this chapter." Section 116, Title 23, U.S.Code. The state's maintenance obligation can be delegated to other governmental entities in accordance with Section 116(b), which recognizes that in some states, as in *Page 5
Ohio, the state transportation department may be without existing legal authority to directly maintain a federal-aid project. See R.C.
{¶ 10} Although Section 116(b) allows such delegation, it does not relieve the state highway department of its responsibility to maintain a federal-aid highway. Section
{¶ 11} The Act does not expressly "authorize a suit or cause of action for violation" of its provisions. Daye v. Pennsylvania (D.C.Pa.,1972),
{¶ 12} "The statutory language of the [Act] clearly indicates that the ultimate responsibility for any safety provisions under the Act lies with the Secretary [of Transportation]" who "is given the power to withhold his approval in the event the design or construction of the highway does not meet applicable federal standards." Id. Because the "express sanction provided in the Act is disqualification of the state for federal funds," *Page 6 we agree with Daye that "the statutory language militates against the implication of a private remedy." Id.
{¶ 13} "Moreover, the congressional policy underlying the Act does not mandate an implied private cause of action." Id. As Daye observed, "the primary function * * * in approving plans submitted * * * by a state and inspecting roads during and after construction, is that of making sure that federal appropriations are being utilized properly and efficiently by the respective states and are not being wasted." Daye, supra, quoting, Mahler v. United States (C.A.Pa.,1962),
{¶ 14} Because "the purpose of the Act is the protection of federal investment, and the sanctions * * * are directed to fulfill such purpose," we again agree with Daye that the Act "gives rise to no private cause of action." Daye, at 1348. See, also, Miller v. UnitedStates (C.A.Colo.,1983),
{¶ 15} In the final analysis, from the beginning of the federal-aid highway program Congress was preeminently concerned with state autonomy in construction and *Page 7 maintenance, but also with safeguarding federal funds. Miller, supra. The federal purpose in demanding state oversight of federal-aid highway maintenance is to protect the federal financial investment.Mahler, supra; Daye, supra. Although ODOT must ensure maintenance of federal-aid highways, it does not owe the obligation to plaintiff but to the federal government.
{¶ 16} Because ODOT did not owe any duty to plaintiff to maintain the road at issue, we overrule plaintiff's single assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the Ohio Court of Claims granting summary judgment to ODOT.
Judgment affirmed.
BROWN and TYACK, JJ., concur. *Page 1
karen-lee-miller-individually-earl-edward-miller-individually-v-united , 710 F.2d 656 ( 1983 )
Leopold W. Mahler and Helen E. Mahler, His Wife, and Bertha ... , 306 F.2d 713 ( 1962 )
Smith v. Bernier , 701 F. Supp. 1171 ( 1988 )
Daye v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania , 344 F. Supp. 1337 ( 1972 )