DocketNumber: No. 08 JE 12.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 6365
Judges: VUKOVICH, J.
Filed Date: 12/5/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
¶ {4} "3. Where court-appointed counsel, with long and extensive experience in criminal practice, concludes that the indigent's appeal is frivolous and that there is no assignment of error which could be arguably supported on appeal, he should so advise the appointing court by brief and request that he be permitted to withdraw as counsel of record.
¶ {5} "4. Court-appointed counsel's conclusions and motion to withdraw as counsel of record should be transmitted forthwith to the indigent, and the indigent should be granted time to raise any points that he chooses, pro se.
¶ {6} "5. It is the duty of the Court of Appeals to fully examine the proceedings in the trial court, the brief of appointed counsel, the arguments pro se of the indigent, and then determine whether or not the appeal is wholly frivolous. *Page 3 ¶ {7} "* * *
¶ {8} "7. Where the Court of Appeals determines that an indigent's appeal is wholly frivolous, the motion of court-appointed counsel to withdraw as counsel of record should be allowed, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed." Toney,
¶ {9} The Toney brief was filed by counsel on June 30, 2008. On August 1, 2008, we informed Mann of counsel's Toney brief and granted him until September 2, 2008 to file a written brief. Mann did not file a pro se brief. Thus, we will proceed to independently examine the record to determine if the appeal is frivolous.
¶ {10} As stated above, Mann pled guilty. A defendant who pleads guilty may only attack the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent nature of the defendant's plea and "may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." State v. Spates,
¶ {11} Thus, we begin our analysis with whether the plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Crim. R. 11(C) requires trial courts to advise the defendant about certain constitutional and nonconstitutional rights that he will be waiving by entering a guilty plea. These advisements ensure that the plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
¶ {12} Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(c) sets forth the constitutional rights that the defendant waives by entering the guilty plea and mandates that the trial court must discuss these rights with the defendant. These rights are: 1) the right to a jury trial; 2) the right to confront witnesses against him; 3) the right to have the compulsory process of obtaining witnesses in his favor; 4) the right to have the state prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and 5) that the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself. Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(c); State v. Veney, Slip Opinion No.
¶ {14} The trial court did an excellent job of strictly complying with the mandated constitutional advisements. The trial court informed Mann of his right to a jury, to confront witnesses against him, to subpoena witnesses in his favor, and to have the state prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 03/03/08 Tr. 9-11. He was also advised that he could not be compelled to testify against himself and the fact that if he chose to not testify that choice could not be considered in determining his guilt. 03/03/08 Tr. 11-12.
¶ {15} As to the nonconstitutional advisements, we find that the trial court substantially complied. Mann was advised of the charges against him and the possible penalties, which included a 2 to 8 year sentence, a fine, restitution, a firearm disability, post-release control. 03/03/08 Tr. 12-13, 15-18. He was also advised about the available community control sanctions. 03/03/08 Tr. 13-15.
¶ {16} The only minor misstep made by the trial court was that it did not expressly state to Mann that after accepting the guilty plea it could proceed straight to sentencing. However, that omission does not amount to reversible error. At the beginning of the hearing, defense counsel indicated that after the plea was entered it was going to request sentencing be postponed until a presentence investigation report could be gathered. 03/03/08 Tr. 2-4. The trial court explained that process to Mann *Page 5 and indicated to him that following the plea, the sentence would not occur because of the request for the presentence investigation. 03/03/08 Tr. 4. It then indicated that they would come back at a later date for sentencing. 03/03/08 Tr. 4. Considering these specific facts, this advisement was in substantial compliance with Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b) and there was no prejudice to Mann.
¶ {17} In addition to all the above, Mann was asked whether his plea was entered into freely and voluntarily and if he was threatened into making the plea. 03/03/08 Tr. 19. Mann indicated he was not threatened and his plea was freely made. 03/03/08 Tr. 19. The plea transcript clearly indicates that it was Mann's wish to enter the guilty plea. 03/03/08 Tr. 20-21. Accordingly, considering all the above, this court finds that there was no error in accepting the guilty plea.
¶ {18} As the plea complied with Crim. R. 11, we now turn to the review of Mann's sentence. Appellate counsel, in its Toney brief, raised a potential issue with the sentence imposed claiming that "the Trial Court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence pursuant toState v. Foster,
¶ {19} Following Foster, there has been confusion among the appellate courts as to what the standard of review is for felony sentences. There have been three approaches taken by the appellate courts. Some appellate districts, including ours, have held R.C.
¶ {20} Given these different approaches, the Ohio Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict in State v. Kalish, Slip Opinion No.
¶ {21} The plurality concluded that in reviewing felony sentences the appellate courts must apply a two-step approach. Id. at ¶ 26 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). The first step requires appellate courts to "examine the sentencing court's compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law." Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). In examining "all applicable rules and statutes," the sentencing court must consider R.C.
¶ {22} The concurring in judgment only opinion did not entirely agree with the plurality's "overly broad" two step approach to reviewing felony sentences. Id. at ¶ 42 (Willamowski, J., concurring in judgment only). It agreed with the plurality that the sentence should be reviewed under the clearly and convincingly contrary to law standard to determine if the sentencing court complied with all applicable rules and statutes, which would include R.C.
¶ {23} The dissent concluded that post-Foster the standard of felony sentencing review remains unchanged and that only a clearly and convincingly contrary to law standard of review is employed. Id. at ¶ 43 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).
¶ {24} Considering the above holdings and reasons in Kalish, the confusion surrounding the standard of review for felony sentences has not been clearly resolved. What we glean from Kalish is that appellate courts should review felony sentences under both the clear and convincingly contrary to law standard and the abuse of discretion standard of review until the Supreme Court clearly and expressly determines the standard of review.
¶ {25} The trial court sentenced Mann to the maximum sentence allowed by R.C.
¶ {26} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court made statements concerning the R.C.
¶ {27} "The court further finds under ORC §
¶ {28} "The court further finds under ORC §
¶ {29} Similar statements were made during the sentencing hearing. 04/21/08 Tr. 20-22.
¶ {30} The trial court's application of these factors to the facts of the case in the manner it did was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court's imposition of the maximum sentence allowable by law.
¶ {31} Lastly, in reviewing the sentence we must examine the post release control notification. In State v. Bezak,
¶ {32} Here, the post release control advisement was provided and it clearly complied with the law. 04/22/08 J.E.; 03/03/08 Tr. 17; 04/21/08 Tr. 22. Thus, there is no error.
¶ {33} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed and counsel's motion to withdraw is granted.
*Page 1Donofrio, J., concurs. DeGenaro, P.J., concurs.