DocketNumber: No. 1269
Citation Numbers: 499 N.E.2d 350, 26 Ohio App. 3d 183
Judges: GEORGE, P.J.
Filed Date: 10/9/1985
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
The matter is before us on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court for a determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding Leo R. Earlenbaugh guilty of reckless operation pursuant to R.C.
Earlenbaugh was cited about midnight April 22, 1983, after allegedly nearly striking State Trooper Joe Anderson with his semi-tractor-trailer on northbound Interstate 71, near the intersection with Interstate 76. Trooper Anderson had stopped to assist another officer. His patrol car was parked on the berm of the road behind the other cruiser, angled slightly with the front end toward the roadway. Both vehicles had lights and flashers activated.
Anderson was standing next to the driver's side of the other patrol car, between the car and the berm line of the highway, when he saw two semi-tractor-trailer rigs approaching, side by side. Anderson testified they both were "running hard" and that neither slowed down as they came near him. Earlenbaugh's rig, he said, crossed over the white edge line, forcing him to flatten himself against the other cruiser to avoid being hit. He estimated the rig came within six inches of him and the cruiser. In his report, he claimed Earlenbaugh deliberately drove over the line "in an apparent attempt to see how close he could get to me."
Earlenbaugh denied ever crossing over the white line. He said he reduced his speed when he saw Anderson and introduced a mechanically reproduced chart purporting to show that the rig did indeed slow to about forty miles per hour at about the time of the incident. He said he realized Anderson was very close to the edge of the road, but that he wasn't worried about hitting him.
Anderson gave chase and stopped Earlenbaugh some six to seven miles down the road. The trial court found that the rig had crossed over the line and concluded that "the act of crossing the line was in wanton disregard of the safety of Trooper Anderson and his vehicle." On appeal, this court (Quillin, J., dissenting) reversed, finding the statute to be impermissibly vague. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and reversed, finding the language of the statute was sufficiently definite to provide clear and adequate notice of the conduct proscribed therein. (SeeState v. Earlenbaugh [1985],
"The trial court erred in finding the defendant guilty of reckless operation in violation of section
R.C.
"No person shall operate a vehicle * * * on any street or highway in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property."
Prior to March 16, 1983, this statute merely proscribed the operation of vehicles without due regard for the safety of persons or property. As amended, the statute requires a showing of "willful or wanton disregard" of the safety of persons or property. *Page 185
In its opinion, State v. Earlenbaugh (1985),
"* * * A person may be found guilty of violating R.C.
It is sufficient then to convict under R.C.
"* * * [W]hen I first seen the patrol car I didn't know it was nearly as close to the edge of the paved part of the road as it was `cause if I had of then I would have backed off to where Icould have got over in the other lane or done whatever I had todo but I didn't know it was that close * * *." (Emphasis added.)
In addition, the speed chart Earlenbaugh offered was not persuasive in that it was subject to various interpretations. There was no testimony as to how it measured the vehicle speed or how accurate it might be. The trooper was emphatic in his testimony that the rig crossed over the berm line directly in front of him. He said he observed it beginning to veer toward the line some distance down the road.
It is clear from the testimony that Earlenbaugh recognized the potential for danger, yet he proceeded with reckless disregard for the trooper's safety when he swerved over the line within six inches of the trooper and the cruiser. Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978),
Judgment affirmed.
QUILLIN, J., concurs.
MAHONEY, J., dissents.