DocketNumber: No. C-990566.
Judges: <bold>WINKLER, Judge.</bold>
Filed Date: 9/8/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Please note: We have sua sponte removed this case from the accelerated calendar.
Seconds later, plaintiff-appellant, Katherine E. Falgner, who was travelling approximately three car lengths behind Sucher, was unable to stop her vehicle before colliding with the front end of Sucher's vehicle. The vehicle travelling behind Falgner, driven by defendant Vickie E. Hollon, ran into the back end of Falgner's vehicle.
Despite relatively minor damage to Sucher's vehicle, Falgner's vehicle sustained heavy damage and had to be towed from the scene. Falgner and her passenger, Peggy Ritter, were picked up by a friend and subsequently went to the hospital.
Falgner filed suit against Sucher, claiming damages from Sucher's negligent driving.1 The case was tried in April 1999, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Sucher. Falgner, after the trial court denied her new-trial motion, appealed to this court.
Falgner raises four assignments of error. In her first, she claims that the trial court erred when it denied her motions for a directed verdict on the issue of Sucher's negligence. According to Falgner, the violation of motor-vehicle-safety statutes is negligence per se. Since Sucher's testimony and other evidence suggested that Sucher may have violated one or more motor-vehicle-safety statutes, Falgner believes she was entitled to a directed verdict. We disagree.
A motion for a directed verdict should be granted when reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion when construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. SeeZiegler v. Wendel Poultry Serv., Inc. (1993),
The evidence in this case reveals that Sucher unexpectedly lost control of her vehicle when she ran over a patch of unseen ice on the roadway. Although having spun one-hundred-and-eighty degrees, Sucher was then able to brake and come to a stop; however, she was then facing eastbound in a westbound lane. Falgner, who was immediately behind Sucher, then downshifted and braked, but the ice on the roadway prevented her from stopping or swerving to avoid striking Sucher's vehicle. The evidence in the record suggests that both parties were negligent per se for violating motor-vehicle-safety statutes: Sucher for failing to maintain reasonable control, slow speed, and, possibly, failing to comply with the lanes-of-travel-upon-roadways statute; and Falgner for failing to maintain an assured clear distance ahead.2
"Where the plaintiff driver is travelling immediately behind the defendant driver, and both parties are negligent per se for failing to [comply with motor-vehicle-safety statutes], the question of whether the negligence of either party was the proximate cause of the ensuing collision, in which the plaintiff driver sustained personal injuries, is for jury determination."Shinaver v. Szymanski (1984),
In Falgner's second assignment of error, she claims that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the presence of ice on the roadway did not excuse a violation by Sucher of various motor-vehicle-safety statutes. If a requested jury instruction is an accurate statement of law and where reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the instruction, the instruction should be given. See Murphy v.Carrolton Mfg. Co. (1991),
"Skidding upon wet or icy roadway pavement is a circumstance within the power of motorists to prevent." Oechsle v. Hart
(1967),
In Falgner's third assignment of error, she claims that the trial court erred when it excluded from evidence a proposed exhibit that included climatological data from the date of the accident, because it was admissible under Evid.R. 803(8). Falgner sought to introduce this exhibit in rebuttal to the testimony of defense witness Vickie Hollon, who testified that the berm into which Falgner had claimed to have driven was blocked by snow. Falgner argues that the climatological data would have presented evidence of temperature and precipitation, including snowfall, which would have demonstrated that there was no snow on the berm at the time of the accident.
Falgner is correct that, as an exception to the hearsay rule, Evid.R. 803(8) allows for the admissibility of public records without further authentication. Despite this, in order to be admissible, evidence must be relevant to a determination of the issues. See Evid.R. 401 and 402. The climatological data sought to be introduced concerned only the area in and around Lunken Airport and not the area in and around the scene of the accident. Additionally, the climatological data contained information from the month of January 1994 only, not for February 10, 1994, the date of the accident. Because the data were not relevant to a determination of the issues in this case, the trial court's exclusion of the data was not an abuse of discretion. See Evid.R. 402; Nye v. Fostoria Distrib. Serv. Co. (1992),
Additionally, the trial court controls the mode and order of interrogation of witnesses and the presentation of evidence. See Evid.R. 611. The admission of evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. See Moore v. Retter (1991),
In Falgner's fourth assignment of error, she claims that the trial court erred when it failed to grant her motion for a new trial. Falgner claims that she was entitled to a new trial on the following grounds: (1) that the judgment was not sustained by the weight of the evidence; (2) that the judgment was contrary to law; and (3) that there was an error of law at trial that was brought to the attention of the trial court. See Civ.R. 59(A)(6), 59(A)(7), and 59(A)(9).
The decision of whether to grant a motion for a new trial based upon a judgment that is against the manifest weight of the evidence is left to the discretion of the trial court. See Antalv. Olde Worlde Prod., Inc. (1984),
Civ.R. 59(A)(7) allows for a new trial if the judgment was contrary to law. Falgner contends that because violations of motor-vehicle-safety statutes are negligence per se, she was entitled to a new trial on that issue. As we stated earlier in this Opinion, the violation of motor-vehicle-safety statutes, while negligence per se, does not automatically translate into liability for Sucher under the facts of this case. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Falgner's motion on this basis.
Finally, Falgner claims that Civ.R. 59(A)(9) mandated a new trial when the trial court committed an error of law. As we determined in sustaining the second assignment of error, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the presence of ice upon the roadway did not excuse a violation of a motor-vehicle-safety statute. Since the failure to give this instruction was an error of law, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant the new-trial motion. Falgner's fourth assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
Therefore, the judgment is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the law and with this Opinion.
DOAN, J., concurs.
HILDEBRANDT, P.J., dissents.