DocketNumber: No. 38373
Citation Numbers: 385 N.E.2d 1078, 57 Ohio App. 2d 128
Judges: DAY, C. J.
Filed Date: 8/19/1977
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
We granted a writ of habeas corpus in this case to bring the complainant before us for a determination of the continuing legality of his detention in county jail in the light of R. C.
"* * * Reduction of jail sentence.
"The sheriff in charge of a county jail may, upon a consideration of the quality and amount of work done in the kitchen, in the jail offices, and on the jail premises, or elsewhere, allow reductions of inmates' sentences as follows:
"(A) On sentences of ninety days or less, up to three days for each thirty days of sentence;
"(B) On sentences longer than ninety days but not longer than six months, up to four days for each thirty days of sentence;
"(C) On sentences longer than six months, up to five days for each thirty days of sentence.
"The reduction of the inmate's sentence shall become effective only upon the written concurrence of the presiding *Page 129 or sentencing judge or magistrate of the court where the sentence was imposed.
"This section shall in no way restrict any other powers vested in the presiding or sentencing judge or magistrate of the court where the sentence was imposed."
However, the sentencing judge testified at the hearing in this court. On direct and cross-examination it was established that he remembered the details of the crime in question; that he considered the seriousness of the offense; correspondence from the complainant since his incarceration; and his trial notes. There was independent testimony by a representative of the sheriff's office whose responsibility included the processing of the particular "reduction of jail time" recommended in this case. The representative testified she had spoken with the judge after transmittal of the reduction recommendation and that he had indicated he needed some time to think about his course of action.
Our disposition must turn on non-constitutional considerations if there is a basis for deciding the case without reaching the constitutional issues. We do not reach them. Our conclusions are based on our reading of R. C.
This program obviously placed a responsibility on the court which required a factual inquiry to enable the court to develope the information essential to the discharge of its statutory duties. To conclude otherwise would enable uninformed judicial action to negate the legislative purpose.
A hearing is the usual and traditional practice when courts make factual determinations. Clearly, a hearing is the procedure of choice although referees and commissioners are sometimes utilized in particular situations not relevant here.
Although a hearing is the preferable prelude to the discharge of the judicial duty imposed by R. C.
Writ denied.
PARRINO and STILLMAN, JJ., concur. *Page 131