DocketNumber: No. 14-07-09.
Citation Numbers: 2007 Ohio 6427
Judges: WILLAMOWSKI, J.
Filed Date: 12/3/2007
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} On February 3, 2005, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Sommerfield on one count of failure to register as a sexually oriented offender pursuant to 2950.04(E), a felony of the third degree. A jury trial was held in April 2005, but resulted in a mistrial with the trial court dismissing the case after determining the statute with which Sommerfield was charged was void for vagueness. The State appealed the judgment. On March 27, 2006, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court. On January 16 and 17, 2007, a second jury trial was held. On January 18, 2007, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court immediately sentenced Sommerfield to two years imprisonment followed by a five year period of post-release control. Sommerfield appeals from this judgment and raises the following assignments of error.
*Page 3In violation of due process, the guilty verdict was entered against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Instances of prosecutorial misconduct, which occurred throughout the jury trial, deprived [Sommerfield] of his right to a fair trial.
Sommerfield's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender violates due process because R.C.
2950.04 is unconstitutionally vague.The trial court erred in imposing a prison sentence in excess of the minimum, not commensurate with the seriousness of [Sommerfield's] conduct and that deprives him of his
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.
{¶ 3} Sommerfield's first claim is that the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief."
State v. Thompkins (1997),
The fact-finder * * * occupies a superior position in determining credibility. The fact-finder can hear and see as well as observe the body language, evaluate voice inflections, observe hand gestures, perceive the interplay between the witness and the examiner, and watch the witness's reaction to exhibits and the like. Determining credibility from a sterile transcript is a Herculean endeavor. A reviewing court must, therefore, accord *Page 4 due deference to the credibility determinations made by the fact-finder.
State v. Thompson (1998),
{¶ 4} Sommerfield was charged with a violation of R.C.
(A)(1) Each of the following types of offender who * * * has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to, a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense shall register personally with the sheriff of the county within five days of the offender's coming into a county in which the offender resides or temporarily is domiciled for more than five days * * *.
** *
(E) No person who is required to register pursuant to divisions (A) and (B) of this section * * * shall fail to register * * * as required in accordance with those divisions * * *.
R.C.
{¶ 5} A review of the record in this case indicates that several witnesses testified either that Sommerfield was no longer seen at his own house in Delaware County and was rarely seen there after June 2004, or that Sommerfield was seen frequently staying at his fiance's home in Union County. Testimony was given by multiple witnesses that Sommerfield would be there everyday, that he would spend the night and then would sound his truck's horn as he left for work the following day. One neighbor of the Union County residence testified that Sommerfield was always there and that he had indicated that he was staying *Page 5 there since he hurt his back. Tr. 104. He further testified that Sommerfield was at the Union County address seven days a week, that he was there every evening, and that he left between 5:30 a.m. and 5:45 a.m.. Tr. 112. This testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. Tr. 139, 148. Sommerfield's wife testified that "there may have been periods of time where it was five days in a row. Tr. 246. Deputy Golden testified that Sommerfield admitted to spending the night at the Union County residence for five nights a week and that he was there everyday. Tr. 176. Given all of this evidence, this court does not find that the evidence weighs heavily against conviction. Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 6} Next, Sommerfield claims that the instances of prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial. Specifically, Sommerfield claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 1) improperly vouching for the credibility of a witness during closing arguments, 2) by appealing to the jury's emotions by implying that Sommerfield was a pedophile, and 3) by making numerous improper remarks throughout the trial.
*Page 6The applicable standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct "is whether the comments and/or questions by the prosecution were improper, and, if so, whether they prejudiced appellant's substantial rights." * * * However, "the touchstone of analysis is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor." * * * Thus, prosecutorial misconduct will not provide a basis for reversal unless the misconduct can be said to have deprived the appellant of a fair trial based on the entire record."
State v. Brady, 3rd Dist. No. 9-03-27,
{¶ 7} Sommerfield claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the state's witnesses. Tr. Vol II, 98-102, 124. A review of the record indicates that the prosecutor merely mentioned various factors to consider when weighing credibility and then applied those factors to his witnesses. He did not improperly vouch for their credibility. Thus there is no misconduct for these statements.
{¶ 8} Sommerfield next claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by implying that Sommerfield is a pedophile. Specifically, the statements at issue are as follows.
Q. Ma'am, aside from that one incident, is there anything that you did after learning about Mr. Sommerfield's past as far as your children were concerned?
A. They — we just told them that they were not allowed to be outside, you know, alone individually. That they needed to be in pairs and actually to come in if they saw him out in the yard.
Tr. 78-79.
Q. And, sir, ultimately did you learn about Mr. Sommerfield's past?
A. Yes, we did. Sometime between Thanksgiving and Christmas in 2004 Darcy was basically in our house, again, with Elaine *Page 7 talking about how her grandparents had found out about Mr. Sommerfield's background.
Q. And did that concern you?
A. Yes. At that time we didn't know that he was a sex offender. We knew that he had a criminal past and had spent 18 years in prison. So we became concerned and we stopped Elaine from having sleep overs at that house.
Tr. 108
And what did [the witness] tell you? She said I was aware of his record and I have children.
Tr. Vol. II, 102. All of these statements were irrelevant to the case as they did not allege any facts which would help the jury determine whether or not Sommerfield was "residing" in Union County rather than Delaware County. These questions were made to elicit responses which indicated that Sommerfield was a danger to children, a claim that is not supported by the record and is irrelevant to the issue before the jury. Thus, these questions were improper. However, no objection was made to them and they do not rise to the level of plain error.
{¶ 9} Finally, Sommerfield claims the prosecutor engaged in various other forms of misconduct throughout the trial. He claimed that the prosecutor improperly commented on his statement to his family to not say anything to the police. "[I]f there was nothing to hide, why would he say don't talk to them?" Tr. Vol 2, 104. The reason behind Sommerfield's request could have been any *Page 8 number of things, such as a general distrust of the police. Thus, the prosecutor's statement was speculative and improper. However, again, it does not rise to the level of plain error as there is no showing that absent the error, the verdict would be different.
{¶ 10} Although some improper statements and arguments were made, there is no indication in the record that but for those improper statements; the result of the trial would have been different. Thus, there is no plain error. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 11} Sommerfield's third assignment of error claims that his conviction violates due process because R.C.
{¶ 12} To determine whether a statute is void for vagueness, two questions must be considered. First, a criminal statute may be unconstitutionally vague if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." State v.Glover (1984),
{¶ 13} The first question requires a court to determine whether the statute provides adequate notice as to what conduct is prohibited.City of Chicago v. Morales (1999),
[M]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for in most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties. Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid.
Rose v. Locke (1975),
{¶ 14} Sommerfield argues that R.C.
{¶ 15} Since the legislature chose not to provide a specific definition of the term in R.C.
{¶ 16} While both "residence" and "temporary domicile" may have unique and technical definitions in various other contexts, the legislature clearly intended the terms to have their commonly accepted legal meanings when used in R.C
{¶ 17} Sommerfield also claims that R.C.
{¶ 18} More importantly, interpreting the statute to mean "more than five days in a lifetime" is not viable. The statute requires the affirmative act of registering "within five days of coming into thecounty." R.C.
{¶ 19} Based on the foregoing, we find that there is a reasonable and practical construction of the language in R.C.
{¶ 20} Finally, Sommerfield claims that by imposing more than the minimum sentence, without a jury finding is unconstitutional. Sommerfield argues that the use of the sentencing remedy set forth inState v. Foster, *Page 14
{¶ 21} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Union County is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed.
SHAW and PRESTON, JJ., concur.*Page 1