DocketNumber: No. L-87-109
Citation Numbers: 542 N.E.2d 684, 44 Ohio App. 3d 190
Judges: <italic>Per Curiam.</italic>
Filed Date: 3/31/1988
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
This cause is before the court upon appeal of three judgments1 of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. The subject judgments affirm three decisions by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (the "board") that, in turn, affirm several decisions on reconsideration by appellee, the Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (the "administrator"). The administrator's decisions found that appellees-claimants, Robert L. Gardner, Daniel G. Sisler, Fred Gose, Duncan Main and sixty-seven others (the "claimants"), refused with good cause an offer of work with appellant, A.P. Parts Company, and allowed the respective claims for unemployment compensation benefits.2 The pertinent facts are as follows.
In March 1984, appellant employed claimants and its other employees at its Matzinger Road Plant in Toledo under the terms of a labor-management agreement executed by appellant and the employees' collective bargaining representative, UAW Local 14 (the "union"). The labor-management contract expired on March 3, 1984, before the union and appellant could agree upon a successor agreement. Following a short strike, the union unconditionally offered on March 5, 1984, to return to work. Appellant responded on the same date by unilaterally implementing the terms of its last contract proposal. The claimants and appellant's other employees returned to their jobs on March 7, 1984. The claimants continued to work until they were separated from employment through a series of layoffs occurring on March 9, 20, and 23, 1984. The layoffs were due to lack of work and were to last indefinitely. Thereafter, the administrator granted unemployment compensation benefits to the claimants. Appellant did not object to these initial grants. On May 2, 1984, appellant's remaining employees walked off their jobs and commenced a strike. In response, appellant contacted the claimants by certified mail, offering work at those jobs vacated by the striking employees. The claimants refused these offers of work.
Notwithstanding these refusals, *Page 192
the administrator granted the claimants' applications for continued unemployment compensation benefits. The administrator's decisions allowing these claims held that R.C.
"Section
"The facts show claimant was offered work by the AP Parts Company on May 3, 1984. The claimant refused the offer of employment because a labor dispute was in existence at the employer's plant.
"In consideration of all the facts, it is concluded that the claimant's health, safety, and morals would have been subject to a considerable degree of risk by accepting such job offer. Under these circumstances it cannot be held claimant refused an offer of suitable work."
Pursuant to R.C.
The board's jurisdiction to review is governed by R.C.
"The material facts in the cases herein are not in dispute. Claimants herein were employees of the Company who were on layoff status with the Company due to a lack of work. While on layoff, the remaining employees still working at the Company went out on strike. After the strike started, the Company recalled the claimants to the jobs which had been vacated by the striking workers. The hours, wages, and other terms and conditions of employment were to be the same as they had been for laid off workers at the time they were laid off. The claimants herein refused the recalls. The question for the Board of Review to decide is a matter of law and involves the interpretation and applications of Sections
The board's decisions affirmed in toto virtually every administrator's *Page 193 decision on reconsideration.3 In affirming the administrator's decisions, the board found that:
"The facts set forth * * * clearly show that the work offered to the claimants herein was work which was vacant due to a strike, and the work offered under those circumstances is not suitable work within the meaning of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Law. Claimants therefore had good cause for refusing the offers of work and, thus, there is no disqualification called for under division (D) of Section
Pursuant to R.C.
The trial court's jurisdiction to review is governed by R.C.
"[E]mployees who are laid off indefinitely for lack of work, but who are recalled solely to fill vacancies created by striking employees, may refuse such recalls because the offered work is unsuitable. The recall is an offer of `new work [* * *] vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute.' R.C.
"Our interpretation of `new work' as used in R.C.
"In the case sub judice, the Board of Review determined that appellees were laid off indefinitely due to lack of work and that they were recalled to jobs which had been vacated by the striking employees. Further, the Board determined that the appellees refused the recall because it was an offer of new work vacant due to a strike and therefore unsuitable. Based on the applicable case law, the Board's finding is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the Board of Review's decision[s] must be affirmed."
Appellant timely appealed.
Appellant raises the following assignment of error:
"The trial court erred when it affirmed the grant of unemployment compensation to appellees because appellees, recalled to work by their base employer, were not recalled to `new work'; and their refusals to work due to a labor dispute, other than a lockout, disqualified them from receiving unemployment compensation." *Page 194
For the following reasons, we find this assignment of error not well-taken.
The trial court supported its holdings in the instant cases with its application of R.C.
"(E) No individual otherwise qualified to receive benefits shall lose the right to benefits by reason of a refusal to acceptnew work if:
"* * *
"(2) The position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant's assignment of error essentially contends that the trial court's application of R.C.
However, we find that Holmes is inapposite. The pertinent facts of Holmes are summarized in its introductory sentence, which states:
"The question here presented is whether an employee may voluntarily quit work continuously available to him by his employer in Ohio, move to a distant state where he accepts employment and later becomes unemployed, refuse work for which he is reasonably fitted and offered him in good faith by his former Ohio employer, on the ground that the offer of such employment is an offer of new work not suitable because of its distance from the employee's present residence, and at the same time qualify himself to collect unemployment benefits as to such former Ohio employer." Id. at 413, 40 Ohio Op. at 406,
The facts in the case sub judice are patently dissimilar. The claimants in the instant case did not voluntarily quit work; they were involuntarily laid off for lack of work. The work was not continuously available. Instead, it became available only after the commencement of a labor dispute. Finally, the claimants herein did not accept employment in a foreign state and then seek unemployment benefits from Ohio as the liable state. Therefore, the law of the case in Holmes, supra, is based on facts wholly distinguishable from those of the instant case. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule in Ohio that, exclusive of per curiam
opinions, the Supreme Court speaks as a court only through the syllabi of its cases. Ohio v. Gallagher (1976),
Appellant directs this court's attention to the cases of other jurisdictions supporting its interpretation of "new work." Several jurisdictions generally hold that an offer of employment made by the base employer to a laid-off base employee is not an offer of "new work" when the offer is motivated by a labor dispute. Merryman v. Admr., Unemployment Comp. Act *Page 195
(1962),
Our review of the cases finds that the authority relied upon by the trial court conflicts with that relied upon by appellant, negating its persuasiveness. Furthermore, a careful review of our previous decisions for cases arising from the same labor dispute underlying the instant case reveals that they are distinguishable and, therefore, not determinative.5 However, this impasse does not preclude resolution of the instant case because we do not agree with appellant's assertion that the "interpretation of `new work' as found in R.C.
Determining "[w]hether work is `suitable work' within the meaning of Section
In reviewing the subject findings, "the jurisdiction of the [trial court] was limited to a finding of whether the decision of the board of review was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence." MacMillian v. UnemploymentComp. Bd. of Review (1983),
When claimants who are receiving unemployment benefits due to lack of work are offered work by the base period employer to replace striking employees, is it unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence for the board either to determine that the work offered is "unsuitable," or to conclude that such offers were refused with "good cause"?
Appellant urges this court to hold that the board's findings are unlawful under the authority of Holmes, supra. We find the inappositeness of Holmes precludes this conclusion. Appellant further contends that the case law it cites from several other states supports the finding of unlawfulness. However, we find that the persuasiveness of these cases is vitiated by those cases cited in the decision of the trial court. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that the subject findings by the board were unlawful. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court's holding that the board's findings were not unlawful.
Our review now requires this court to address the determination made by the trial court that the board's decisions were neither unreasonable nor against the manifest weight of the evidence. Our role in reviewing this determination is to ascertain whether the trial court abused its discretion. Angelkovski, supra, at 161, 11 OBR at 243,
On consideration whereof, this court finds substantial justice has been done the party complaining, and the judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed. It is ordered that appellant pay the court costs of this appeal.
Judgments affirmed.
CONNORS, HANDWORK and GLASSER, JJ., concur.