DocketNumber: No. 8-08-29.
Citation Numbers: 2009 Ohio 1834
Judges: ROGERS, J.
Filed Date: 4/20/2009
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
{¶ 2} In November 2000, Downing was convicted of one count of corruption of a minor in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} In November 2007, Downing received notification from the Ohio Attorney General that he was being reclassified from a sexually oriented offender to a Tier II sex offender based upon the newly enacted law contained in R.C.
{¶ 4} In January 2008, Downing filed a petition in the trial court to contest the application of S.B. 10, arguing that his reclassification under the act violated various provisions under the United States and Ohio Constitutions, including the Ex Post Facto Clause, the prohibition on retroactive laws, the separation of powers doctrine, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Due Process Clause, as he committed his offense and was sentenced prior to the adoption of S.B. 10. Additionally, Downing argued that he could not be subject to a community notification requirement under S.B. 10 because he was not subject to a community notification requirement under prior law, as provided by R.C.
{¶ 5} In August 2008, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition, in which it upheld Downing's reclassification under S.B. 10, finding there to be no constitutional violations pursuant to this Court's decision in In re Smith, 3d Dist. No. 1-07-58,
{¶ 6} It is from this judgment that Downing appeals, presenting the following assignment of error for our review.
*Page 4THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF OHIO'S AWA CONSTITUTIONAL.
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, Downing argues that trial court erred in finding his reclassification as a Tier II sex offender under S.B. 10 to be constitutional. Specifically, he contends that applying S.B. 10 to reclassify him when he committed the offense prior to the adoption of S.B. 10 violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws under the United States Constitution, the prohibition on retroactive laws under the Ohio Constitution, the separation of powers doctrine under the Ohio Constitution, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, and his due process rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Furthermore, Downing also contends that if S.B. 10 can be constitutionally applied to reclassify him, he cannot be subject to a community notification requirement, as he was not subject to a community notification requirement under prior law, and R.C.
{¶ 8} "An enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible." State ex rel.Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955),
{¶ 9} S.B. 10 was enacted in June 2007, with an effective date of January 1, 2008, and amended the sexual offender classification system found in former R.C.
{¶ 10} In contrast, S.B. 10 requires the trial court to designate the offender as either a Tier I, II, or III sex offender. R.C.
(F) "Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender" means any of the following:
(1) A sex offender who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, has been convicted of, or has pleaded guilty to any of the following sexually oriented offenses:
* * *
(b) A violation of section
2907.04 of the Revised Code when the offender is at least four years older than the other person with whom the offender engaged in sexual conduct, or when the offender is less than four years older than the other person with whom the offender engaged in sexual conduct and the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section2907.02 ,2907.03 , or2907.04 of the Revised Code or former section2907.12 of the Revised Code;
R.C.
{¶ 11} For those sexual offenders classified under former R.C.
(A)(1) At any time on or after July 1, 2007, and not later than December 1, 2007, the attorney general shall determine for each offender or delinquent child who prior to December 1, 2007, has registered a residence, school, institution of higher education, or place of employment address pursuant to section
2950.04 ,2950.041 , or2950.05 of the Revised Code the offender's or delinquent child's new classification as a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender under Chapter2950 . of the Revised Code as it will exist under the changes that will be implemented on January 1, 2008, [and] the offender's or delinquent child's duties under Chapter2950 . of the Revised Code as so changed * * *.(2) At any time on or after July 1, 2007, and not later than December 1, 2007, the attorney general shall send to each offender or delinquent child who prior to December 1, 2007, has *Page 7 registered a residence, school, institution of higher education, or place of employment address pursuant to section
2950.04 ,2950.041 , or2950.05 of the Revised Code a registered letter that contains the information described in this division.* * *
(E) An offender or delinquent child who is in a category described in division (A)(2) or (B) of this section may request as a matter of right a court hearing to contest the application to the offender or delinquent child of the new registration requirements under Chapter
2950 . of the Revised Code as it will exist under the changes that will be implemented on January 1, 2008.
R.C.
{¶ 12} Additionally, R.C.
No person who has been convicted of, is convicted of, has pleaded guilty to, or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense shall establish a residence or occupy residential premises within one thousand feet of any school premises or preschool or child day-care center premises.
{¶ 13} In order to challenge the residency restriction of R.C.
{¶ 14} This Court in Smith,
{¶ 15} Here, just as in Smith, Downing challenges the constitutionality of the retroactive application of S.B. 10 to reclassify him as a Tier II sex offender. However, as this Court has found that the retroactive application of S.B. 10 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the prohibition against retroactive laws, and the separation of powers doctrine under the United States and Ohio Constitutions, we are bound by the principle of stare decisis to our prior decision. See In re Copeland, 3d Dist. No. 1-08-40,
{¶ 16} Moreover, we find that Downing does not have standing to claim that S.B. 10's residency restriction violates his substantive due process rights to live in a location of his choosing, as he has failed to assert an actual deprivation of his due process right by claiming that he is currently in violation of that residency restriction or that he has been forced to move from an area due to his close proximity to a school. *Page 10
{¶ 17} Finally, we find to be moot Downing's argument that he cannot be subject to the community notification requirement because he was not subject to the requirement under prior law, as provided in R.C.
{¶ 18} Accordingly, we overrule Downing's assignment of error.
{¶ 19} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed. PRESTON, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.