DocketNumber: No. 05AP-582.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 2537
Judges: FRENCH, J.
Filed Date: 5/23/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} This court referred this matter to a magistrate pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that this court deny the requested writ. (Attached as Appendix A.) Relator filed objections to the magistrate's decision. In those objections, he essentially reargues some of the same issues he presented to the magistrate: (1) relator's injuries occurred in a "workshop" and the employer had notice that an accident involving a portable conveyor is a violation of Ohio Adm. Code
{¶ 3} Relator also objects to the magistrate's failure to address, or the magistrate's implicit rejection of, relator's argument that the commission should not have exercised continuing jurisdiction in this matter. While the magisate did not address this issue, we find that the commission properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction authority in this case. State ex rel.Gobich v. Indus. Comm.,
{¶ 4} For these reasons, we overrule relator's objections to the magistrate's decision. Having made our own review of the evidence and legal issues presented, and finding no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, this court adopts the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in it. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, the requested writ is denied.
Objections overruled, writ of mandamus denied.
Petree and Sadler, JJ., concur.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
Habash, Reasoner Frazier, and Stephen J. Habash, for respondent MBM Corporation (formerly First American Carriers, Inc.)
IN MANDAMUS
{¶ 5} Relator, Robert A. Boltenhouse, has filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its order exercising its continuing jurisdiction and ultimately denying relator's application for a violation of a specific safety requirement ("VSSR"). Relator requests a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to find that he is entitled to an additional award for the VSSR.
Findings of Fact:
{¶ 6} 1. Relator sustained his injuries on May 24, 2001. At the time, relator was driving a truck for First American Carriers, Inc. ("employer"), delivering food to various restaurants throughout the midwestern states. At the time of his injury, relator had been unloading product from his truck to a Red Lobster restaurant in Cincinnati, Ohio. Relator was utilizing a conveyor roller ramp, which utilized gravity to move the product from the truck to the dock area outside the restaurant. One end of the roller ramp rested on the back of the truck while the other end rested on the dock. There were portable stands supporting the weight of the conveyor roller ramp along the route between the truck and dock. At the time his injuries occurred, the conveyor roller ramp had begun to tilt and relator caught the weight of it and incurred his injuries. Relator's claim has been allowed for "contusion of back, coccyx; sprain of neck; sprain thoracic region; sprain lumbar region."
{¶ 7} 2. On May 7, 2003, relator filed an application for an additional award for a VSSR, alleging that his injuries occurred as a result of the employer's failure to securely fasten the conveyor roller ramp to the truck and its bases as required by Ohio Adm. Code
{¶ 8} 3. Relator's application was heard before a staff hearing officer ("SHO") on August 25, 2004. The SHO concluded that the employer had violated Ohio Adm. Code
The Staff Hearing Officer has considered the employer's argument that O.A.C. 4121:1-5-05 WORKSHOPS AND FACTORIES does not apply to the factual situation herein (i.e. being outside an enclosed site) and finds it unpersuasive.
{¶ 9} 4. The employer filed a request for rehearing, which was denied by order of the commission mailed December 4, 2004, because the employer had failed to submit new and relevant evidence and failed to show that the August 25, 2004 order was based on an obvious mistake of fact or on a clear mistake of law.
{¶ 10} 5. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for reconsideration, which was ultimately granted by the commission. The commission determined that the August 25, 2004 order contained a clear mistake of law as follows:
* * * The Staff Hearing Officer decision dated 08/25/2004 contains a clear mistake of law in that the Staff Hearing Officer failed to follow the law set forth in State ex rel. Bu[u]rmaFarms, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1994),
The injured worker was a truck driver who was making a delivery of boxed food items to a restaurant. He was outdoors in a customer parking lot adjacent to the restaurant, and in the process of unloading the truck, when a gravity conveyor tipped over and fell on him. The parking lot was not fenced in, or enclosed in any manner. The injured work alleged a violation under Ohio Adm. Code
The injured worker does not fall under the exception in Stateex rel. Petrie v. Atlas Iron Processors, Inc. (1999),
In conclusion, the Commission denies the injured worker's application for violation of a specific safety requirement, filed 05/07/2003, as the injured work was not working in a workshop when injured. There has been no allegation that the injured worker was working in a factory when injured.
{¶ 11} 6. Thereafter, relator filed the instant mandamus action in this court.
Conclusions of Law:
{¶ 12} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a determination of the commission, relator must show a clear legal right to the relief sought and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief. Stateex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967),
{¶ 13} In regard to an application for an additional award for a VSSR, relator must establish an applicable and specific safety requirement exists, which was in effect at the time of the injury, that the employer failed to comply with the requirement, and that the failure to comply was the cause of the injury in question. State ex rel. Trydle v. Indus. Comm. (1972),
{¶ 14} Relator contends that the commission abused its discretion by interpreting Ohio Adm. Code
{¶ 15} Ohio Adm. Code
(E) Anchoring and mounting of machinery.
(1) Stationary machinery.
* * *
(2) Portable machinery.
Portable machinery mounted upon trucks or bases shall be securely fastened thereto, and such truck or base shall be so locked or blocked as to prevent movement or shift while such machine is in operation.
{¶ 16} Ohio Adm. Code Chapter 4121:1-5 is entitled "Specific Safety Requirements for Workshops and Factories."
{¶ 17} In the present case, the commission determined that the reference code section was not applicable because the portable roller conveyor was not used, and the injuries did not occur, inside a workshop or factory. In State ex rel. BuurmaFarms, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1994),
"* * * The [Franklin County Appellate] Court in State ex rel.York Temple Country Club v. Industrial Commission of Ohio [(Apr. 18, 1985), Franklin App. No. 84AP-818, unreported] relied on Black's Law Dictionary to find [that a `workshop' is] `* * * a room or place where power driven machinery is employed and manual labor is exercised by way of trade for gain or otherwise.' TheLocation of claimant's accident was in a place, a 3 sided building with a permanent roof, concrete floor and ceiling light fixtures where power driven machinery was employed. Essentially the court was looking toward an enclosure in which the accident occurred. [Ohio Adm. Code Chapter] 4121:1-5 further applies here because the nature of claimant's employment was not in an open boundless field, but within specific boundaries of a fixedbuilding which contained a conveyor to pack and load productswhich were the end result of farm labors." (Emphasis added.) * * *
Buurma Farms, at 112. On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, that court held as follows:
"* * * The specific requirements of this code are requirements upon an employer for the protection of such employer's employees and no others and apply to all workshops and factories subject to the Workers' Compensation Act * * *."
In alleging specific safety requirement inapplicability, appellant asserts that a farm is neither a workshop nor a factory. Appellant, however, misinterprets the commission's decision. The commission, contrary to appellant's representation, did not broadly rule that appellant's farm was a "workshop." It found that the farm contained a particular building that was a "workshop." Limiting our review to this narrower finding, we discern no abuse of discretion.
"Workshop" has not been defined statutorily, administratively or judicially by this court. As such, it must "be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage." R.C.
"Within Workmen's Compensation Acts, a room or place wherein power-driven machinery is employed and manual labor is exercised by way of trade for gain or otherwise."
Appellant does not dispute that claimant worked in a room where power-driven machinery was used and manual labor was "exercised by way of trade for gain * * *." The commission, therefore, properly found that claimant was injured in a workshop.
(Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 18} In State ex rel. Waugh v. Indus. Comm. (1997),
"In Buurma Farms, * * * [
As the court of appeals observed, we have defined "workshop" as "`a room or place wherein power-driven machinery is employed and manual labor is exercised by way of trade for gain or otherwise.'" Buurma Farms, supra. Waugh contends that Ohio Adm. Code Chapter 4121:1-5 also applies to workplaces without structural boundaries by seizing on the "room or place" language. Since this language is in the disjunctive, he argues that the definition transcends boundaries, extending to any
place where the requisite machinery and labor are in use. This expansive interpretation makes sense, he insists, because other sections within the chapter, specifically Ohio Adm. Code
We disagree. Our definition refers to a place where in the relevant power machinery and manual labor is employed, not where at these activities occur. The court of appeals in Stateex rel. York Temple Country Club, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (Apr. 18, 1985), Franklin App. 84AP-818, unreported, recognized this small but significant distinction and, adopting its referee's reasoning, concurred that "the `shop' portion of `workshop' connotes some form of enclosure." The York court therefore concluded that a claimant's injury by an errant golf ball while working at a golf course driving range had not occurred in a workshop. We find this logic compelling, as is manifest from our decisions in Buurma Farms, Weirs Farms, and State ex rel.Double v. Indus. Comm. (1992),
In the face of this logic, we cannot transform the accepted meaning of workshop to account for provisions in Ohio Adm. Code Chapter 4121:1-5 that seemingly regulate outdoor activity. Our admonition in Double at 16-17,
"A VSSR is an employer penalty and must be strictly construed in the employer's favor. [Citation omitted.] It must also be specific enough to `"plainly * * * apprise an employer of his legal obligations to his employees."' State ex rel. Frank Brown Sons, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1988),
(Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 19} Relator points to the court's decision in State exrel. Parks v. Indus. Comm. (1999),
(E) Approach distances to exposed energized conductors and equipment.
(1) The requirements of this paragraph apply only to the electric utility and clearance tree-trimming industries.
(2) No employee shall be required to approach or take any conductive object closer to any electrically energized power conductors and equipment than prescribed in table 4121:1-5-23(E) to this rule unless:
(a) The employee is insulated or guarded from the energized parts (insulating gloves rated for the voltage involved shall be considered adequate insulation); or
(b) The energized parts are insulated or guarded from the employee and any other conductive object at a different potential; or
(c) The power conductors and equipment are deenergized and grounded.
{¶ 20} In Parks, the court found an exception to the requirement that this code section only applies to workshops and factories because, by its very language, Ohio Adm. Code
{¶ 21} Relator argues that his job takes him outside to make deliveries every day and that, from the code's use of the word "portable" in Ohio Adm. Code
{¶ 22} First, relator places his focus on his job duties while the code focuses on the place wherein the machinery is used. Second, even if, arguably, some portable machinery can and does leave the confines of a workshop/factory, machinery does not automatically leave the confines of a workshop/factory simply because it is portable and can be moved.
{¶ 23} The magistrate finds that the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that relator's injuries did not occur within a workshop or factory and that the cited provision does not apply. This case does not present a reason to find an exception to the "workshop" requirement as was found in Parks. Furthermore, the magistrate finds that the commission did not abuse its discretion by refusing to create another exception to the "workshop" requirement, as the court created in Parks. While relator is correct to assert that it would be prudent to secure the roller conveyor at the truck, the dock, and the stands upon which it rests, these particular cited code provisions do not apply. As stated previously, a violation can only be found where there is an applicable and specific safety requirement in existence that applied and, because a VSSR award is a penalty, all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be construed against its applicability to the employer. The VSSR provisions of the Ohio Administrative Code serve to put employers on notice. In the present case, because the code provisions apply to factories and workshops, the instant employer would not have been on notice that the failure to secure this portable roller conveyor would result in the violation of a VSSR and a financial penalty to the employer. As such, the magistrate finds the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that the code provision did not apply and in denying relator's application for an additional award for the violation of a specific safety requirement, and relator's request for a writ of mandamus should be denied.
/s/ Stephanie Bisca Brooks STEPHANIE BISCA BROOKS MAGISTRATE