DocketNumber: C.A. No. 03CA008319.
Citation Numbers: 2004 Ohio 1612
Judges: BETH WHITMORE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/31/2004
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 3} Almost three years after Colonial commenced suit in Lorain County, Pruitt filed a counter-claim in Lorain County against Colonial. His counter-claim asked the trial court to order Colonial, as the successor in interest to Endura, to indemnify and reimburse him for the attorney's fees he incurred when he unsuccessfully defended himself against Colonial in the Florida litigation. Pruitt based his counter-claim on a purported indemnification agreement he entered into with Horne when he sold his interest in Endura to Horne.2
{¶ 4} Colonial's complaint and Pruitt's counter-claim were tried to the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas on June 4, 2003. On July 14, 2003, the trial court granted judgment for Pruitt on Colonial's complaint and for Colonial on Pruitt's counter-claim. Colonial timely appealed the trial court's decision to this Court, and Pruitt cross-appealed asserting one assignment of error. Colonial's appeal was dismissed on November 20, 2003, because of its failure to file an appellate brief.3 As such, this Court shall only address the assignment of error raised in Pruitt's cross-appeal.
{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, Pruitt has argued that the trial court's decision to deny his counter-claim for the indemnification and reimbursement of attorney's fees was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Pruitt has argued that pursuant to the purported indemnification agreement he entered into with Endura, Colonial, as the successor in interest to Endura, should indemnify and reimburse him for the attorney's fees he incurred when he unsuccessfully defended himself in the Florida litigation. We disagree.
{¶ 6} Pruitt's claim of indemnification is based on a purported indemnification agreement that was signed by Horne on behalf of Endura when Pruitt sold his one half interest of Endura to Horne. The purported indemnification agreement stated:
"Pursuant to the authority of Florida Statutes Chapter 607, the undersigned, being all of the Directors of [Endura], do hereby take the following action in writing without a meeting:
"Resolved: The undersigned do hereby approve and ratify all acts of [Pruitt] in his capacity as an Officer and/or Director of [Endura] and further agree to indemnify such Officer and Director and hold him harmless for costs, expenses, judgments, decrees, fines, and penalties which may arise out of his activities as Director and/or Officer of [Endura]."
{¶ 7} An identical agreement was executed by Horne in his capacity as the sole additional shareholder of Endura. Both documents were signed by Horne on March 22, 1989.
{¶ 8} This Court must first determine whether to apply Ohio law or Florida law to the instant appeal. "It is elementary that the law of the place where a contract is made enters into and becomes a part of the contract, and that the contract must be construed as though the law were written out in full therein."Garlick v. McFarland (1953),
{¶ 9} Fla. Stat. § 607.0850, entitled "Indemnification of officers, directors, employees, and agents[,]" states that a corporation can indemnify its officers, directors, employees, or agents against reasonable expenses incurred during legal proceedings. Fla. Stat. § 607.0850(2). The statute expressly prohibits indemnification of a director, officer, employee, or agent if:
"(7) * * * [A] judgment or other final adjudication establishes that his or her actions * * * were material to the cause of action so adjudicated and constitute:
"* * *
"(d) Willful misconduct or a conscious disregard for the best interests of the corporation in a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor * * *." Fla. Stat. § 607.0850(7)(d).
{¶ 10} Pruitt has argued that because he had a valid indemnification agreement with Endura, he was entitled to indemnification and reimbursement of the attorney's fees he incurred when he unsuccessfully defended himself against Colonial in the Florida litigation, even though a jury found him guilty of breaching his fiduciary duty to Endura.
{¶ 11} Our careful review of the record indicates that Pruitt was the first witness called to testify at trial, and that he first testified on cross-examination for Colonial, then later testified on direct examination in his own defense. Pruitt presented the following sworn testimony on cross-examination:
"[Colonial:] Mr. Pruitt, in 1996, did the jury in the Federal Court in Miami, Florida[,] find that you were liable to Colonial * * * in the amount of $150,000?
"[Pruitt:] Yes.
"[Colonial:] And they found that you were liable on the * * * basis of a breach of fiduciary obligations that you owed to Endura; is that correct?
"[Pruitt:] It was a single count, breach of fiduciary duty."
{¶ 12} Later at trial, Pruitt presented the following testimony on direct examination:
"[Pruitt's Attorney]: And your counter claim is for what Mr. Pruitt?
"[Pruitt:] * * * [I]t's records of attorney's expenses, traveling expenses, document expenses and some — some amount of time that I had to have when I thought I shouldn't have, but it's expenses related to defending myself."
{¶ 13} This Court will not disturb the judgment of a trial court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence so long as the judgment is supported by "some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case."Complete Gen. Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (2002),
{¶ 14} We find that Pruitt's sworn testimony was competent, credible evidence that he engaged in willful misconduct while he was the owner and operator of Endura. Assuming without deciding that the indemnification agreement signed by Horne constituted a valid contract, based on his own testimony, Pruitt cannot be indemnified for the attorney's fees he incurred in the Florida litigation because to do so would essentially indemnify him for his own willful misconduct, which is expressly prohibited pursuant to Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 607.0850(7)(d). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court's decision denying Pruitt's counter-claim seeking indemnification and reimbursement of attorney's fees was based on competent, credible evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Pruitt's assignment of error lacks merit.
Judgment affirmed.
Carr, P.J. Batchelder, J. Concur,