DocketNumber: No. 12095
Citation Numbers: 504 N.E.2d 1147, 29 Ohio App. 3d 213
Judges: MAHONEY, J.
Filed Date: 12/4/1985
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
Appellant, Mary Redle, challenges an order of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, establishing the existence of a father and child relationship between appellee, Deane Van Pham, and Martin John Redle, born to Mary Redle on July 12, 1984. We affirm.
The record suggests that following this incident, Redle continued to work for Van Pham, see him socially, and even had sexual relations with him at his apartment on the day her pregnancy was confirmed. Redle, furthermore, made no complaint as to the crime of rape until after the child was born.
On July 24, 1984, Van Pham instituted paternity proceedings pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3111, claiming himself to be Martin's biological father. Redle filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for *Page 214
lack of personal jurisdiction under R.C.
The court overruled Redle's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that its sole responsibility in a paternity proceeding is to determine the existence of a parent and child relationship. The court found no statute or law precluding the finding of such relationship in the event the sexual intercourse occurred by force. The court then found pursuant to R.C.
In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court should have granted her motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. She contends that the trial court erred in finding that consent to sexual intercourse is irrelevant to the grant of personal jurisdiction under R.C.
"A person who has sexual intercourse in this state submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to an action brought under this chapter with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse. In addition to any other method provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure, personal jurisdiction may be acquired by personal service of summons outside this state or by certified mail with proof of actual receipt."
We find no case law in Ohio to support appellant's proposition that in order for a court to acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a paternity proceeding, the defendant must have consented to the act of sexual intercourse.
We believe Redle misconstrues the purpose of R.C.
Additionally, R.C.
"III. The court erred in refusing, over defendant's objection, to allow the testimony of witnesses in defendant's behalf."
Initially, Redle argues that the trial court violated Civ. R. 32 by reviewing her deposition prior to the hearing. This review, she contends, deprived her of the opportunity to object to the deposition's admissibility into evidence at trial. Civ. R. 32(B) provides in relevant part: *Page 215
"Objections to admissibility. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (D)(3) of this rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and testifying. Upon the motion of a party, or upon its own initiative, the court shall decide such objections before the deposition is read in evidence."
The Franklin County Court of Appeals, in Standard Oil Co. v.Landmark Farm Co-Op (1976),
Second, Redle contends that the trial court erred not only in restricting the scope of her testimony, but also in refusing to allow others to testify in her behalf. Such exclusion, she argues, prejudiced her by preventing her from demonstrating that the sexual intercourse between the parties was forced rather than consensual.
Evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence is relevant and therefore admissible. Evid. R. 401 and 402. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to decide what evidence is relevant and will assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue. State v. Williams (1983),
To establish personal jurisdiction over the appellant under R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
QUILLIN, J., concurs.
GEORGE, J., concurs in judgment only.