DocketNumber: NO. 73085
Judges: TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.:
Filed Date: 1/14/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Defendant-appellant Alvin W. Lasher appeals his conviction in the Garfield Heights Municipal Court for importuning, in violation of R.C.
The record and the agreed statement of the evidence reflect that on April 29, 1997, Sergeant Mark Carney, a Ranger with the Cleveland Metroparks Ranger Department, was working as an undercover officer in the Meadows Picnic Area, a public recreation area that is part of the Cleveland Metroparks. Sergeant Carney was aware of vice activity in the Meadows Picnic Area and his duty that day was to detect any such activity in the area. Sergeant Carney was accompanied by Officer Gary Pace of the Cuyahoga Valley National Park Service.
Sergeant Carney testified that as he drove into the Meadows Picnic Area parking lot, he observed appellant, dressed in a suit, trench coat and hat and standing next to a Buick Skylark, write something on a piece of paper and hand it to the driver of the car, who then drove away.
Sergeant Carney then observed appellant walk to the men's room, enter and peer out onto the parking lot through lattice vents in the men's room. After a minute or two, Sergeant Carney entered the men's room, where he saw appellant, fully dressed, sitting on the toilet and smiling. Sergeant Carney said "hello" to appellant and walked to the urinal immediately adjacent to the toilet where appellant was sitting.
The urinal and toilet were separated by a partition. Sergeant Carney testified that there was a "glory" hole in the partition, which he described as a hole punched in the partition so that men can engage in sexual activity.
According to Sergeant Carney, he was too upset to urinate because he observed appellant watching him through the "glory" hole in the wall. Sergeant Carney then asked appellant, "What are you looking for?" Appellant replied that he would like to "suck" him. When Carney replied, "Excuse me," appellant repeated his comment.
Officer Pace, acting as back-up to Sergeant Carney, listened to the conversation between Carney and appellant via a body wire worn by Sergeant Carney and verified Carney's version of the conversation at trial.
Sergeant Carney testified that he was so offended by appellant's solicitations that he immediately wanted to hit him. Carney testified that appellant's solicitations were "fighting words" to him and that if he had been off duty, he certainly would have struck appellant. Sergeant Carney also testified that appellant's solicitations especially angered him because they occurred in a park frequented by children and families and that, in his opinion, appellant was reckless in soliciting him.
Sergeant Carney then identified himself as a police officer and informed appellant that he was under arrest. Appellant was issued a misdemeanor citation charging him with the offense of importuning, in violation of R.C.
No person shall solicit a person of the same sex to engage in sexual activity with the offender, when the offender knows such solicitation is offensive to the other person, or is reckless in that regard.
On July 3, 1997, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that R.C.
On August 25, 1997, appellant was sentenced to a six-month jail term and a $1,000 fine. Execution of the sentence was stayed pending appeal.
Appellant timely appeals his conviction, assigning three assignments of error for our review:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT-DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE PREMISE THAT OHIO REVISED CODE §
2907.07 (B) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THEFIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLEI , SECTION11 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO.II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT-DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE PREMISE THAT OHIO REVISED CODE §
2907.07 (B) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THEFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLEI , SECTION2 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO.III. THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A TRIER OF FACT COULD REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF IMPORTUNING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because R.C.
Appellant concedes that in State v. Phipps (1979),
The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statute by reasoning that although R.C.
Appellant does not argue that Phipps was wrongly decided. Rather, he asserts that even assuming the analysis in Phipps
was constitutionally sound at the time it was decided, the rationale for the Phipps decision has been invalidated by a subsequent interpretation of the
Plaintiff-appellee argues, however, that R.A.V. is not applicable to this case. Appellee contends that R.C.
Decisions of a court of last resort are to be regarded as law and should be followed by inferior courts, whatever the view of the latter may be as to their correctness, until they have been reversed or overruled. Krause v. State (1972),
In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss because R.C.
Homosexuals are not a suspect class, see Equality Foundationof Greater Cincinnati, Inc., et al. v. City of Cincinnati
(C.A.6, 1995); and, therefore, appellant's equal protection argument regarding R.C.
According to the Committee Comment to R.C.
Appellant cites State v. Perrin (1991),
In Faulk, the Hamilton County Court of Appeals held R.C.
Appellant presents well-reasoned and persuasive arguments addressing the viability of R.C.
We are "bound by and must follow decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court." Victoria Mortgage Corp. v. Williams (Apr. 25, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 68012, unreported, quoting Thacker v.Bd. Of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (1971),
In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his conviction. Specifically, appellant asserts that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that appellant's conduct amounted to "fighting words," or that his conduct was reckless.2
A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of production at trial. State ex rel. v.Crawford (1997),
" 'Fighting words' are those 'which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Phipps, supra at 278, quoting Chaplinsky v. NewHampshire (1942),
Here, the evidence is just not sufficient to support a conclusion that appellant's words tended to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Sergeant Carney is a police officer and trained to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average person, especially in this factual scenario where he is acting as a decoy in hopes of eliciting a solicitation. Accordingly, there was no real likelihood that Sergeant Carney would react violently to appellant's words. The likelihood that, in these circumstances, appellant's words would incite the average person to immediate violence is similarly remote. When Sergeant Carney entered the restroom, appellant was fully clothed and sitting in a stall. At no time did he ever approach Sergeant Carney or make any physical move toward him. By his own description of the restroom layout, Sergeant Carney could have exited the restroom at any time without incident. Moreover, appellant merely told Sergeant Carney what he wanted to do to him; he did not ask Carney to perform any act. Under these circumstances and on this evidence, we conclude that although appellant's words may well have been inappropriate, annoying and even offensive, nonetheless, they did not rise to the level of fighting words.
There is similarly insufficient evidence in the record to establish that appellant was reckless in his solicitation of Sergeant Carney. It was Sergeant Carney who initiated the conversation with appellant and who asked appellant to repeat his comment to him. Thus, we are unable to conclude that appellant acted with heedless indifference to the consequences that his solicitation would be offensive.
Appellant's third assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Garfield Heights Municipal Court is reversed and defendant is discharged.
This cause is reversed for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee his costs herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_______________________________ TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE JUDGE
KARPINSKI, J., CONCURS;
DYKE, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, S.Ct. Prac.R. II, Section 2(A) (1).