DocketNumber: No. 1493
Citation Numbers: 284 N.E.2d 188, 30 Ohio App. 2d 183
Judges: GUERNSEY, J.
Filed Date: 6/14/1972
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
On March 25, 1966, Mariann Colby, who had been tried for murder in the first degree, was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to the Lima State Hospital pursuant to R. C.
On the same date, November 15, 1971, the respondent also filed a motion in this court to stay execution of the Common Pleas Court order of release. On November 16, 1971, this court overruled that motion finding that respondent had failed to comply with Appellate Rule 7 and "that the order of the Common Pleas Court having been fully executed by the release of Mariann Colby it is beyond the power of this court to stay excution thereof."
Upon hearing arguments of the appeal on its merits the matter of possible mootness of the appeal was suggested by the court and thereafter briefed by the parties. That issue is the one with which we are now concerned.
In considering same it must be observed that in the eyes of the law Mrs. Colby is not a convicted criminal but was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Her status in the Lima State Hospital was merely one of patient who by reason of the statutory presumption of continued insanity is committed there for treatment until restored to sanity, a status essentially the same as that of any patient committed to a civil mental institution.
It also must be emphasized that an action in habeas corpus is a civil action which tests the legality of the restraint of liberty by the respondent of the person who is the subject of the action. Neither that person nor the respondent may have the legality of the restraint determined by the trial court in an action in habeas corpus if the restraint has terminated.
Historically and legally the writ of habeas corpus has been used, and is designed, to give a person restrained of his liberty an immedate hearing to inquire into and determine the legality of the detention. 39 Corpus Juris Secundum *Page 185
428, Habeas Corpus, Section 4a. It loses its efficacy if the finality of such determination may be indefinitely postponed. Consequently, at common law, no appeal from the determination existed. Appeal therefrom now exists only by virtue of statutory provisions. See, for example, R. C.
Again there is a variance among states as to whether, where a statute permits appeal from habeas corpus cases generally, such appeal may be had from an order of release as contrasted with an order denying release. In Henderson v. James, Warden,
We must conclude from the Henderson case that the order of discharge before us is reviewable on appeal. However, the issue squarely before us is whether the issues to be determined by such review have become moot by reason of the actual execution of the order of release, resulting here from a failure of the respondent to timely obtain an order from either the Common Pleas Court or from this court staying execution of the discharge order pending appeal.
We have tried without success to find some Ohio case where an appellate court has reviewed a determination of discharge after the subject of the habeas corpus action has actually been released. We referred first to the leading case involving the issue which was before the trial court, specifically Ex ParteRemus,
However, we find respectable authority requiring a determination of mootness in Sakacsi v. McGettrick,
"The records show that appellee has been released from the custody of respondents. The questions presented by this appeal are, therefore, now moot. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed * * *."
Compare, McDonald v. Keiter,
Mrs. Colby has long since departed the geographical jurisdiction of both the Common Pleas Court and this court. She is not subject to any coercive criminal process to restore her to the custody of the respondent. She has not escaped from his custody but left same pursuant to court order. She is not subject to any coercive civil process for restoration thereto. A judgment of this court reversing the determination of release by the Common Pleas Court could not be enforced by any process thereon issuing either from this court or from the Common Pleas Court to restore her to the respondent's custody. In its essentials the situation is like that in Ohio Contract CarriersAssn. v. Public Utilities Commission,
"* * * Appeals are not allowed for the purpose of settling abstract questions [however interesting or important to the public generally], but only to correct errors injuriously affecting the appellant." (Bracketed phrase added from text of decision.)
See, also, 4 Corpus Juris Secundum 153, Appeal and Error, Section 40b.
We conclude that where a patient committed to the Lima State Hospital under the provisions of R. C.
Appeal dismissed.
YOUNGER, P.J., and COLE, J., concur.