DocketNumber: Case No. 1-2000-04.
Judges: <bold>WALTERS, J.</bold>
Filed Date: 8/3/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
On January 15, 1999, Appellant was convicted of two counts of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C.
Thereafter, Appellant filed a direct appeal. This court affirmed Appellant's trafficking convictions and reversed the RICO conviction. See State v. Agner, (Oct. 29, 1999), Allen App. No. 1-99-08, unreported. Additionally, we vacated Appellant's original sentence and remanded the matter for re-sentencing because the trial court did not specify the reasons as its grounds for imposing the maximum sentence or the consecutive sentence.
On remand, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and again re-sentenced Appellant to five years in prison on each trafficking charge, to be served consecutively for a total of ten years. The court also fined Appellant $10,000 for each trafficking conviction pursuant to R.C.
Appellant now appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court, assigning one error for our review.
The sentence imposed in this case should be reversed because it is not supported by the record and is contrary to law.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in re-sentencing him because it did not properly state its reasons for imposing maximum consecutive sentences. Additionally, Appellant argues that the facts are insufficient to support the maximum consecutive sentences. Finally, Appellant argues that his sentence is excessive and constitutes "double counting", because the trial court applied the same reasoning in imposing both the maximum and consecutive sentences.
With respect to felony sentencing, R.C.
Pursuant to Senate Bill 2, enacted July 1, 1996, trial courts are required to make various findings before imposing sentences. This court has held that "it is the trial court's findings under R.C.
(C) Except as provided in division (G) of this section or in Chapter 25 of the Revised Code, the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony may impose the longest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this section only upon offenders who committed the worst forms of the offense, upon offenders who pose the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes, upon certain major drug offenders under division (D)(3) of this section, and upon certain repeat violent offenders in accordance with division (D)(2) of this section.
Additionally, the trial court must comply with R.C.
(2) The court shall impose a sentence and shall make a finding that gives its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed in any of the following circumstances:
* * *
(d) If the sentence is for one offense and it imposes a prison term for the offense that is the maximum prison term allowed for that offense by division (A) of section
2929.14 of the Revised Code, its reasons for imposing the maximum prison term.
In State v. Edmonson (1999),
The sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the trial court found that pursuant to R.C.
Therefore, we find that the record sufficiently demonstrates that the trial court properly set forth its findings pursuant to R.C.
(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(b) The harm caused by the multiple offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of a single course of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
Additionally, the trial court must comply with R.C.
(2) The court shall impose a sentence and shall make a finding that gives its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed in any of the following circumstances:
* * *
(c) If it imposes consecutive sentences under section
2929.14 of the Revised Code, its reasons for imposing the consecutive sentences.
See also Edmonson, supra.
The sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the trial court found that pursuant to R.C.
Therefore, we find that the trial court satisfied the statutory criteria in both R.C.
In addition to the above argument, Appellant claims that the facts are insufficient to support the imposition of maximum consecutive sentences. With respect to appellate review of the sufficiency of the facts, we have previously stated:
State v. Martin (June 23, 1999), Crawford App. No. 3-98-31, unreported.It is our belief that if the legislature had intended to mandate that appellate courts conduct a de novo sentencing in every case, it would have phrased R.C.
2953.08 (G) quite differently. Instead, the legislature provided a mechanism by which appellate courts are to 1) review the propriety of the trial court's sentencing decisions, including whether the findings that support a sentence are themselves supported in the record, and 2) substitute our judgment for the trial court's only upon clear and convincing evidence of one of the four errors described by R.C.2953.08 (G).
In Martin, we also stated:
There are strong public policy reasons that support the legislature's decision to restrict our review. It is self-evident that the trial court is in the best position to make the fact-intensive determinations required by the sentencing statutes. It is the trial court who has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the defendant, and the trial court who is best able to judge the impact of a particular crime upon its victims and society. The sentencing statutes accordingly place the duty to make the relevant sentencing findings upon the trial court. See R.C.2929.12 ,2929.13 ,2929.14 , and2929.19 . Without specific findings by the trial court, this court's review would be reduced to combing through the trial record in a speculative attempt to discover what factors the trial court may have relied upon in determining the length of a prison term or the conditions of a community control sanction. Post-hoc justification of a sentence by a reviewing court that lacks the ability to hold sentencing hearings is surely not the "meaningful appellate review" that the legislature apparently intended.Of the four reasons cited in R.C.
2953.08 (G), the only ones applicable herein are whether the record does not support the sentence, and whether the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. After reviewing the record, we cannot clearly and convincingly find that the trial court erred in either respect. The record is replete with facts, which support its decision to impose maximum consecutive sentences. As we stated in Martin, supra, the trial court is in the best position to weigh the facts and sentence an offender accordingly. Our role is to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by facts in the record. Because we find that they are, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
Finally, Appellant cites United States v. Romano (6th Cir. 1992),
We find, however, that Romano is inapplicable to the facts herein. In Romano, the appellant argued that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence in violation of the federal sentencing guidelines. Initially, we note that the federal sentencing guidelines differ markedly from the Ohio sentencing guidelines. The federal sentencing guidelines operate under a rigid system, whereby a defendant is categorized in a particular level depending on the nature of the offense, and then sentenced accordingly. Essentially, under the federal scheme, the sentences are fixed for each offense level.
Conversely, under the Ohio sentencing guidelines, trial courts do not classify defendants within a particular offense level. Instead, trial courts are obligated to set forth a series of findings pursuant to R.C.
Despite Appellant's argument to the contrary, R.C.
R.C.2929.14 (E)(4) * * * admonishes the court to exhaust the maximum of concurrent sentences before imposing consecutive sentences because of the severity of the offense, but permits consecutive sentences if the gravity of the offender's conduct is so great or unusual that a maximum sentence will be inadequate punishment.
Burt W. Griffin Lewis R. Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law T 7.9 (West, 3d ed. 1999).
Thus, the imposition of consecutive sentences is merely a potential waypoint in the continuum of sanctions provided under Ohio felony sentencing laws, which is reserved for those cases where it is necessary to protect the public or to punish the offender proportionately. It is not, as Appellant suggests, a separate punishment above and beyond a maximum sentence that requires the trial court to set forth independent reasoning for support. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not error by considering the gravity of Appellant's offense in imposing both the maximum and consecutive sentences.
Accordingly, Appellant's assignment of error is not well taken and is therefore overruled.
Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
______________________________ WALTERS, J.
HADLEY, P.J., and BRYANT, J., concur.