DocketNumber: No. 86278.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 447
Judges: JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J.,
Filed Date: 2/2/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} Plaintiffs commenced this action against Prudential and others seeking to recover uninsured motorist coverage for injuries plaintiff Patrick T. Meehan ("Meehan") sustained in an automobile accident on August 1, 2000. Meehan was a passenger in an automobile driven by John Buettner ("Buettner"). Prudential insured Buettner under a Personal Catastrophe Liability Policy ("Prudential Policy"). The trial court determined that Meehan, as a passenger, did not qualify as an "insured" under the terms of the Prudential Policy and granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment. The matter proceeded against the remaining parties and ultimately resulted in a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against appellant Erie Insurance Exchange. Erie assigns two errors for our review.
{¶ 3} "I. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company."
{¶ 4} We employ a de novo review in determining whether summary judgment was warranted. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.,
{¶ 5} We are required to construe ambiguous terms, susceptible of more than one meaning, liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer who drafted the policy.Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1999),
{¶ 6} In this case, the trial court found that Meehan did not qualify as an insured under the Prudential Policy. In particular, the trial court found "The Prudential Policy provides a specific definition of who is an insured. The plaintiff argues that he falls under the definition of an insured, as he was `using' the automobile. However, the section of the policy requires a person to be using the vehicle and to have a reasonable belief that he is entitled to "operate" the vehicle. As there is no evidence that plaintiff was entitled to `operate' the vehicle, he is not an insured under the Prudential Policy. [citation omitted]."
{¶ 7} The Prudential Policy defines an insured, in relevant part, as follows:
{¶ 8} "Insured means;
{¶ 9} "* * *
{¶ 10} "3. With respect to cars, recreational vehicles, and watercraft, only as stated below:
{¶ 11} "a) any person maintaining, using * * * a car, * * * owned by, hired for, or loaned by you, provided such use is within the scope of your permission, and the person must have a reasonable belief that he or she is entitled to operate the vehicle, and the person is not an excluded operator under this policy; * * *."
{¶ 12} Erie argues that as a passenger Meehan was "using" the car. However, to qualify as an insured, Meehan must also establish that he had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to "operate" the car. Erie does not argue that Meehan had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to "operate" the car. Instead, Erie argues these provisions are conflicting, since "use" has a broader application than "operating," thereby negating coverage for those who "use" but do not "operate" the car. Erie urges us to entirely ignore the latter provision on the theory of ambiguity and construe Meehan as an insured under the Prudential Policy based on his "use" of the car.
{¶ 13} The language is neither conflicting nor ambiguous. Parties to an insurance contract are free to define who is an insured under the policy. Holliman,
{¶ 14} Assignment of Error I is overruled.
{¶ 15} "II. The trial court erred in granting judgment against defendant Erie Insurance Exchange to the extent that liabilities imposed on Erie should have been imposed instead, in whole or in part, on Prudential."
{¶ 16} Our disposition of Assignment of Error I renders Assignment of Error II moot.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Cooney, J., and Corrigan, J., concur.