State v. Green

[Cite as State v. Green , 2018-Ohio-2729.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 106116
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DANIEL J. GREEN
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-16-610119-A
BEFORE: Laster Mays, J., S. Gallagher, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 12, 2018
-i-
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Mark A. Stanton
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
By: John T. Martin
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O’Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Holly Welsh
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Daniel J. Green (“Green”) appeals his sentence and asks this
court to vacate his sentence, remand to the trial court for resentencing, and issue an order for the
trial court to correct the journal entry regarding the length of his sentence. We affirm in part,
vacate Green’s sentence, and remand for resentencing.
{¶2} Green pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 34 of attempted pandering of sexually oriented
matter involving a minor, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(3) and
2923.02; Counts 3, 13, 24, 28, 32, and 36 of attempted illegal use of a minor in a nudity oriented
material/performance, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1) and 2923.02;
Count 19 of unlawful sexual contact with a minor, a third-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2907.04(A); Count 26 of compelling prostitution, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2907.21(A)(2)(a); Counts 30 and 31 of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, a fifth-degree
felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(1); Count 39 of failure to provide notice of change of
address, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2950.05(F)(1); and Count 41 of possessing
criminal tools, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A).
{¶3} Green was sentenced to a total of nine years imprisonment. Specifically, he
received 18 months for Counts 1 and 34 to be served concurrently, but consecutively to; Counts
3, 13, 24, 28, 32, and 36, which he was sentenced to 18 months for each count to be served
concurrently. The trial court also sentenced him to three years imprisonment for Count 19; 12
months imprisonment for Count 26; 12 months imprisonment for Count 39; and six months
imprisonment for Count 41; all to be served consecutively to six months imprisonment for
Counts 30 and 31. Although the trial court sentenced Green to an aggregate total of nine years
imprisonment, it stated that the aggregate total was eight years. (Tr. 149.) The journal entry
also recorded the sentence as eight years instead of nine years.
{¶4} Before sentencing Green to consecutive sentences, the trial court stated,
So, with regard to the length of the prison term, consecutive prison terms, the
presumption is concurrent prison terms under 2929.41(A). The court has
discretion to impose a consecutive sentence if it’s necessary to protect the public
and/or punish the offender and it’s not disproportionate and makes the following
findings under 2929.14(C)(4): I do find that these offenses were committed
while you were under the supervision of the Adult Parole Authority on postrelease
control, that the harm in this matter is so great or unusual that a single term will
not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct. I base that on the age of
the victims, both the victims that are in this case as well as the prior victim from
your prior case, showing a pattern of victimizing minors. That in this case there
are multiple victims. There were multiple different types of offenses ranging from
sex offenses to — they’re all sex offenses, but some of them are e-mails and that
led to the unlawful conduct with a minor. The large jurisdictional area that your
behavior reached, not just limited to the [s]tate of Ohio or the [c]ounty of
Cuyahoga as well as the prior sex offense conviction, I find that your criminal
history shows that a consecutive term is needed to protect the public. Those are
the findings with regard to consecutive sentence.
(Tr. 147-148.)
{¶5} As a result of the sentencing, Green filed an appeal, assigning two errors for our
review:
I. The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences when it failed to
find that consecutive terms were not disproportionate to the seriousness of
the offense and the danger the defendant posed to the community,
respectively; and
II. The combination of concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment
reflected in the sentencing journal entry total six years and constitutes the
sentence in this case; the trial court’s mention in the journal entry that the
total sentence is eight years is incorrect surplusage that must be stricken.
I. Consecutive Sentencing
{¶6} In Green’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing
consecutive sentences by not making the correct findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
An appellate court must conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s
sentencing decision. State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97579,
2012-Ohio-2508, ¶ 6, citing State v. Hites, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-11-07,
2012-Ohio-1892. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that our review of consecutive
sentences is not for an abuse of discretion. Instead, an appellate court must
“review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification
given by the sentencing court.” Id. If an appellate court clearly and
convincingly finds either that (1) “the record does not support the sentencing
court’s findings under [R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)],” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise
contrary to law,” then “the appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise
modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the
sentencing court for resentencing.” Id. The Ohio Supreme Court has further
explained:
We note that some sentences do not require the findings that R.C.
2953.08(G) specifically addresses. Nevertheless, it is fully consistent for
appellate courts to review those sentences that are imposed solely after
consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 under a standard
that is equally deferential to the sentencing court. That is, an appellate
court may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.
State v. McDonall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105787, 2018-Ohio-2065, ¶ 69, citing State v.
Marcum, 146 Ohio St. 3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 23.
{¶7} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides:
If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple
offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms
consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect
the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and
to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the
following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant
to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under
postrelease control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more
courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses
so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{¶8} The trial court did not err when it sentenced the appellant to consecutive sentences.
The trial court did make the necessary findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). At
sentencing, the trial court stated, “I do find that these offenses were committed while you were
under the supervision of the Adult Parole Authority on postrelease control, that the harm in this
matter is so great or unusual that a single term will not adequately reflect the seriousness of the
conduct.” (Tr. 147.) Appellant argues that these words used by the trial court does not address
the proportionality requirement. We find that because the trial court did not use the actual word
“disproportionate” does not demonstrate that the trial court failed to make the finding.
When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required
findings as part of the sentencing hearing, and by doing so it affords notice to the
offender and to defense counsel. See Crim.R. 32(A)(4). And because a court
speaks through its journal, State v. Brooke, 113 Ohio St. 3d 199, 2007-Ohio-1533,
863 N.E.2d 1024, ¶ 47, the court should also incorporate its statutory findings into
the sentencing entry. However, a word-for-word recitation of the language of the
statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial
court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains
evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.
State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St. 3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29.
{¶9} In State v. Costilla, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1062, 2015-Ohio-397, the appellant
argued that the trial court failed to make the necessary finding that consecutive sentences were
not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender
poses to the public. The trial court stated at sentencing,
Mr. Costilla, the facts and circumstances surrounding this case are extremely
egregious. Not only did your codefendant and you hold a person up at gunpoint,
that gun was placed to her head. There’s some indication that unless she gave up
her personal possessions that she would be killed, not only was that done, you
were involved in a high-speed chase throughout Lucas County and Monroe
County at speeds in excess of a hundred miles an hour. You put extreme risk to
other civilians, to law enforcement, to yourself. You could easily be standing
here having killed somebody and being charged with something a lot worse that
you were charged with now.
Mr. Costilla, I certainly cannot overlook the fact that kind of conduct is
unacceptable and placed many people at harm. And you cannot control yourself
or make better decisions than that, then you leave me no choice but to make the
decisions for you. And in this particular circumstance, I am going to send you to
prison. I am going to send you to prison as long as I possibly can send you to
prison.
Id. at ¶ 10.
{¶10} In Costilla, the trial court did not use the word “disproportionate” but the appellate
court ruled that “[i]n light of the foregoing, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s
findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).” Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶11} The court in State v. Blevins, 2017-Ohio-4444, 93 N.E.3d 246, ¶ 20-21 (8th Dist.),
stated,
In State v. Morris, 2016-Ohio-7614, 73 N.E.3d 1010 (8th Dist.), this court faced a
similar argument regarding the trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) proportionality
finding. In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court stated that
consecutive sentences “are not disproportionate.” Id. at ¶ 27. On appeal, the
defendant-appellant argued that the trial court’s proportionality finding was
insufficient because the court did not specify whether its finding was related to the
seriousness of his conduct, the danger he posed to the public, or both. Id. at ¶
29. This court rejected appellant’s proportionality argument and held that “[t]he
trial court’s statements on the record indicate that it considered proportionality
both with regard to the seriousness of [the defendant’s] conduct and the danger he
poses to the public.” Id. at ¶ 34. This court relied on State v. Crawley, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102781, 2015-Ohio-5150, where this court rejected the
defendant-appellant’s argument regarding the specificity of the trial court’s
proportionality finding and concluded that “the trial court’s failure to identify the
factors — or ‘the reasons’ — that were considered in its proportionality analysis
does not render the consecutive sentences contrary to law.” Crawley at ¶ 12-13.
The Morris court also relied on State v. Amey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103000
and 103001, 2016-Ohio-1121. There, this court held that “the trial court’s
statements on the record clearly indicate that it considered proportionality with
regard to the seriousness of Amey’s conduct and the danger presented.” Id. at ¶
16. This court explained, [t]he [trial] court remarked that Amey was on
probation for a domestic violence conviction in Cuyahoga C.P.
No. CR-13-578704. The court noted that he had been referred to domestic
violence classes but did not attend them. The court also outlined Amey’s
extensive record that included crimes of violence and offenses committed while
Amey was on community control sanctions. The court remarked that he had not
“responded favorably to sanctions previously imposed.” Viewing the court’s
remarks in their entirety, we are satisfied that the trial court made a distinct
“proportionality” finding in compliance with the statute. Id.
{¶12} In Blevins, the court decided that
[a]fter review, the record reflects that the trial court did not specifically state that
consecutive sentences would not be disproportionate to the danger appellant poses
to the public. However, we find that the trial court’s statements on the record —
when viewed in their entirety — clearly indicate that the trial court considered
proportionality with regard to both the seriousness of appellant’s conduct and the
danger appellant posed to the public.
Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶13} Green’s argument fails in his assertion that the trial court failed to find that he was
a danger to the community. At sentencing, the trial court stated,
[t]he large jurisdictional area that your behavior reached, not just limited to the
State of Ohio or the County of Cuyahoga as well as the prior sex offense
conviction, I find that your criminal history shows that a consecutive term is
needed to protect the public. Those are the findings with regard to consecutive
sentence.
(Tr. 148.) The trial court also incorporated its findings in the journal entry.
{¶14} Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive
sentences. When viewed in its entirety, the journal clearly indicated that the trial court
considered the proportionality requirement. Green’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II. Incorrect Sentencing
{¶15} In Green’s second assignment of error, he argues that the combination of
concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment reflected in the sentencing journal entry total
six years and constitutes the sentence in this case; the trial court’s mention in the journal entry
that the total sentence is eight years is incorrect surplusage that must be stricken. Green is
incorrect in his assertion. The journal entry does not reflect that Green was sentenced to six
years imprisonment, but nine years. Green argues that the journal entry makes no mention of
whether the sentence for Counts 19, 26, and 39 are to be run concurrently or consecutively.
This is incorrect. The journal entry specifically states, “[t]he court imposes prison terms
consecutively * * *.”
{¶16} The actual issue is that at sentencing, the trial court states that it is imposing an
eight-year sentence when it actually imposed a nine-year sentence. It is also recorded
incorrectly in the journal entry. The trial court made a mathematical mistake both at the
sentencing hearing and in the journal entry. The state argues that this can be corrected with a
nunc pro tunc order, however,
where a clerical or mathematical error exists in a sentencing entry, a nunc pro tunc
entry may be properly used to correct the sentencing entry to reflect the sentence
the trial court actually imposed upon the defendant at the sentencing hearing. See,
e.g., State v. Spears, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94089, 2010-Ohio-2229, ¶ 8-10
(where trial court sentenced defendant to an 11 year aggregate prison sentence at
sentencing hearing but erroneously indicated in its sentencing journal entry that
defendant’s sentences amounted to a net ten year sentence, trial court could use a
nunc pro nunc entry to correct sentencing entry to reflect that defendant had
received a net 11 year prison sentence and not a ten year sentence); State v.
Fugate, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000-02-031, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5235,
*3-6 (Nov. 13, 2000) (where trial court sentenced defendant to three-year prison
term at sentencing hearing but filed a judgment entry that inconsistently stated that
defendant’s term of imprisonment was two years, trial court properly issued nunc
pro tunc entry correcting the error so that the sentencing entry would accurately
reflect the penalty imposed at the sentencing hearing); State v. Battle, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 23404, 2007-Ohio-2475, ¶ 2, 8 (where trial court’s journal entry
sentenced defendant to 18 months of community control rather than two years of
community control as pronounced during the sentencing hearing, the sentencing
journal entry “contained a clerical mistake that could be corrected with a nunc pro
tunc entry”).
State v. Thompson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102326, 2015-Ohio-3882, ¶ 16.
{¶17} A nunc pro tunc entry is supposed to correct an error in the journal entry when that
error is not reflective of what actually happened at the sentencing hearing. However, in this
case, the journal entry reflects exactly what happened at the sentencing hearing. The trial court
sentenced Green to nine years imprisonment, but stated that it was only eight years.
[P]roper use of a nunc pro tunc order “is limited to memorializing what the trial
court actually did at an earlier point in time, such as correcting a previously issued
order that fails to reflect the trial court’s true action,” Spears at ¶ 10, “not what the
court might or should have decided or what the court intended to decide.” State
v. Lester, 130 Ohio St. 3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 18.
Id. at ¶ 15. This court cannot determine what the trial court intended to do: sentence Green to
eight or nine years imprisonment. Therefore, we vacate Green’s sentence and remand to the
trial court for resentencing.
{¶18} Judgment is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing.
It is ordered that the appellee and appellant split costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR