DocketNumber: C.A. No. 21307.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 3854
Judges: FAIN, J.
Filed Date: 7/28/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement conflicts with the City of Dayton's Charter regarding appeals for residency requirement terminations. The Charter generally provides that an employee dismissal may be appealed to the Civil Service Board, but there is nothing in the Charter providing that an appeal to the Civil Service Board is the exclusive remedy available to an employee. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court erred in holding that Quatman's grievance was not arbitrable, and therefore erred in denying the Union's counterclaim for declaratory judgment and in granting the City of Dayton's complaint for declaratory judgment and request for preliminary and permanent injunctions.
{¶ 3} Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Reversed, and this cause is Remanded for further proceedings.
{¶ 5} During his employment with the City of Dayton, Quatman was a member of a bargaining unit subject to the provisions of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City and the Union. The Agreement provides that "[i]n the event that an employee believes any Suspension, Demotion or Discharge is without just cause, such action may be subject to the Grievance Arbitration Procedure or an appeal to the Civil Service Board, at the employee's option." The Union filed a grievance alleging that Quatman was terminated without just cause, in violation of the Agreement. In October, 2004, the Union and the City requested that the grievance be submitted for arbitration. An arbitrator was appointed and an arbitration hearing was scheduled for July, 2005.
{¶ 6} Shortly before the arbitration hearing, the City informed the Union that the grievance was not arbitrable because residency terminations are to be heard solely by the Civil Service Board, in accordance with the Charter. The City filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and application for preliminary and permanent injunctions to enjoin the arbitration hearing from taking place. The Union filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, requesting the trial court to declare Quatman's grievance to be arbitrable and to order the City to proceed to arbitration.
{¶ 7} After a hearing, the trial court concluded that "the City and the Union agreed to submit to arbitration the `just cause' determination of whether the discharged employee resided outside and physically lived outside the City in violation [of] the Charter's residency rule." However, the trial court went on to conclude that "[b]oth the Charter and the Agreement provide for the factual determination as to whether an employee has resided outside and physically lived outside the City of Dayton in violation of the residency rule. The Agreement allows the determination to be made in a Grievance Arbitration Procedure at the employee's option. The Charter requires the determination be made by the Civil Service Board, whose judgment is final. A clear conflict exists between the Charter and the Agreement." In accordance with R.C.
{¶ 9} "THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DETERMINING THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT CONFLICTS WITH THE CITY OF DAYTON'S CHARTER.
{¶ 10} "THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DETERMINING THE DISCHARGE FOR VIOLATION OF THE CITY OF DAYTON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL WAS NOT ARBITRABLE.
{¶ 11} "THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, CAPTAIN JOHN C. POST LODGE NO. 44'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.
{¶ 12} "THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF."
{¶ 13} The Union contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement conflicts with The City of Dayton's Charter to the extent that the Charter's provisions would prevail over the provisions in the Agreement allowing an employee dismissal to be appealed to arbitration. The Union argues that the Charter does not include any provision requiring that the factual determination whether an employee resides or physically lives outside the City of Dayton is to be made solely by the Civil Service Board.
{¶ 14} The City contends that the Collective Bargaining Agreement does conflict with The City of Dayton's Charter, because it allows residency terminations to be appealed to arbitration, whereas the Charter requires residency terminations to be appealed to the Civil Service Board. Therefore, the City argues that the conflicting provision of the Agreement is unenforceable pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 15} Because general principles of statutory construction apply in this case and a question of law is at issue, we will conduct a de novo review. See Hayslip v. City of Akron (1984),
{¶ 16} R.C.
{¶ 17} "When a provision in a collective bargaining agreement addresses a subject also addressed by a state or local law, so that the two conflict, R.C.
{¶ 18} "Hence, the analysis employed to resolve whether the collective bargaining agreement or the state or local law prevails is straightforward: (1) Initially, we examine the relevant provision of the collective bargaining agreement and the relevant state or local law, and ask whether the agreement and the law conflict. (2) If there is a conflict, we then ask whether the conflicting law pertains to one of the areas listed in R.C.
{¶ 19} The Agreement is silent regarding any residency requirements and therefore, does not conflict with the Charter in this regard. The Agreement does not provide that employees do not have to reside and physically live in the City of Dayton or that an employee will not be terminated for violating the residency rule. The Agreement does provide that "[i]n the event that an employee believes any Suspension, Demotion or Discharge is without just cause, such action may be subject to the Grievance Arbitration Procedure or an appeal to the Civil Service Board, at the employee's option."
{¶ 20} We conclude that this provision of the Agreement does not conflict with the Charter. There is nothing in the Charter requiring that residency-requirement terminations, or termination for any other cause, for that matter, can only be appealed to the Civil Service Board. The City's labor relations manager, Brent McKenzie, testified to the same at the hearing before the trial court stating that he was not aware of any provision in the Charter providing that an appeal of a residency issue can only be made to the Civil Service Board. The Charter merely provides that an employee dismissal may be appealed to the Civil Service Board. The Agreement does not conflict with this provision; it, too, provides that the employee may appeal a dismissal to the Civil Service Board, but it adds the additional option of arbitration.
{¶ 21} Even if the provision in the Charter for appeal to the Civil Service Board were deemed to establish that remedy as the exclusive remedy available to a discharged employee, so that the provision did conflict with the Agreement, we would nevertheless hold in favor of the Union. R.C.
{¶ 22} To "pertain" has been defined as: "To belong or relate to, whether by nature, appointment, or custom." Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, to "pertain" is defined as follows:
{¶ 23} "1a(1): to belong to something as a part or member or accessory or product those who ~ed to the Christian tradition — J.D. Conway (2): to belong to something as an attribute or adjunct or attendant feature or function the destruction and havoc~ing to war a job that ~ s to one man alone (3): to belong to something as a care or concern or dutyresponsibilities that ~ to fatherhood (4): to belong to something by inherent character, right, assignment, or established association privileges that ~ ed only to the wealthier class b: to be appropriate to something: be right or proper or suitable trades ~ ing to military activities —Amer. Guide Series: Minn.: be pertinent the criteria for their appointments will be different from those that ~ elsewhere in the faculty — J.B. Conant 2: to have some connection with or relation to something: have reference: RELATE in matters tildeing to man and his environment — Current Biog. his intention to translate some historical documents ~ ing to Christopher Columbus — Saxe Commins the enormous stress which women lay on everything ~ ing to clothes — P.M. Gregory"
{¶ 24} Of the definitions of to "pertain" set forth in Webster's, we find the last to be the most appropriate in this case. It expressly incorporates the concept of a particular relationship between the two things that causes one to pertain to another, although this concept seems, also, to underlie the other definitions.
{¶ 25} Thus, the issue is whether the Dayton City Charter provisions upon which the City relies can be said to "pertain" to the residency requirement. In our view, they are too general to permit a finding that they pertain to the residency requirement. Article X, Section 101 of the Charter provides that all
suspensions, reductions in rank, and dismissals may be appealed to the Civil Service Board, not just those actions resulting from violation of the residency requirement. Had the Charter provided language along the lines of: "including, but not limited to, adverse employment actions based upon violation of residency requirements," then we might be inclined to hold that there was a specific "reference" in the Charter provision to the residency requirement for it to be said that the Charter provision "pertained" to the residency requirement, for purposes of R.C.
{¶ 26} In any event, we conclude that Article X, Section 101 of the Charter is not in conflict with the Agreement, since both the Charter provision and the Agreement provide that an employeemay appeal an adverse employment decision to the Civil Service Board, without, however, specifying that an appeal to the Civil Service Board shall be the only remedy available to the employee. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Quatman's grievance is not arbitrable and therefore erred in denying the Union's counterclaim for declaratory judgment and in rendering declaratory judgment for the City of Dayton and allowing the City injunctive relief.
{¶ 27} Given our resolution of the Union's first argument, we need not address the Union's remaining arguments that the trial court erred in denying Quatman his right to arbitrate his discharge based upon violations of the sick leave and vehicle use policies and in issuing injunctive relief where other adequate legal remedies were available to the City.
{¶ 28} The Union's assignments of error are sustained.
Wolff and Valen, JJ. concur.
(Hon. Anthony Valen, retired from the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).