DocketNumber: No. 04CA22.
Citation Numbers: 2004 Ohio 7282
Judges: WILLIAM H. HARSHA, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/17/2004
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} At the start of the 2003-2004 school year, Victor was enrolled at Fort Frye High School, but he did not attend school for "even a day". A delinquency complaint based upon chronic truancy followed. In November, Victor and his father moved to the Marietta area. The first date that he attended school during the 2003-2004 school year was February 23, 2004, at Marietta High School. Between February 23 and May 5, Victor missed twelve days of classes, with six being unexcused absences.
{¶ 3} At the adjudicatory hearing, Whittekind admitted that Victor did not attend school until February 23, 2004. He explained that Victor's attendance problem started at the end of the 2002-2003 school year when Victor began feeling uncomfortable riding the bus because the bus driver forced him to sit next to a "sex offender." Whittekind complained, but the bus driver did not permit Victor to sit anywhere else. According to Whittekind, the school superintendent told him that "the reason [Victor] had to sit next to the sex offender, because it would be discrimination against the sex offender."
{¶ 4} Whittekind stated that Victor's attendance problems for the 2003-2004 school year began because of a "bus suspension." Whittekind complained and eventually decided that he would not send Victor back to the Fort Frye School District, but instead would move into another district. Whittekind moved to Marietta around Thanksgiving, but did not enroll Victor in school until February.
{¶ 5} The court subsequently adjudicated Victor a delinquent child for chronic truancy. The court found that Victor "had no legitimate excuse not to be in school, especially since the time [the Whittekinds] moved to Marietta around Thanksgiving."
{¶ 6} In this appeal, Whittekind argues that the trial court's delinquency finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. He asserts that because he refused to allow Victor to attend school, he is the guilty party, not Victor.
{¶ 7} A trial court may enter a finding of delinquency when the evidence demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the child is a chronic truant. See R.C.
{¶ 8} A child who is a "chronic truant" is a delinquent child. See R.C.
{¶ 9} Here, the record does not contain enough evidence to support the trial court's delinquency adjudication. Both Whittekind and Victor admitted that Victor did not attend school for the 2003-2004 school year until February of 2004. However, Victor's absence was due to Whittekind's refusal to allow Victor to attend school. His refusal to allow Victor to attend school provided Victor with a legitimate excuse for being absent. The law does not place Victor in the position of confronting Hobson's choice, i.e., either disobeying his father at the risk of unknown forms of punishment, or complying with his father's commandment at the peril of facing delinquency charges. It is the state's proper role to protect Victor from a parent who willfully refuses to perform parental duties by filing a neglect proceeding and/or a complaint against Mr. Whittekind under R.C.
{¶ 10} Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
Judgment reversed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Kline, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.